Abstract
Memories have long been compared with archived items that can be faithfully retrieved by minds, as if they were the sorts of thing that exist in a kind of internal mental storehouse. Down the ages memories have often been conceived of as images — proxies of items encountered by the senses — which are received, sometimes suitably augmented, retained and later retrieved by minds. This familiar picture of memories has a long and influential history, finding perhaps its earliest and most eloquent expression in St. Augustine’s Confessions.
And so I come to the fields and vast palaces of memory, where are stored the innumerable images of material things brought to it by the senses. Further there is stored in the memory the thoughts we think, by adding or taking from or otherwise modifying the things that sense has made contact with and all other things that have been entrusted to and laid up in memory … when I turn to memory I ask it to bring forth what I want …1
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Notes
St. Augustine, Confessions, trans. Francis J. Sheed (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2006), Book 10, VIII.
Marcelo Dascal, ‘Hobbes’s Challenge’, in The Prehistory of Cognitive Science, ed. Andrew Brook (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 73.
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Lawrence Shapiro, ‘Review of Radicalizing Enactivism’, Mind 123(489) (2014). Emphases added.
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Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 52. Anthony Chemero, Radically Enactive Cognitive Science. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009).
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Uriah Kriegel, The Sources of Intentionality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3–4.
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© 2016 Daniel D. Hutto
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Hutto, D.D. (2016). Remembering without Stored Contents: A Philosophical Reflection on Memory. In: Groes, S. (eds) Memory in the Twenty-First Century. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137520586_28
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137520586_28
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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