Abstract
Some people have thought that there is a power of intuition by which we have a priori knowledge of self-evident moral truths. Bernard Williams in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy writes of this view:
This model of intuition in ethics has been demolished by a succession of critics, and the ruins of it that remain above ground are not impressive enough to invite much history of what happened to it.1
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Lenman, J. (2015). Moral Inquiry and Mob Psychology. In: Daly, C. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137344557_26
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137344557_26
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