Abstract
Certain works of art, particularly the narrative arts, feature episodes that are apt to provoke experiences that spectators find painful. A paradigm example would be the scene in King Lear in which Regan and Cornwall put out Gloucester’s eyes. If we combine this fact — that some art gives rise to painful experiences — with the hedonic theory of motivation we seem to have an inconsistency. This is the so-called ‘paradox of tragedy’: that people both are and are not motivated to pursue painful experiences. In a helpful recent article Aaron Smuts has done work disentangling various claims, and shown that the so-called paradox is not a paradox at all as there is no reason to believe the hedonic theory of motivation. Instead, he argues, we are left with two questions that do merit attention: the ‘motivational question’ and ‘the difference question’:
The motivational question asks: Why is it that people want to see putatively painful art? And, the difference question asks: Why are people more willing to experience painful affect in response to art than in their normal lives? (Smuts 2009: 43)
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Budd, M. (2007). ‘The Intersubjective Validity of Aesthetic Judgements’, in his Aesthetic Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 62–104.
Carroll, N. (2011). ‘Art Interpretation’, The British Journal of Aesthetics 51(2): 117–135.
Currie, G. (1993). ‘Interpretation and Objectivity’, Mind 102: 413–428.
Gaut, B. (1993). ‘The Paradox of Horror’, The British Journal of Aesthetics 33(4): 333–345.
Hughes, R. (1991). Nothing If Not Critical: Selected Essays on Art and Artists (London: Harvill).
Kant, I. (1948). Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (published as The Moral Law) (London: Hutchinson).
Klein, M. (1929). ‘Infantile Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in the Creative Impulse’, in J. Mitchell (ed.), The Selected Melanie Klein (London: Penguin), 84–94.
Lear, J. (1999). Love and Its Place in Nature: A Philosophical Interpretation of Freudian Psychoanalysis (Yale: Yale University Press).
Levinson, J. (1992). ‘Intention and Interpretation in Literature’, in his The Pleasures of Aesthetics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press), 175–213.
Levinson, J. (1992). ‘Musical Profundity Misplaced’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 50(1): 58–60.
Levinson, J. (1998). ‘Wollheim on Pictorial Representation’, in his Contemplating Art: Essays in Aesthetics (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 239–251.
Levinson, J. (2002). ‘Hypothetical Intentionalism: Statement, Objections, and Replies’, in his Contemplating Art: Essays in Aesthetics (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 302–311.
Longuenesse, B. (2012). ‘Freud and Philosophy’, Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86: 19–39.
McDowell, J. (1978). ‘Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?’ Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52: 13–29.
Mitchell, J. (1986). ‘Introduction’, The Selected Melanie Klein, (ed.) J. Mitchell (London: Penguin), 9–32.
Nehamas, A. (1981). ‘The Postulated Author: Critical Monism as a Regulative Ideal’, Critical Inquiry 8: 131–149.
Scheffler, S. (1994). Human Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Segal, H. (1952). ‘A Psycho-Analytical Approach to Aesthetics’, in Sandra Gosso (ed.), Psychoanalysis and Art (London: Karnac), 42–61.
Sharpe, R. A. (2004). Philosophy of Music: An Introduction (Chesham: Acumen).
Smuts, A. (2009). ‘Art and Negative Affect’, Philosophy Compass 4(1): 39–55.
Stecker, R. (1997). Artworks: Definition, Meaning, Value (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press).
Tanner, M. (1994). Nietzsche (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Velleman, J. D. (1999). ‘A Rational Superego’, in his Self to Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 129–155.
Williams, B. (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana).
Wimsatt, W. K., and M. C. Beardsley (1954). ‘The Intentional Fallacy’, in D. Newton-de Molina (ed.), On Literary Intention: Critical Essays. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), 1–13.
Wollheim, R. (1979). ‘The Sheep and the Ceremony’, in his The Mind and Its Depths (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1–21.
Wollheim, R. (1980). ‘Criticism as Retrieval’, in his Art and Its Objects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 185–204.
Wollheim, R. (1987). Painting as an Art (London: Thames and Hudson).
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2014 Derek Matravers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Matravers, D. (2014). Negative Emotions and Creativity. In: Levinson, J. (eds) Suffering Art Gladly. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137313713_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137313713_11
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-34598-4
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-31371-3
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)