Abstract
Since the financial turmoil of 2008 considerable efforts have been made to draw lessons from it for the design of supervisory architectures. One of the main issues, which have been, and still are being, addressed, is how to prevent the instability of the financial system as a whole, by building up a macroprudential framework. By definition, the macroprudential framework has to address the cross-sectional dimensions which characterise any systemic risk distribution. Therefore, two key features of any macroprudential architecture are: on the one hand, how to define its governance, that is, which authorities have to be involved in order to assign the set of powers and tools that characterises macroprudential policy; and on the other hand, how to identify its perimeter, that is, the boundaries and features of the financial area that has to be supervised.
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© 2014 Donato Masciandaro and Alessio Volpicella
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Masciandaro, D., Volpicella, A. (2014). Central Banking, Macroprudential Supervision and Insurance. In: Monkiewicz, J., Małecki, M. (eds) Macroprudential Supervision in Insurance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137439109_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137439109_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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