Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Is differentiation possible in rule of law?

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Comparative European Politics Aims and scope

Abstract

The European Union (EU) is a community based on the rule of law. EU member states have committed themselves to uphold the rule of law and to respect the primacy of EU law. Yet today, the EU legal order is threatened by the emergence of increasingly autocratic member state governments, particularly those in Hungary and Poland, who routinely violate the fundamental rule of law principles on which the EU is based. This article assesses whether the model of differentiated integration can be applied to help the EU address this rule of law crisis. In recent years, many analysts have called on the EU to embrace a model of differentiated integration as a way to address its many challenges, and some have suggested that versions of differentiation might help the EU resolve tensions with its member states concerning the rule of law. By contrast, this article will argue that differentiation in the rule of law and the theory of constitutional pluralism that some use to justify it are neither normatively desirable nor practically feasible models. In short, we must reject differentiated integration when it comes to rule of law.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See Robinson (2017) and De Vries (2017). Of course, while Brexit may not present a profound crisis for the EU, it does present one for the UK.

  2. A full discussion of the shortcomings of differentiated integration is beyond the scope of this paper. (For recent critiques of differentiated integration, see Vimont 2018; European Parliament 2019). However, it is worth noting that despite the recent upsurge in interest in differentiated integration, it is less likely to become a dominant model for the EU in the wake of Brexit. Since the UK was the leading political force behind most instances of differentiated integration, its departure should, ceteris paribus, make the future prevalence of the approach less likely.

  3. On the concept of states built primarily through subsuming preexisting local legal orders into a new, overarching legal orders, see Strayer (1970), Fukuyama (2012, p. 271), Berman (1983, p. 406), and Kelemen and Pavone (2018).

  4. See Court of Justice of the European Union Opinion 1/09 of 8 March 2011 at I-1172 describing national courts as “as ‘ordinary’ courts within the European Union legal order.”

  5. See Speech by Commission Vice President Frans Timmermans, 19 July 2017, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-2084_en.htm.

  6. This section draws on Kelemen (2018).

  7. Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL, p. 594. For further developments of the CJEU’s jurisprudence on supremacy, see, for instance, Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Infer- und Vorratsstelle fü r Getreide und Futtermittel,EU:C:1970:114 (emphasizing that EU law enjoys supremacy over national constitutional law); and, Case 314/85 Foto Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lü beck-Ost, EU:C:1987:452 (establishing the Court of Justice’s exclusive competence to invalidate acts of EU institutions).

  8. Sarmiento Daniel, 2015, ‘The OMT Case and the Demise of the Pluralist Movement’, 21 September 2015, available at https://despiteourdifferencesblog.wordpress.com/2015/09/21/the-omt-case-and-the-demise-of-the-pluralist-movement/; R. Uitz, ‘National Constitutional Identity in the European Constitutional Project: A Recipe for Exposing Cover Ups and Masquerades’, Verfassungsblog on Constitutional Matters, 11 November 2016. Available at www.verfassungsblog.de.

  9. Hungarian Constitutional Court, Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB on the Interpretation of Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law, 30 November 2016 (discussed below). As explained below, the decision involved a request for an abstract constitutional interpretation. As such, the Court was not asked to (and did not) actually declare participation in the EU scheme unconstitutional in Hungary, but rather simply to indicate that it could declare the scheme unconstitutional in Hungary. See Halmai (2017) for a detailed discussion of the background to this case.

  10. European Commission, Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland: Proposal for a Council Decision on the Determination of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach by the Republic of Poland of the Rule of Law, 2017/0360 (APP), 20 December 2017, at http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=49108.

  11. While the precise outcome of the pending Article 7 procedure against Poland remains uncertain, it is clear that ultimately no sanctions will be imposed on Poland through the procedure, as sanctions (under Article 7(2)) would require a unanimous agreement in the Council and the Hungarian government’s promise to a veto.

  12. The Minister for Justice and Equality v. Celmer, [2018] IEHC 119, http://www.courts.ie/Judgments.nsf/0/578DD3A9A33247A38025824F0057E747; See also https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/courts/high-court/high-court-judge-seeks-eu-ruling-on-effect-of-polish-law-changes-1.3424530.

  13. Case C-216/18 PPU, Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) made on 27 March 2018—Minister for Justice and Equality v LM, at http://www.courts.ie/Judgments.nsf/0/FD843302847F2E228025825D00457F19.

  14. ibid, at para. 68.

  15. Case 294/83 Les Verts v. Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para. 23; See Pech (2009).

References

  • Avbelj, Matej and Jan Komarek (eds.). 2012. Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond. Oxford: Hart Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beck, Gunnar. 2011. The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court, the Primacy of EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz–Kompetenz. European Law Journal 17: 470–494.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berman, Harold J. 1983. Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cienski, Jan. 2018. Polish Supreme Court Turns to the ECJ for Help. Politico Europe. 8 Feb 2018. Available at https://www.politico.eu/article/polish-supreme-court-turns-to-ecj-for-help-older-judges-retirement-eu-rule/.

  • Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland. 2018. White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary. Warsaw 7 March.

  • Commission of the European Union. 2014. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A new EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law COM (2014) 158 final.

  • Commission of the European Union. 2017. White Paper on the Future of Europe, COM (2017) 2025 of 1 March 2017.

  • Commission of the European Union. 2018. Rule of Law: Commission Launches Infringement Procedure to Protect the Independence of the Polish Supreme Court. Press Release available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4341_en.htm.

  • De Vries, Catherine. 2017. Benchmarking Brexit. Journal of Common Market Studies 55(S1): 38–53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ejchart-Dubois, Maria, Sylwia Gregorczyk-Abram, Paulina Kieszkowska-Knapik, and Michał Wawrykiewicz. 2018. Devastation of Poland’s Supreme Court and Judicial Independence: The Situation Now. Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation.

    Google Scholar 

  • European Parliament. 2019. European Parliament Resolution of 17 January 2019 on Differentiated Integration (2018/2093(INI). P8_TA-PROV(2019)0044.

  • Fabbrini, Federico. 2016. After the OMT Case: The Supremacy of EU Law as the Guarantee of the Equality of the Member States. German Law Journal 16: 1003.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fukuyama, Francis. 2012. The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gibson, Edward. 2005. Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries. World Politics 58: 101–132.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gibson, Edward. 2012. Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Giraudy, Augustina. 2015. Democrats and Autocrats: Pathways of Subnational Undemocratic Regime Continuity Within Democratic Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Halmai, Gabor. 2017. National(ist) Constitutional Identity? Hungary’s Road to Abuse Constitutional Pluralism. EUI Working Paper Law 2017/8, European University Institute.

  • Holzinger, Katherina, and Frank Schimmelfennig. 2012. Differentiated Integration in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy 19(2): 292–305.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kelemen, R. Daniel. 2011. Eurolegalism: The Transformation of Law and Regulation in the EuropeanUnion. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kelemen, R. Daniel. 2016. On the Unsustainability of Constitutional Pluralism. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 23: 136–150.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kelemen, R. Daniel. 2017a. Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe’s Democratic Union. Government and Opposition 52(2): 211–238.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kelemen, R. Daniel. 2017b. Europe’s Authoritarian Equilibrium. ForeignAffairs.com, 22 Dec 2017 at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/hungary/2017-12-22/europes-authoritarian-equilibrium.

  • Kelemen, R. Daniel. 2018. The Dangers of Constitutional Pluralism. In Research Handbook on Pluralism and EU Law, ed. Gareth Davies and Matej Avbelj, 392–403. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Kelemen, R. Daniel, and Kathleen McNamara. 2018. How Theories of State-Building Explain the European Union. In 25th International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, IL March 28–30, 2018.

  • Kelemen, R. Daniel, and Tommaso Pavone. 2018. The Political Geography of Legal Integration: Visualizing Institutional Change in the European Union,” with Tommaso Pavone. World Politics 70(3): 358–397.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kelemen, R. Daniel, and Laurent Pech. 2018. Why Autocrats Love Constitutional Identity and Constitutional Pluralism. Reconnect Working Paper No. 2. https://reconnect-europe.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/RECONNECT-WorkingPaper2-Kelemen-Pech-LP-KO.pdf.

  • MacCormick, Neil. 1995. The Maastricht Urteil: Sovereignty Now. European Law Journal 1: 259–266.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maduro, Miguel. 2003. Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action. In Sovereignty in Transition, ed. N. Walker. Oxford: Hart Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mickey, Robert. 2015. Paths out of Dixie: The Democratization of Authoritarian Enclaves in America’s Deep South, 1944–1972. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Mickey, Robert, Steven Levitsky, and Lucan Way. 2017. Is America Still Safe for Democracy? Foreign Affairs 96(3): 22.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nielsen, Niolaj. 2018. Dutch Refuse Polish Arrest Warrant over Judicial Independence Fears. EU Observer, 5 Oct. Available at https://euobserver.com/justice/143034.

  • Pawlak, Justyna, and Anna Wlodarczak-Semczuk. 2018. Poland Faces Turmoil over Contested Overhaul of Supreme Court. Reuters, 3 July. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-poland-turmoil/poland-faces-turmoil-over-contested-overhaul-of-supreme-court-idUSKBN1JT2WH.

  • Pech, Laurent. 2009. The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union, Jean Monnet Working Paper Series No. 4/2009. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1463242.

  • Pech, Laurent, and Kim Lane Scheppele. 2017. Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU. Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 19: 3–47. https://doi.org/10.1017/cel.2017.9.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Robinson, Duncan. 2017. European Support for EU Surges in Wake of Brexit Vote. Financial Times, 7 June available at https://www.ft.com/content/78b4ded6-51ce-11e7-bfb8-997009366969 .

  • Sadurski, Wojciech. 2018. How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding. Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 18/01, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3103491.

  • Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Thomas Winzen. 2014. Institutional and Constitutional Differentiation in the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies 52(2): 354–370.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Strayer, Joseph. 1970. On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tamanaha, Brian Z. 2009. A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law. In Relocating the Rule of Law, ed. Gianluigi Palombella and Neil Walker. Portland, OR: Hart Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tamanaha, Brian Z. 2011. The Rule of Law and Legal Pluralism in Development. Hague Journal on the rule of Law 3: 1–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vimont, Pierre. 2018. Flexibility is not Europe’s Miracle Solution. Carnegie Europe, 26 June. Available at https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/06/26/flexibility-is-not-europe-s-miracle-solution-pub-76681.

  • Von Bogdandy, Armin, and S. Schill. 2011. Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty. Common Market Law Review 48: 1–38.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walczak, Grzegorz. 2018. Hiszpanie pytają kielecki sąd o niezawisłość w polskim sądownictwie. Gazeta Wyborcza, 8 Oct. Available at http://kielce.wyborcza.pl/kielce/7,47262,24019354,hiszpanie-pytaja- kielecki-sad-o-niezawislosc-w-polskim-sadownictwie.html?disableRedirects = true.

  • Walker, Neil. 2002. The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism. Modern Law Review 65: 317–359.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Walker, Neil. 2016. Constitutional Pluralism Revisited’. European Law Journal 22: 333–355.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Rutgers University, 89 George St., New Brunswick, NJ, 08901, USA

    R. Daniel Kelemen

Authors
  1. R. Daniel Kelemen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to R. Daniel Kelemen.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Kelemen, R.D. Is differentiation possible in rule of law?. Comp Eur Polit 17, 246–260 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-019-00162-9

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-019-00162-9

Keywords

Search

Navigation