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Regulatory Dissonance

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Banking Regulation in China

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Abstract

This chapter discusses an important regulatory characteristic featuring in China’s banking regulation: regulatory dissonance between the PBoC and the CBRC. Regulatory dissonance provides a further example that regulation is captured by private forces, here, by regulators. Dissonance is undoubtedly detrimental to the interest of the public. Notwithstanding that the two bodies are charged with distinct regulatory objectives, “transverse dissonance” has emerged in areas such as credit regulation and antimoney laundering provisions. Furthermore, “jurisdictional dissonance” has likewise occurred in macro-prudential regulation, consumer financial protection, and deposit insurance schemes. Deficiency and indeterminacy in policy formulation has been the primary cause. The chapter also discusses the efforts that have been made by the PBoC, the CBRC, and the central government to achieve regulatory coordination.

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Notes

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© 2014 He Wei Ping

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Ping, H.W. (2014). Regulatory Dissonance. In: Banking Regulation in China. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137367556_6

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