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Abstract

This chapter explores the ways in which American Political Development (APD) and institutional studies more generally have theorized institutional stability, change, and power, as a way to locate the potential scope and utility of the Federalist framework. In particular, many theories of institutional change point to things, such as an exogenous crisis or a political entrepreneur, that disrupt stable practices or work within institutions to transform them. Such theories indicate the factors that can initiate general institutional change but not how the absolute or relative power of institutions gets altered. The Federalist theory defines and focuses on the intervening factors within and across institutions that are actually altered and, thereby, cause changes in institutional power.

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© 2015 Daniel Wirls

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Wirls, D. (2015). Stability, Change, and Power in the Study of Political Institutions. In: The Federalist Papers and Institutional Power in American Political Development. Palgrave Pivot, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137499608_3

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