Abstract
What is philosophy good for? The importance of practical philosophy may be obvious enough — but what of theoretical philosophy (a.k.a. ‘impractical philosophy’)? Hofweber (2009) raises this in an acute way for metaphysics, and ‘metaphysics’ here could just as well be construed to include all of theoretical philosophy:
[…] the greatest threat to metaphysics as a philosophical discipline… [is] that the questions that metaphysics tries to answer have long been answered in other parts of inquiry, ones that have much greater authority. And if they haven’t been answered yet then one should not look to philosophy for an answer. What metaphysics tries to do has been or will be done by the sciences. There is nothing left to do for philosophy (p. 260)
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Parent, T. (2015). Theory Dualism and the Metalogic of Mind-Body Problems. In: Daly, C. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137344557_20
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