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Positive and Normative Implications of Liability Dollarization for Sudden Stops Models of Macroprudential Policy

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Abstract

“Liability dollarization,” namely intermediation of capital inflows in units of tradables into domestic loans in units of aggregate consumption, adds three important effects driven by real exchange rate fluctuations that alter standard models of Sudden Stops significantly: changes on the debt repayment burden, on the price of new debt, and on a risk-taking incentive (i.e., a negative premium on domestic debt). Under perfect foresight, the first effect makes Sudden Stops milder and multiple equilibria harder to obtain. The three effects add an “intermediation externality” to the macroprudential externality of standard models, which is present even without credit constraints. Optimal policy under commitment can be decentralized equally by taxing domestic credit or capital inflows, and hence capital controls as a separate instrument are not justified. This optimal policy is time inconsistent and follows a complex, nonlinear schedule. Quantitatively, an optimized pair of constant taxes on domestic debt and capital inflows makes crises slightly less likely and yields a small welfare gain, but other pairs reduce welfare sharply. For high effective debt taxes, capital controls and domestic debt taxes are again equivalent, and for low ones, welfare is higher with higher taxes on domestic debt than on capital inflows.

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Notes

  1. Capital Flows and Emerging Market Economies, CGFS Papers No. 33, Bank for International Settlements, January 2009.

  2. This framework originated in the seminal articles by Salter (1959), Swan (1960), and Díaz-Alejandro (1965).

  3. This setup originates in the work of Mendoza (2002). Studies that explore the models’ normative implications, and in particular the implications for macroprudential policy, include Bianchi (2011), Benigno et al. (2016), Korinek (2011), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017), Bianchi et al. (2016), and Hernández and Mendoza (2017).

  4. This implies that the standard SS models of macroprudential policy do not justify the use of capital controls as an instrument to discriminate foreign versus domestic credit. See Sect. 4.1 for details.

  5. The equilibrium conditions in the standard models differ in that \(R^*\) replaces \({\tilde{R}}_{t+1}^T\) in condition (8), the terms \(q_{t}^cp_t^c b_{t+1}^c\) and \(p_t^c b_{t}^c\) are replaced with \(q^*b_{t+1}\) and \(b_t\) where \(b_t\) are bonds in units of \(c_t^T\), and condition (10) is removed.

  6. A wealth-neutral income shock at t=0 is defined by income levels \((y_0^T,y_1^T)\) such that \(y_1^T-{\bar{y}}^T=R({\bar{y}}^T-y_0^T)\) and \(y_t^T={\bar{y}}^T\) for \(t\ge 2\). Hence, wealth remains constant at \(W_0={\bar{y}}^T/(1-\beta )\).

  7. Similarly, keeping \({\tilde{b}}_0^c\) and \(b_0\) unchanged when making parametric changes that affect wealth (e.g., temporary or permanent, unanticipated changes in the tradables income stream) results in different equilibria that depend on the changes in initial prices and debt repayment burden.

  8. As shown in the Appendix, the \({\text {BB}}^{\mathrm{SSLD}}\) curves are concave if the elasticity of substitution between \(c^T\) and \(c^N\) is greater or equal to 1, convex if it is less or equal than 1/2, and switch from concave to convex as \(c^T\) rises if the elasticity is between 1/2 and 1. Under reasonable parameter values for emerging markets and any elasticity between 0 and 1, however, \({\text {BB}}^{\mathrm{SSLD}}\) is either strictly convex or nearly linear with a slightly concave segment for very low \(c^T\).

  9. The threshold income in the SSLD model is \({\hat{y}}_0^T=\frac{{\bar{c}}^T-{\bar{p}}^c{\tilde{b}}_0^c-\kappa {\bar{p}}^N{\bar{y}}^N}{1+\kappa }\), where \({\bar{c}}^T\), \({\bar{p}}^c\) , and \({\bar{p}}^N\) are the unconstrained equilibrium allocations and prices.

  10. Those are the values of \(c_0^T,p_0^N\) such that the budget and credit constraints hold with equality and \(p_0^N\) equals the corresponding marginal rate of substitution. It is also straightforward to show that the Euler equation holds with a Lagrange multiplier of \(\mu _0=u'(c_0^T)-u'(c_1^T)>0\) and that \(\mu _t=0\) for \(t\ge 1\). In the SS model, since \(W_0\) is unchanged, \(y_1^T>{\bar{y}}^T>y_0^T\), and \(y_t^T={\bar{y}}^T\) for \(t\ge 2\), it follows that the fact that \(c_0^T<{\bar{c}}^T\) implies \(c_1^T>{\bar{c}}^T\). Moreover, \(c_t^T=c_1^T\) for \(t\ge 2\). This, together with \(y_1^T>{\bar{y}}^T\), implies that \(b_2>b_1>-\kappa (y_1^T+p_1^Ny^N)\) and \(b_t=b_2\) for \(t\ge 2\).

  11. The fact that \(p^{c\prime }(t){\tilde{b}}_0^c<0\) implies that \(m^{\mathrm{SSLD}}>m^{\mathrm{SS}}\), and the fact that \(\omega ^{1/\eta }{\tilde{b}}_0^c<b_0\) implies that \(I^{\mathrm{SSLD}}>I^{\mathrm{SS}}\).

  12. In all the Sudden Stops equilibria of Fig. 2, \(c_0^T<\bar{c_T}<c_1^T\) and the Euler equation holds with a Lagrange multiplier \(\mu _0=u'(c_0^T)-u'(c_1^T)>0\). This is again because, given constant wealth, the intertemporal resource constraint implies that \(c_1^T\) rises as the credit constraint makes \(c_0^T\) fall.

  13. \(\tilde{y}^T\) is the income level that makes the BB curves tangent to the PP curve, which is different for the two models.

  14. Mendoza and Rojas (2017) show that the finding that Sudden Stops are milder extends to quantitative comparisons of stochastic SS and SSLD models, in which the debt-price and risk-taking effects of liability dollarization are present, and that for the same calibration the SSLD model performs better at matching the observed empirical regularities of Sudden Stops.

  15. The last assumption is equivalent to assuming that the planner cannot contract debt directly with foreign lenders in units of tradables and instead borrows from the same intermediaries as private agents.

  16. The planner’s problem is written in short notation for simplicity. Given the Markov process of \(y_t^T\), the expectations are taken over histories of realizations, with the date-t probability of a history \(y^{Tt}\) denoted by \(\pi _t(y^{Tt})\) and the associated consumption and bonds allocations denoted by \(c_t^T(y^{Tt})\) and \(b_{t+1}^c(y^{Tt})\) , respectively.

  17. See Mendoza and Rojas (2017) for full details.

  18. Notice that, when \(\mu _t>0\), pledging higher \(c_{t+1}^T\) could make the constraint less tight by increasing the price of bonds, but this does not generate additional resources for consumption, which are still be given by \(-\kappa (y_t^T+p_t^N{\bar{y}}^N)\).

  19. One effect of the intermediation externality does remain, and it operates via the debt repayment burden of the exogenous date-0 debt \(p^c_0b^c_0\). This can be seen in condition (24) because for \(t=0\) there is no matching term \({\mathbb {E}}_{-1}[\lambda _0]\) to cancel the two terms with \(p^{c \prime }(t) b_t^c\). Hence, the planner has the incentive to increase \(p^c_0\) to reduce the debt repayment burden at \(t=0\).

  20. As explained earlier, intermediation in the SS setup can be interpreted as frictionless domestic banks that borrow and lend in tradables units, or as the nonfinancial private sector borrowing directly from abroad. Either way, the optimal policy needs to tackle only the inefficiency driving a wedge between the social and private marginal costs of domestic borrowing, and hence domestic debt taxes and capital controls are equivalent.

  21. See Mendoza and Rojas (2017) for an analysis of optimal time-consistent policy for a conditionally efficient regulator that takes as given the pricing function of private debt of the unregulated competitive equilibrium. In this case, the equivalence breaks. Capital controls support the debt pricing function, effectively implementing a policy that targets the expected rate of real appreciation, and domestic debt taxes are set as needed to support the optimal \(\tau _t^{ef}\) given the optimal \(\theta _t\).

  22. We solve the competitive equilibrium with and without taxes using the same time iteration algorithm with fixed grids as in Mendoza and Rojas (2017).

  23. If intermediaries pay the lump-sum taxes to finance these subsidies, the taxes cause a harmless fall in dividends, because there are no limit on bank liability and no constraint requiring bank dividends to be positive. Lowering \(\theta\) so as to approach − 1 would then be optimal, because while the subsidy-adjusted value of collateral (\(-(1+\theta )\kappa (y_t^T+p_t^N{\bar{y}}^N)\)) allows only for an infinitesimally small amount of debt, the amount of resources in units of tradables that this debt generates (\(-(q^*{\mathbb {E}}_t(p_{t+1}^{c})/(1+\theta ))b_{t+1}^{c}\)) grows infinitely large.

  24. Intuitively, the planner acting under commitment is constrained-efficient in terms of being subject to the collateral constraint and the pricing conditions of goods and asset markets, and the latter in particular means the planner is committed not to distort the intermediaries no-arbitrage condition, which the ad hoc constant \(\theta\) distorts.

  25. This is only one-fifth the size of the gain that Mendoza and Rojas (2017) found for an optimal, time-consistent policy of time-varying tax rates.

  26. As in the literature (see Mendoza 2010), we define Sudden Stops as states in which the constraint binds and the current account increases by more than two standard deviations.

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Acknowledgements

This paper was prepared for the IMF’s Eighteenth Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference. We would like to thank Cristina Arellano for her insightful discussion and conference participants for helpful comments. We are also grateful for comments and suggestions by Javier Bianchi, Emine Boz, Markus Brunnermeier, and Linda Tesar and by participants at the 2018 AEA Annual Meetings, the XXIII Jornadas Anuales de Economía of the Central Bank of Uruguay, and the 2017 Workshop of the Financial Stability and Development Network of the IDB with the BIS-CCA.

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Correspondence to Enrique G. Mendoza.

Appendix: Properties of the \({\text {BB}}^{\mathrm{SSLD}}\) Curve

Appendix: Properties of the \({\text {BB}}^{\mathrm{SSLD}}\) Curve

The \({\text {BB}}^{\mathrm{SSLD}}\) curve determines the value of \(p^N\) that corresponds to a value of \(c^T\) such that both the resource and the collateral constraint hold with equality [see Eq. (13) in the text]. Formally, the \({\text {BB}}^{\mathrm{SSLD}}\) curves is given by the following function:

$$\begin{aligned} p^N(c^T)=\frac{c^{T}-(1+\kappa )y^T-p^c(c^T) b^c}{\kappa {\overline{y}}^N }. \end{aligned}$$

We omit time subscripts for simplicity, but notice \(b^c\) corresponds to the outstanding debt at the beginning of the period. Given the parametric restrictions on \(c^T\), \(\kappa\), \(y^T\), \({\bar{y}}^N\) , and \(b^c\), the fact that \(p^c(c^T)\) is continuous implies that the \({\text {BB}}^{\mathrm{SSLD}}\) curve is continuous.

The horizontal intercept of the \({\text {BB}}^{\mathrm{SSLD}}\) curve is found by evaluating the above expression when \(p^N=0\). Using Eq. (3) to determine the consumption price index, when \(p^N=0\), it follows that the intercept is the value of tradables consumption such that \(c^T=(1+\kappa )y^T+\omega ^\frac{1}{\eta }b^c\).

To obtain the slope of the \({\text {BB}}^{\mathrm{SSLD}}\) curve, we take the first derivative of the above expression, which yields \(\frac{\partial p^N}{\partial c^T}=\frac{1-\frac{\partial p^c}{\partial c^T} b^c}{\kappa {\overline{y}}^N}\). The sign of the slope depends on the signs of \(\frac{\partial p^c}{\partial c^T}\) and \(b^c\). Using Eq. (3), it follows that because of the CES structure of preferences, \(\frac{\partial p^c}{\partial c^T}=(1+\eta )\frac{1-\omega }{\omega }\left[ \omega +(1-\omega )(c^T)^{\eta }\right] ^{\frac{1}{\eta }}(c^T)^{\eta -1}>0\). Moreover, since we are interested in economies with debt (\(b^c<0\)), it follows that \(\frac{\partial p^N}{\partial c^T}>0\). Hence, the \({\text {BB}}^{\mathrm{SSLD}}\) curve is increasing in \(c^T\)

To determine whether the \({\text {BB}}^{\mathrm{SSLD}}\) curve is concave or convex, we analyze its second derivative, which is the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial ^2 {p^N}}{\partial {c^T}^2}=-\frac{\frac{\partial ^2 p^c}{\partial {c^T}^2}b^c}{\kappa {\overline{y}}^N}. \end{aligned}$$

The sign of this derivative is the same as the sign of the second derivative of \(p^c\) with respect to \(c^T\). This derivative can be expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial ^2 p^c}{\partial {c^T}^2}=(1+\eta )\frac{1-\omega }{\omega }\left( \omega +(1-\omega ) (c^T)^\eta \right) ^{\frac{1}{\eta }}(c^T)^{2(\eta -1)}\left[ \frac{1-\omega }{\omega +(1-\omega )(c^T)^\eta }+(\eta -1)(c^T)^{-\eta }\right]. \end{aligned}$$

All the terms in the right-hand side of this expression are positive, except for the last term in square brackets, which has an ambiguous sign. Hence, the sign of this derivative is determined by the sign of the term \(\left[ \frac{1-\omega }{\omega +(1-\omega )(c^T)^\eta }+(\eta -1)(c_T)^{-\eta }\right]\). We can characterize the conditions determining the sign of this term by first reducing it to this expression:

$$\begin{aligned} \left[ \frac{1}{\tilde{\omega }+(c^T)^\eta }+\frac{\eta -1}{(c^T)^{\eta }}\right] \end{aligned}$$
(30)

where we used the definition \(\tilde{\omega }\equiv \omega / (1-\omega )\). Analyzing this expression, it follows that:

$$\begin{aligned} \left[ \frac{1}{\tilde{\omega }+(c^T)^\eta }+\frac{\eta -1}{(c^T)^{\eta }} \right] \gtreqqless 0 \Leftrightarrow \eta \gtreqqless \frac{\tilde{\omega }}{\tilde{\omega }+(c^T)^\eta }. \end{aligned}$$
(31)

Notice the expression in the right-hand side of the last inequality is always a positive fraction, but its magnitude varies with \(c^T, \omega\) and \(\eta\), which is what makes the direction of the inequality ambiguous. Still, given that \(\eta >-1\) from the CES functional form and that \(c^T>0\) and \(0<\omega <1\), we can establish the following three results:

  1. 1.

    The\(p^c\)and\({\text {BB}}^{\mathrm{SSLD}}\)functions are strictly concave when the elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables is greater or equal to 1: If \(-1<\eta \le 0\) (i.e., \(1/(1+\eta )\ge 1\)), then \(\eta < \frac{\tilde{\omega }}{\tilde{\omega }+(c^T)^\eta }\), and hence \(\left[ \frac{1}{\tilde{\omega }+(c^T)^\eta }+\frac{\eta -1}{(c^T)^{\eta }}\right] <0\) and thus both \(p^c\) and \({\text {BB}}^{\mathrm{SSLD}}\) are strictly concave, for any positive \(c^T, \omega\).

  2. 2.

    The\(p^c\)and\({\text {BB}}^{\mathrm{SSLD}}\)functions are strictly convex when the elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables is less or equal than 1/2: If \(\eta \ge 1\) (i.e., \(1/(1+\eta )\le 1/2\)) then \(\eta > \frac{\tilde{\omega }}{\tilde{\omega }+(c^T)^\eta }\), and hence \(\left[ \frac{1}{\tilde{\omega }+(c^T)^\eta }+\frac{\eta -1}{(c^T)^{\eta }}\right] >0\) and both \(p^c\) and \({\text {BB}}^{\mathrm{SSLD}}\) are strictly convex, for any positive \(c^T, \omega\).

  3. 3.

    The\(p^c\)and\({\text {BB}}^{\mathrm{SSLD}}\)functions are concave (convex) for sufficiently low (high)\(c^T\)when the elasticity of substitution is between 1/2 and 1: If \(0<\eta <1\) (so that \(1/2< 1/(1+\eta ) <1\)), the sign of \(\left[ \frac{1}{\tilde{\omega }+(c^T)^\eta }+\frac{\eta -1}{(c^T)^{\eta }}\right]\) changes from negative to positive as \(c^T\) rises. Around \(c^T=0\) we obtain \(\eta < \frac{\tilde{\omega }}{\tilde{\omega }+(c^T)^\eta }=1\) and as \(c^T\) increases \(\frac{\tilde{\omega }}{\tilde{\omega }+(c^T)^\eta }\) falls. Hence, near \(c^T=0\) the derivatives are negative and the curves are concave. By continuity, for sufficiently low \(c^T\) the curves are concave, and for sufficiently high \(c^T\) the curves turn convex.

Bianchi (2011) notes that estimates of the elasticity of substitution in tradables and nontradables consumption for emerging markets are in the [.4, .83] interval. Hence, most of this range falls in the region where the third result above applies. Quantitatively, however, in our baseline calibration for the perfect-foresight experiments taken from Bianchi’s work (which uses \(\eta =0.205\), \(1/(1+\eta )=0.83\)) and for other exercises using reasonable values of \(b^c\) and \(y^T\) and any \(0< \eta <1\), we found that \({\text {BB}}^{\mathrm{SSLD}}\) is either convex or nearly linear, except for a slightly concave segment for very low \(c^T\). In all of these experiments, the concavity is visible only for \(c^T<0.05\) compared with a perfect-foresight unconstrained equilibrium of \(c^T=0.92\) using our baseline calibration, or a Sudden Stop outcome of \(c^T=0.83\) for a wealth-neutral negative shock of nearly 20% from an initial income of \(y^T=1\). Hence, assuming convex or nearly linear \({\text {BB}}^{\mathrm{SSLD}}\) curves when the elasticity of substitutions is less than unitary is innocuous.

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Mendoza, E.G., Rojas, E. Positive and Normative Implications of Liability Dollarization for Sudden Stops Models of Macroprudential Policy. IMF Econ Rev 67, 174–214 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41308-018-0070-8

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