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Self-Defense in International Law: Preemptive/Preventive Requisites

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Governing the Use-of-Force in International Relations

Part of the book series: New Security Challenges Series ((NSECH))

Abstract

This chapter will investigate and assess the legal requisites of prevention and preemption, particularly in the context of the UN Charter’s Article 51 — ”the self-defense article.” As a foundational pillar for analyzing the specific preventive/preemptive strategies of both the Bush and Obama administrations’ use-of-force policies in the fight against global terrorism, the chapter will evaluate the extent to which such strategic options have been accepted more generally as justifiable measures of self-defense. Simply put, what was the standing of prevention and preemption under international law, and more specifically, their position under the UN Charter jus ad bellum regime before the inception of the Bush doctrine? In addressing this question, the chapter will evaluate the ongoing debate over the scope of self-defense permissible in international law and specifically the standing of the preventive and preemptive use-of-force in three interrelated sections.

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Notes

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. RMIT University, Australia

    Aiden Warren

  2. United Nations University, Japan

    Ingvild Bode

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  1. Aiden Warren
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© 2014 Aiden Warren and Ingvild Bode

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Warren, A., Bode, I. (2014). Self-Defense in International Law: Preemptive/Preventive Requisites. In: Governing the Use-of-Force in International Relations. New Security Challenges Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137411440_3

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