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Regulatory institutional misalignment and cross-border acquisitions: evidence from an emerging-market country

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Abstract

Do anticorruption efforts affect a country’s investment appeal? Business investment depends on a stable and predictable institutional environment, but meaningful control of corruption typically requires a radical change in the institutional system that has enabled it. This underscores the need for a deeper understanding of how anticorruption efforts can affect the enforcing country’s institutional system on which investment relies. Synthesizing the concept of institutional complementarity and the literature on different modes of anticorruption enforcement, we propose that campaign-style anticorruption enforcement in emerging-market countries can produce “regulatory institutional misalignment,” defined as a situation in which government agencies continue to monopolize critical resources while the exercise of bureaucratic discretion essential to achieving effective resource allocation diminishes substantially. We theorize how such institutional misalignment can harm domestic business environments and drive emerging-market firms to engage more actively in cross-border acquisitions (CBAs). Our hypotheses derived from the regulatory institutional misalignment perspective on CBAs are supported by empirical analyses using data from a sample of privately controlled firms during China’s unprecedented anticorruption campaign launched in late 2012. We also discuss this study’s contributions to the IB literature on institutional complementarity, CBAs by emerging-market enterprises, and anticorruption efforts’ impact on international business.

Résumé

Les efforts de lutte contre la corruption influencent-ils l'attractivité d'un pays pour les investisseurs ? Les investissements des entreprises dépendent d'un environnement institutionnel prévisible et stable, mais un contrôle significatif de la corruption exige généralement un changement radical du système institutionnel qui l'a rendu possible. Cela souligne la nécessité de mieux comprendre comment les efforts de lutte contre la corruption peuvent influer sur le système institutionnel du pays qui les met en œuvre et dont dépendent les investissements. En synthétisant le concept de complémentarité institutionnelle et la littérature des différents modes de lutte contre la corruption, nous proposons que la lutte contre la corruption sous forme de campagne dans les pays émergents puisse produire un " désalignement institutionnel réglementaire ", défini comme une situation dans laquelle les agences gouvernementales continuent à monopoliser des ressources critiques alors que l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire bureaucratique, essentiel pour parvenir à une allocation efficace des ressources, diminue de manière substantielle. Nous théorisons la manière dont un tel désalignement institutionnel peut nuire aux environnements commerciaux domestiques et pousser les entreprises des marchés émergents à s'engager plus activement dans des acquisitions transfrontalières (Cross-Border Acquisitions - CBAs). Nos hypothèses dérivées de la perspective du désalignement institutionnel réglementaire sur les CBAs sont confirmées par des analyses empiriques utilisant des données provenant d'un échantillon d'entreprises privées pendant la campagne anticorruption sans précédent lancée par la Chine à la fin de l'année 2012. Nous discutons également des contributions de cette recherche aux littératures des affaires internationales, plus spécifiquement, aux celles de la complémentarité institutionnelle, des CBAs par les entreprises des marchés émergents, et de l'impact des efforts de lutte contre la corruption sur les affaires internationales.

Resumen

¿Afectan los esfuerzos de la lucha contra la corrupción al atractivo para inversionistas en un país? La inversión empresarial depende de un entorno institucional estable y predecible, pero un control significativo de la corrupción suele requerir un cambio radical en el sistema institucional que la ha permitido. Esto subraya la necesidad de comprender mejor cómo los esfuerzos de la lucha contra la corrupción pueden afectar al sistema institucional del país en el que se basa la inversión. Sintetizando el concepto de complementariedad institucional y la literatura sobre los diferentes modos de aplicación de la ley anticorrupción, proponemos que la aplicación de la ley anticorrupción al estilo de las campañas en los países con mercados emergentes puede producir un “desajuste institucional regulador”, definido como una situación en la que las agencias gubernamentales continúan monopolizando recursos críticos mientras que el ejercicio de la discreción burocrática esencial para lograr una asignación eficaz de los recursos disminuye sustancialmente. Teorizamos cómo este desajuste institucional puede perjudicar a los entornos empresariales nacionales e impulsar a las empresas de los mercados emergentes a participar más activamente en las adquisiciones transnacionales (ACB). Nuestras hipótesis derivadas de la perspectiva de la desalineación institucional regulatoria sobre las adquisiciones transnacionales están respaldadas por análisis empíricos que utilizan datos de una muestra de empresas controladas por el sector privado durante la campaña anticorrupción sin precedentes lanzada por China a finales de 2012. También discutimos en este estudio la contribución a la literatura de Negocios Internacionales sobre la complementariedad organizacional, las adquisiciones transnacionales por parte de empresas de mercados emergentes, y el impacto de los esfuerzos de la lucha contra la corrupción en los negocios internacionales.

Resumo

Esforços anticorrupção afetam o apelo ao investimento de um país? O investimento empresarial depende de um ambiente institucional estável e previsível, mas o controle significativo da corrupção normalmente demanda uma mudança radical no sistema institucional que o gerou. Isto sublinha a necessidade de uma mais profunda compreensão de como esforços anticorrupção podem afetar o sistema institucional do país do qual o investimento depende. Sintetizando o conceito de complementaridade institucional e a literatura sobre diferentes modos de assegurar anticorrupção, propomos que a aplicação anticorrupção sob forma de campanha em países de mercados emergentes pode produzir “desalinhamento institucional regulatório”, definido como uma situação na qual agências governamentais continuam a monopolizar recursos críticos enquanto o exercício do poder burocrático discricionário, essencial para atingir uma alocação eficaz de recursos diminui substancialmente. Teorizamos como esse desalinhamento institucional pode prejudicar ambientes empresariais domésticos e levar empresas de mercados emergentes a envolverem-se mais ativamente em aquisições transfronteiriças (CBA). Nossas hipóteses derivadas da perspectiva do desalinhamento institucional regulatório em CBAs são apoiadas por análises empíricas utilizando dados de uma amostra de empresas de controle privado durante a sem precedentes campanha chinesa anticorrupção, lançada no final de 2012. Também discutimos contribuições deste estudo para a literatura de IB sobre complementaridade institucional, CBAs por empresas de mercados emergentes, e o impacto de esforços anticorrupção em negócios internacionais.

摘要

反腐败工作会影响一个市场的投资吸引力吗？商业投资取决于稳定和可预测的制度环境, 对腐败的有效控制通常需要对导致腐败的制度体系进行彻底变革。因此, 我们需要深入理解反腐败工作会如何影响投资所依赖的制度体系。综合制度互补概念和不同反腐败模式文献, 我们 提出新兴市场国家的 运动式反腐败在短期内会导致“监管制度错位”的假设； 也就是说, 政府机构在继续垄断关键资源的同时, 反腐败运动大幅限制了对资源配置 起着至关重要作用的官僚自由裁量权。我们的理论解释了这种制度错位为何会损害国内商业环境, 并促使新兴市场公司更积极地参与跨 境并购 。运用中国在2012年启动的空前反腐败斗争为准自然实验, 以此期间的民营控股上市公司为样本, 实证分析结果支持我们从监管制度错位视角推导出的跨境并购假设。我们还讨论了本研究对国际商务文献的贡献, 这些文献涉及的制度互补性、新兴市场企业的跨境并购以及反腐败工作对国际商务的影响。

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Notes

  1. A commonly used data source in the IB literature on corruption, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is a quintessential example that highlights the extremely unbalanced variance of corruption across different countries versus the variance of corruption across different years. Upon examining the CPI scores of different countries between 2012 and 2021, we found that the variance across different countries in the same year was 374.8 (average of all years), whereas the variance across different years in the same country was only 6.3 (average of all countries).

  2. We restrict our sample period to years to 2017 to rule out the potential effect of the de-globalization trend and the trade war between China and the US since early 2018, when the Trump administration commenced a series of actions that raised duties on China’s exports to the US. We also require our sample firms to be publicly listed at least three years before the 2012 campaign to address the concern that our results are driven by new companies appearing after the campaign.

  3. Results are similar if we use the full sample period of 2010–2017.

  4. We generate similar results when excluding CBAs with destinations in tax havens such as the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Mauritius, Samoa, and the Virgin Islands.

  5. Using an OLS model generates similar results for the continuous measure of CBAs (CBA_RATIO). We use a Tobit model instead of an OLS model because many observations have a value of zero for CBA_RATIO.

  6. Given the evolving nature of the BRI, the number of countries involved in it may increase or decrease in the future. For this robustness check, we refer to a joint report titled The Economic Development along the Belt and Road 2017, which was authored by the China Development Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and Peking University in 2017; the report includes 65 countries that have already participated in or have been considered relevant to the BRI.

  7. In another test, we adopt an alternative measure for political connection (POLCON), where it takes the value one when a firm or its top executives were directly involved in anticorruption investigations and zero otherwise. Untabulated results indicate that while the coefficient on POST*TREAT remains positively significant, that on POST*TREAT*POLCON is negative and marginally significant at the 10% level (p = -0.096 for the CBA_DUMMY model; and p = -0.084 for the CBA_RATIO model). The summed coefficient on POST*TREAT + POST*TREAT* POLCON is statistically insignificant. These results suggest that firms directly involved in anticorruption investigations do not experience differences in the likelihood of undertaking CBAs and in the value of CBAs after the 2012 anticorruption enforcement.

  8. Specifically, we first estimate a logistic model to predict the probability of being a treatment firm in the year before the first anticorruption investigation following the onset of the 2012 anticorruption campaign in the province, using a treatment sample of POEs that are used in our main analyses and a control sample of SOEs. The prediction model regresses the likelihood of being a treatment firm on the firm-level control variables (i.e., FOREIGN_WORK, INVEST, TQ, ROA, FSALE, SIZE, LEV, TANG, CFVOL, AGE, LOWN, TMOWN, POLCON, DUAL, and BIND). Our PSM procedure requires that most of the differences in the covariates between the matched samples are insignificant, and we obtain the largest caliper width of 0.1. The results are similar if we match the sample by industry and firm size.

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Area Editor Marjorie Lyles and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions. In addition, we are grateful for feedback provided by Heather Haveman, Danqing Wang, Michael Witt, Xueyong Zhan, as well as participants at the Fuqua Business School research seminar. Dong acknowledges financial support from the Nazarbayev University Social Policy Grant Program. Hu acknowledges financial support from the National Social Science Foundation of China (22BGL084), Social Science Foundation of the Fujian Province (FJ2021A018), and Natural Science Foundation of the Fujian Province (2023J01050).

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  1. All authors contributed equally and are listed in alphabetical order.

Authors and Affiliations

  1. INSEAD, Singapore, Singapore

    Guoli Chen

  2. Graduate School of Business, Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan

    Jiyang Dong

  3. Institute of Financial and Accounting Studies/Center for Accounting Studies, Xiamen University, Xiamen, Fujian, People’s Republic of China

    Jinshuai Hu

  4. China Europe International Business School, Shanghai, People’s Republic of China

    Feida Zhang

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  1. Guoli Chen
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Chen, G., Dong, J., Hu, J. et al. Regulatory institutional misalignment and cross-border acquisitions: evidence from an emerging-market country. J Int Bus Stud 55, 172–193 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-023-00665-4

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