Leibniz’s Stoic and Spinozistic Justification for Eternal Damnation

Abstract

Leibniz’s metaphysics is oftentimes fundamentally related to his own theological views. While it is sometimes the case that his metaphysics is broadly consistent with these theological beliefs, there are some circumstances in which these beliefs are difficult to reconcile with one another. One such problematic case concerns Leibniz’s views regarding the nature of Hell and, in particular, eternal damnation in the best of all possible worlds. The problem is that Leibniz seems to endorse two inconsistent claims. Speaking primarily as a Lutheran, Leibniz believed that eternal damnation was justified for individuals based on the nature of sin.¹ But speaking primarily as a metaphysician, Leibniz believed that there is no transcendent reality such as Hell and that the entire causal chain, except the act of creation, is fully actualized in the best of all possible worlds. Despite the apparent inconsistency, I believe that Leibniz has the resources to resolve the tension in his thought. In Section 1, I will present the Stoic and Spinozistic view of virtue and vice and show that Leibniz was working primarily out of a similar system. In Section 2, I will show that, even though Leibniz was working out of a deterministic system, his view did not amount to necessitarianism, and so at least for some individuals, perpetual psychological torment was possibly escapable. In Section 3, I will argue that Leibniz’s conception of Hell is not a transcendent reality, but is based on the psychology of those that sin, and moreover, the reward or punishment of those individuals is carried out in the best of all possible worlds.