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Missile Defenses in the Euro-Atlantic, “Wider Middle East,” and Indo-Pacific

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NATO Expansion and US Strategy in Asia
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Abstract

In his first state-of-the-nation address, Russian President Medvedev had greeted President-elect Barack Obama with warnings that Moscow would deploy short-range nuclear-capable Iskander (“Alexander the Great”) missiles and radar-jamming systems in Kaliningrad. It was clear that Moscow wanted Washington to wake up, that the new president should act—not just talk—against the high costs and the “unproven” nature of the missile defense as criticized by Obama and Democrats themselves during the presidential election campaign (see chapters 1 and 3).

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Notes

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  28. Amaani Lyle, “Hagel: U.S. Bolstering Missile Defense,” American Forces Press Service (March 15, 2013), http://fortstewart.patch.com/groups/politics-and-elections/p/hagel-u-s-bolstering-missile-defense

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© 2013 Hall Gardner

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Gardner, H. (2013). Missile Defenses in the Euro-Atlantic, “Wider Middle East,” and Indo-Pacific. In: NATO Expansion and US Strategy in Asia. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137367372_6

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