Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Push and pull forces in the UNGA: analyzing foreign policy change in the context of international norms

  • Original Article
  • Published:
International Politics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper proceeds from the observation that states at times change their foreign policy preferences vis-à-vis an international norm on reoccurring resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly. In order to explain this phenomenon, we utilize a push–pull approach capturing the impact of domestic (push) and international dynamics (pull) on foreign policy change concerning repeated international norms. The theoretical expectations are empirically examined in order to shed light on the causal pathways underlying foreign policy changes. To this end, the paper combines a descriptive analysis of over 150 UNGA resolutions with more than 50 interviews with diplomats and MFA members, an analysis of official documents and an examination of WikiLeaks material. The evidence illustrates that both domestic push and international pull factors account for shifting foreign policy positions on international norms. On the push side, we find that domestic political institutions, the norm context and state agency drive position change, whereas on the pull side, the international norm environment as well as the activities of third states and groups influence vote shifts. In addition, salience of the norm also matters, as high politics norms tend toward higher voting consistency, whereas states adjust foreign policies more frequently on resolutions concerning less-politicized low politics norms.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Using Wikileaks material has attracted some controversy in political science due to it being an unauthorized release of classified information. However, as this material is now in the public domain not using it for political science research would leave out a valuable primary data source and potentially lead to biased observations and inferences (Michael 2015).

  2. A t test revealed that the mean for disarmament norms is 11.67 (median 10.67, standard deviation 6.40) and for geopolitical international norms the mean shifts per resolutions/GA by policy cluster is 12.43 (median 14.11; standard deviation 3.60).

  3. According to a t test on shifts per resolutions/GA by policy cluster, the mean is 16.90 for human rights (median 18.00; standard deviation 5.25) and 17.00 (median 17.67; standard deviation 7.54) for the policy area of development.

  4. For example, ‘Our biggest push during the General Assembly is to ensure passage of the country-specific human rights resolutions introduced in 3rd Committee’ (Wikileaks 2009b).

  5. For example, ‘We were able to pick up two more ‘no’ votes when Kiribati got in its proxy and Tuvalu's Permrep reluctantly carried out his good instructions from capital. Kiribati for the first time was able to join all the Third Committee human rights votes’ (Wikileaks 2008a). Also, ‘We face a number of tough votes on human rights resolutions for which we will need the support of capitals to win adoption. The above-mentioned cable requests posts to demarche at the highest appropriate level to solicit support for U.S. priority resolutions… ‘(Wikileaks 2008b). Similarly, ‘Post demarched the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, insertion by the authors] at three levels prior to the vote the Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister and Prime Minister’ (Wikileaks 2009a).

  6. And not all intensive lobbying efforts payoff: ‘Despite direct pressure from The Ambassador to the Prime Minister, The Bahamas elected to abstain on principle on all country-specific votes’ (Wikileaks 2009a). This was internally attributed due to the fact that ‘changes to U.S. policy on off-shore banking and tax collection directly affects their second largest industry, negative statements in the Human Rights Report and Trafficking in Person Report are seen as unwelcome and even as a threat to tourism’ (Wikileaks 2009a).

  7. ‘…the Iran resolution. It survived a “no action” motion last year by only one vote and there were ominous reports of heavy lobbying by Iran’ (Wikileaks 2008d).

  8. For example, ‘For the GA plenary vote December 18, the Ecuadorians broke with this pattern to vote against the Iran substantive resolution and for two hostile Iranian amendments. This came after President Correa's official visit to Tehran’ (Wikileaks 2008d).

  9. Perhaps for this reason, in 2009 ‘there were no “no action” motions to confuse things in Committee consideration of the specific country human rights resolutions on Iran, Burma and North Korea’ (Wikileaks 2009d).

  10. Yet, not all lobbying efforts were effective: ‘regards to Iran Resolution on Human Rights traditionally we supported that resolution in the past but … this is a very important political step for us and we said even though the pressure of the international community or the P5 we said no. And we keep our “no” position till the end of course, there was a very long line of Ambassadors at the desk of our Minister of Foreign Affairs and of course myself in my office but we keep our position’ (Interview #48, 05-02-14).

  11. Also ‘there were eleven WHA delegations that voted for all three resolutions; fourteen abstained on all three (Caribbeans, Brazil, Bolivia, and Colombia). Only two voted against all three resolutions: Cuba and Venezuela. Nicaragua voted against the Iran and Burma resolutions but abstained on the North Korea resolution. Ecuador abstained on Burma and North Korea but voted against the Iran resolution. Jamaica and Guyana also split their votes. Jamaica voted for the Burma and North Korea resolutions but abstained on Iran. Guyana voted for the Burma resolution but abstained on the other two. Overall, we marginally improved the region's support on these key votes compared to last year’ (Wikileaks 2009d).

  12. Similarly, ‘the no-action motion on Burma gained 11 more “no” votes over the Third Committee vote of last year of 64-77(U.S.)-30), likely reflecting the regime's brutal crackdown in September on peaceful demonstrators. ASEAN countries have traditionally voted in favor of all country specific no-action motions, with the exception of the Philippines that abstained on Burma last year’ (Wikileaks 2007).

  13. For example, ‘They brought our attention to problems which we didn’t know about, it resonated well, we felt empathy; before we didn’t really pay attention, so yes, we gave them our support’ (Interview #43, 03-12-13; similar Interview #50, 18-03-14).

  14. ‘Iran for example, there was a change in government there so [country name omitted by the authors] had to reassess how to approach the issue of Iran’ (Interview #41, 22-11-13). Also ‘…the latest one on Iran, we have … some positive developments … and … this was among the reasons … that we decided to vote in favour’ (Interview #43, 08-01-14).

  15. The following vote shifts seem also to be in line with H4: ‘This year Indonesia switched to a “no” vote and both the Philippines and Singapore abstained–a sign of growing impatience with Burma's military regime’ (Wikileaks 2007).

  16. Another example: ‘The U.S. consulted with the NAC [New Agenda Coalition, insertion by the authors] co-sponsors (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden) in an effort to seek changes that would permit the U.S. to move from a “no” vote to an abstention or positive vote. Our key concerns were the NPT (Non-Proliferation-Treaty, insertion by the authors) universalization paragraph, the need to “soften” the reference to the NPT “practical steps” from the 2000 NPT Review Conference, addition of a reference to FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, insertion by the authors) negotiations, and strengthening the need for compliance. We provided the co-sponsors with language along those lines, but they could not agree to any of the U.S. proposals, thus the U.S. subsequently voted “no”’ (Wikileaks 2009c).

  17. For example, concerning the transparency in armaments resolution: ‘The Operative Paragraph could have been very important, changing the content of the larger resolution’ (Interview #40, 15-11-13).

  18. Similarly: ‘We always try to support our close partners and consistently vote with them to show support’ (Interview #43, 04-03-13).

  19. For example, ‘it's right to change its position, considering, it's, let's say position regarding some, some issues, for instance, to, to be more concrete: you have mentioned the, the, the resolutions regarding the Nuclear Weapon Convention and there are few resolutions there, which are, which are referred to this. In general, as a position, (country name omitted by the author) votes against it. Because it's not, not because it is in, it is against the Nuclear Weapon Convention, but it considered that it is not the time right now to do it and it is to be done in a certain way, in a gradual way and not to push for it, you know, because we are aware of how it, how it needs to be done. So, nevertheless, this being the position of, (country name omitted by the author), we abstained or decided to abstain on the resolution on the follow-up of the ICJ (International Court of Justice, insertion by the authors) advisory opinion on nuclear weapons and this was done and this was also explained to the main sponsors of the resolutions, not because, (country name omitted by the author) has changed the position regarding Nuclear Weapon Convention, which is mentioned in the in this resolution, but just for respect and for not having such a, let's say harsh position against, vis-a-vis an opinion, advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. So, it is just this one, not the position of the, towards the Nuclear Weapon Convention that made us, let's say soften our position in this, in this resolution’ (Interview #44, 08-01-14).

  20. For example, a diplomat reported: ‘Vote change? You know that the main, the main, the main, there is normally for the political issues···government issue also, what I saw if you see the treaty of small arms, the army treats (sic), we in [country name omitted by the authors], we didn't, we didn't approve this, this, this resolution. But last year we change and we vote. We were voting abstentions until last year and last year we just changed and we agreed with the treaty. Then coming in force then we are just waiting for the, for the normal procedures in, in [country name omitted by the authors]. It's one of the cases that normally we, we do assess in our capacity are more political issues. They have a technical and operative and humanitarian issue. Normally we vote according to our region. For that region. Here, in the UN we have the, the different groups, but normally when the G75 plus China and African Group and all these groups (..), but the, yeah, there are positions that we have to take our own, every, every government just taken its own’ (Interview #47, 29-01-14).

  21. ‘In accordance with its instructions, USDEL opened a dialogue with the sponsors of this resolution in an attempt to find common ground that might justify a change in the U.S. vote on this resolution. The sponsors made clear that they recognized that the United States and other P-5 states (except China) continued to have problems with the Bangkok Treaty. However, they said that they would be highly pleased if the United States could treat this resolution as a separate issue from the Treaty itself and shift to an abstention from its previous ‘no’ vote. USDEL proposed changes to the resolution, mainly intended to correct the impression that consultations regarding the Bangkok Treaty were ongoing when in fact they were not. ASEAN accepted the changes and the United States abstained. The Thai representative repeatedly expressed her gratitude for the U.S. vote’ (Wikileaks 2009c).

References

  • Ahmia, M. 2012. The group of 77 at the United Nations. Environment and sustainable development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alderson, K. 2001. Making sense of state socialization. Review of International Studies 27: 415–433.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berton, P., K. Hiroshi, and W. Zartman (eds.). 1999. International negotiation: Actors, structure/process, values. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bloom, W. 1990. Personal identity, national identity and international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Brazys, S., and D. Panke. 2017. Why do states change positions in the United Nations general assembly? International Political Science Review 38 (1): 70–84.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brazys, S., and Dukalskis, D. 2017. Canary in the coal mine? China, the UNGA and the changing world order. Review of International Studies. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210517000067.

  • Bueno de Mesquita, B.J., R. Jackman, and R.M. Siverson (eds.). 1991. Democracy and foreign policy: Community and constraint. Special Issue of Journal of Conflict Resolution 35: 181–186.

  • Checkel, J.T. 1999. Norms, institutions, and national identity in contemporary Europe. International Studies Quarterly 43: 83–114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Finnemore, M. 1993. International organization as teachers of norms: The United Nations educational, scientific, and cultural organization and science policy. International Organization 47: 565–597.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Finnemore, M., and K. Sikkink. 1998. International norm dynamics and political change. International Organization 52: 887–917.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Flores-Macias, G.A., and S.E. Kreps. 2013. The foreign policy consequences of trade: China’s commercial relations with Africa and Latin America, 1992–2006. The Journal of Politics 75: 357–371.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Giaufret, E. 2012. The EU in the UNGA third committee. In The European Union and Multilateral Governance: Assessing EU Participation in United Nations Human Rights and Environmental Fora 66.

  • Kremenyuk, Victor (ed.). 1991. International negotiation: Analysis, approaches, issues. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Linder, S., and G.B. Peters. 1989. Instruments of government: Perceptions and contexts. Journal of Public Policy 9: 35–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Michael, G.J. 2015. Who’s Afraid of Wikileaks? Missed opportunities in political science research. Review of Policy Research 32: 175–199.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Panke, D. 2013. Unequal actors in equalising institutions. Negotiations in the United Nations General assembly. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Panke, D. 2014. The UNGA—a talking shop? Exploring rationales for the repetition of resolutions in subsequent negotiations. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 27 (3): 442–458.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Plantey, A. 2007. International negotiation in the twenty-first century. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, R. 1988. Diplomacy and domestic politics. The logic of two-level games. International Organization 42: 427–460.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wikileaks. 2007 62nd UNGA: East Asian and Pacific Island’s Performance. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07USUNNEWYORK1209_a.html.

  • Wikileaks. 2008a. 63rd UN General Assembly: East Asian and Pacific Island’s Performance. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08USUNNEWYORK1173_a.html.

  • Wikileaks. 2008b 63rd UN General Assembly: United States Goals and Priorities. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE99672_a.html.

  • Wikileaks. 2008c. Report on African Delegations at the 63rd General Assembly. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08USUNNEWYORK1192_a.html.

  • Wikileaks. 2008d UNGA: Western Hemisphere Delegations. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08USUNNEWYORK1197_a.html.

  • Wikileaks. 2009a. Bahamas Changes Position on Country-Specific Resolution Fearing Reprisals. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09NASSAU729_a.html.

  • Wikileaks. 2009b. Report on African Delegations at the 64th General Assembly. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09USUNNEWYORK1131_a.html.

  • Wikileaks. 2009c. Summary of UNGA First Committee Resolutions: Increased U.S. Engagement Pays Off. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09USUNNEWYORK1070_a.html.

  • Wikileaks. 2009d. UNGA: Western Hemisphere Delegations. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09USUNNEWYORK1133_a.html.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

    Samuel Brazys

  2. Department of Political Science, University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany

    Diana Panke

Authors
  1. Samuel Brazys
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Diana Panke
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Diana Panke.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Brazys, S., Panke, D. Push and pull forces in the UNGA: analyzing foreign policy change in the context of international norms. Int Polit 54, 760–774 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0056-6

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0056-6

Keywords

Search

Navigation