Yudhoyono’s Third Way: Muslim Democracy, National Stability, and Economic Development in Indonesia

Abstract

Conceptualizing Indonesia’s ascent toward great power status in Asia requires consideration of the role Islam will play in shaping Indonesian politics. Although the identities of Islam in Indonesia remain as varied as ever, since the final decade of Suharto’s rule there has been a general increase in the level of religiosity expressed in the public sphere. How these dynamics will shape Indonesia’s ascent is a source of concern to some observers. Some cite the rise of the transnational jihadist movement and probable Indonesian connections as a threat to both the secular Indonesian constitution, and to regional and international order.¹ Others are more worried about governments of Muslim majority nations compensating for economic and political weaknesses through a rhetorical depiction of themselves as ‘defenders of the faith’, appealing to crass populist sentiments of xenophobia, intolerance, and authoritarianism.² Since the discontent of the Asian Financial Crisis swept away the institutions of dictatorship, ushering in demokrasi and reformasi, the political culture of Islam in Indonesia has not embraced the revolutionary Islamic movements that have arisen, nor has this political culture of Islam acquiesced to the temptation to cloak aggressive and violent politics of the state in the language of Islam.