Abstract
To begin, it is worth considering a paradigmatic version of what the philosophy of history looks like when it is too objective or, to put it in other words, when it considers the nature of history as something which is only an object of our understanding and our knowledge without acknowledging the importance of individual existence in the shaping of the historical phenomenon.
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Notes
G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Introduction: Reason in History, translated from the German edition of Johannes Hoffmeister by H.B. Nisbet, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
Hegel, The Philosophy of History, translated by J. Sibree, (New York: Dover Publications, 1956)
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, translated by Malcolm Knox, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952)
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A. V. Miller, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977)
John Watson refers to Hegel’s ‘impenetrability’ and he tries to give us a general guide through Hegel’s overall philosophy. He concludes that, for Hegel, we can grasp the real nature of the things through a systematic categorisation of man’s intellectual actions because ‘all is rational’. John Watson, ‘The Problem of Hegel’, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 3, No. 5 (Sept. 1894), pp. 546–567.
For an excellent analysis of Hegelian dialectical logic in point of its relation with common (Aristotelian) logic see: The International Library of Critical Essays in the History of Philosophy, Hegel, Vol. II, edited by David Lamb, Robert Hanna, ‘From an Ontological Point of View: Hegel’s Critique of the Common Logic’, pp. 137–170; and Katalin G. Havas, ‘Dialectical Logics and their Relation to Philosophical Logics’, pp. 185–196 (London: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1998).
Later, I will attempt to spell out the significance of the Incarnation for Hegel’s philosophy of history. At this stage, however, what is crucial is to underline the ambiguity of the Hegelian use of certain concepts, including the concept of God. See: J. A. Leighton, ‘Hegel’s Conception of God’, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 5, No. 6 (Nov. 1896), pp. 601–618.
Hegel himself gives this kind of explanation in the sixth paragraph of the Introduction of his Logic, in the Being, part one of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), translated by William Wallace. The main problem with this Hegelian declaration is that it is so general and abstract that it becomes vague. The historical fact of the existence of two opposite to each other interpretations of Hegel’s philosophy exactly after his death (with the so-called right-and left-wing Hegelians) is enough to point out the problem. Hegel’s rationalism, and the way we will choose to interpret it, grounds every possible effort to analyse and understand Hegel’s philosophy in general and his philosophy of history in particular. My point is that it is enough for us to understand Hegel’s ‘rationalism’ as an epistemological belief regarding our ability to know the world. It goes without saying that the Hegelian rationalism can be a lot more than this, but it is my aim to point out that Hegel in his philosophy of history believes that we can know our history without having any kind of problems regarding the nature of our knowledge. Morris R. Cohen offers us a general summary of the problems regarding Hegel’s rationalism. He concludes by stating that: ‘It must admit [rationalism] that rational order is only one phase of a world which always contains more than we can possibly explain.’ Morris R. Cohen, ‘Hegel’s Rationalism’, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 41, No. 3 (May 1932), p. 301.
The importance of these preliminary clarifications regarding some of the most basic Hegelian terms lies not only in their elementary nature but also in their central position in the Hegelian philosophy of history. What Hegel means by writing ‘reason’, or ‘understanding’, or ‘God’, or’ spirit’ in his philosophy of history is the necessary key for us to wholly understand his philosophy of history. For a general discussion on the possible reasons that drove Hegel to have his particular philosophy of history, see Steven B. Smith, ‘Hegel’s Discovery of History’, The Review of Politics, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Apr. 1983), pp. 163–187.
George Dennis O’Brien makes an interesting point regarding Hegel’s analysis of the varieties of historical writing: ‘Hegel is universally regarded as a speculative philosopher of history, but it would seem that from the standpoint of his own system no such philosophical enterprise can be derived.’ George Dennis O’Brien, ‘Does Hegel have a Philosophy of History?’, History and Theory, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1971), p. 298.
The debate continues between those who view Hegel as a philosopher who grounds (and reduces) everything in a single power (Spirit) and those who understand him as something different. See: James Kreines, ‘Metaphysics without Pre-Critical Monism: Hegel on Lower-Level Natural Kinds and the Structure of Reality’, The Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, Vol. 57/58, (2008), pp. 48–70.
Emilia Digby, ‘Hegel’s Monism and Christianity’, The Monist, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Oct. 1896), pp. 114–119.
F. la T. Godfrey, ‘Hegel’s Dialectic in Historical Philosophy’, Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 63 (Jul. 1941), pp. 306–310.
Jon Stewart: ‘The Architectonic of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Dec. 1995), pp. 747–776.
See: J. N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-Examination, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1958).
See: Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2: Hegel and Marx, (London and New York: Routledge, 1945).
See: Anselm K. Min, ‘Hegel’s Absolute: Transcendent or Immanent?’, The Journal of Religion, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Jan. 1976), pp. 61–87.
See: James Kreines, ‘Metaphysics without Pre-Critical Monism: Hegel on Lower-Level Natural Kinds and the Structure of Reality’, The Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, Vol. 57/58, 2008, pp. 48–70.
Thomas J. J. Altizer, ‘Hegel and the Christian God’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 71–72.
Esperanza Seade tries to give us a full depiction of the way Hegel defines ‘people’ and’ state’ in his philosophy of history. See: Esperanza Duran De Seade, ‘State and History in Hegel’s Concept of People’, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Jul.-Sept. 1979), pp. 369–384.
Hegel uses by turns the term ‘nation’ and the term’ state’. But as we can see also in his PR, state with its objective structure is that which Hegel refers to. 35. Karl Popper is the most obvious example of such an interpretation towards a Hegelian concept of freedom. Kaufman and Findlay argue (in my opinion successfully) against Popper’s accusations. S. W. Dyde can offer us an alternative point of view. While he recognises that Hegel directly connects individuals’ freedom to their belonging in a state, he also points out that every effort to define Hegel’s notion of freedom must be accompanied by a simultaneous effort to proceed further than Hegel. Dyde claims that Hegel’s own definition of freedom obliges us to do so. See: S. W. Dyde, ‘Hegel’s Conception of Freedom’, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 3, No. 6 (Nov. 1894), pp. 655–671.
Future in Hegel’s philosophy of history, the way I examine it, is nothing but something that we can know when it will become past. The apparent Hegelian presumption regarding history as past is that the future is not yet completed (actualised) and thus not yet history. I am interested in pointing out the Hegelian disregard of the future as an important historical dimension. I do not, however, have to concern myself with the problems that arise with Hegel’s ‘eschatology’. My research tries to understand the way Hegel posits the historical dimensions. I have already argued that past is the only temporal dimension which guarantees us, for Hegel, epistemological security. This is enough for my purposes. For those who would like to know something more regarding the way Hegel understands the future in his philosophy of history, Daniel Berthold-Bond can give us a satisfactory basic analysis. See: Daniel Berthold-Bond, ‘Hegel’s Eschatological Vision: Does History Have a Future?’, History and Theory, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Feb. 1988), pp. 14–29.
Joshua Foa Dienstag considers Hegel’s philosophy of history to be a well-organised’ seduction’, in order for Hegel to make us ‘love’ our history and all its atrocities. Dienstag focus on Hegel’s effort to ‘put all of history into one form... tie up all the loose ends, to bring every line of plot to a conclusion.’ Joshua Foa Dienstag, ‘Building the Temple of Memory: Hegel’s Aesthetic Narrative of History’, The Review of Politics, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Autumn 1994), p. 725.
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Patios, G. (2014). Hegel’s Philosophy of History. In: Kierkegaard on the Philosophy of History. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137383280_2
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