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Predicting European Bank Distress: Evidence from the Recent Financial Crisis

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Governance, Regulation and Bank Stability

Abstract

The global financial crisis has brought a large number of banks to the brink of collapse, including several European banks1, stressing the importance of detecting early signals of bank distress in order to activate prompt corrective actions. Indeed, identifying weak banks early is crucial, especially when problems are identified late, as solving them is much more costly. So in light of this, it becomes critically important to make use of data and indicators that can help supervisors and investors to discover which financial institutions are at risk of distress.

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© 2014 Laura Chiaramonte and Federica Poli

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Chiaramonte, L., Poli, F. (2014). Predicting European Bank Distress: Evidence from the Recent Financial Crisis. In: Lindblom, T., Sjögren, S., Willesson, M. (eds) Governance, Regulation and Bank Stability. Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137413543_5

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