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Intuitions, Experiments, and Armchairs

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Experimental Ethics

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Abstract

Most ethicists agree that moral doctrines should fit our moral intuitions. They disagree, however, about the interpretation of this evaluative criterion. Some predominantly draw on low-level intuitions about cases (e.g., Foot, 1978; Kamm, 2007; Thomson, 1976). Others believe that we should rather trust our high-level intuitions about moral principles (e.g., Hare, 1981; Singer, 1974; Singer, 2005). In this paper, I examine and reject three empirically informed arguments against the former view: the argument from disagreement, the argument from framing effects, and debunking explanations. I will not argue that we are immediately justified to accept our low-level intuitions about cases as moral beliefs. I merely want to dispel doubts about a considerably weaker claim, viz. that at least some of our low-level intuitions can count as evidence for (or against) a moral theory.

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Authors
  1. Nikil Mukerji
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Technische Universität München, Germany

    Christoph Luetge  & Matthias Uhl  & 

  2. Justus Liebig University Giessen & Technische Universität München, Germany

    Hannes Rusch

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© 2014 Nikil Mukerji

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Mukerji, N. (2014). Intuitions, Experiments, and Armchairs. In: Luetge, C., Rusch, H., Uhl, M. (eds) Experimental Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137409805_15

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