Abstract
Since the modal turn of the 1960s and 1970s, modality has played a central role in metaphysical theories about numerous topics. For example, many philosophers have defined an essential feature of an object as a property it must have if it exists. Others have tried to give an account of truth-making in terms of a modal relationship between worldly entities and true claims. Various relations of supervenience have been used in an attempt to capture theses of the forms The B-facts are nothing over and above the A-facts or The A-facts are more fundamental than the B-facts. Counterfactual conditionals have been put to heavy work in several areas of metaphysics as well. And there are many more examples. These developments made it natural to think of the exploration of modal facts as one of the chief occupations of the metaphysician.
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Kment, B. (2015). Modality, Metaphysics, and Method. In: Daly, C. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137344557_8
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