Skip to main content

Negative Emotions and Creativity

  • Chapter
Suffering Art Gladly
  • 407 Accesses

Abstract

Certain works of art, particularly the narrative arts, feature episodes that are apt to provoke experiences that spectators find painful. A paradigm example would be the scene in King Lear in which Regan and Cornwall put out Gloucester’s eyes. If we combine this fact — that some art gives rise to painful experiences — with the hedonic theory of motivation we seem to have an inconsistency. This is the so-called ‘paradox of tragedy’: that people both are and are not motivated to pursue painful experiences. In a helpful recent article Aaron Smuts has done work disentangling various claims, and shown that the so-called paradox is not a paradox at all as there is no reason to believe the hedonic theory of motivation. Instead, he argues, we are left with two questions that do merit attention: the ‘motivational question’ and ‘the difference question’:

The motivational question asks: Why is it that people want to see putatively painful art? And, the difference question asks: Why are people more willing to experience painful affect in response to art than in their normal lives? (Smuts 2009: 43)

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Budd, M. (2007). ‘The Intersubjective Validity of Aesthetic Judgements’, in his Aesthetic Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 62–104.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carroll, N. (2011). ‘Art Interpretation’, The British Journal of Aesthetics 51(2): 117–135.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Currie, G. (1993). ‘Interpretation and Objectivity’, Mind 102: 413–428.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gaut, B. (1993). ‘The Paradox of Horror’, The British Journal of Aesthetics 33(4): 333–345.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hughes, R. (1991). Nothing If Not Critical: Selected Essays on Art and Artists (London: Harvill).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kant, I. (1948). Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (published as The Moral Law) (London: Hutchinson).

    Google Scholar 

  • Klein, M. (1929). ‘Infantile Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in the Creative Impulse’, in J. Mitchell (ed.), The Selected Melanie Klein (London: Penguin), 84–94.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lear, J. (1999). Love and Its Place in Nature: A Philosophical Interpretation of Freudian Psychoanalysis (Yale: Yale University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Levinson, J. (1992). ‘Intention and Interpretation in Literature’, in his The Pleasures of Aesthetics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press), 175–213.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levinson, J. (1992). ‘Musical Profundity Misplaced’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 50(1): 58–60.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levinson, J. (1998). ‘Wollheim on Pictorial Representation’, in his Contemplating Art: Essays in Aesthetics (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 239–251.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levinson, J. (2002). ‘Hypothetical Intentionalism: Statement, Objections, and Replies’, in his Contemplating Art: Essays in Aesthetics (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 302–311.

    Google Scholar 

  • Longuenesse, B. (2012). ‘Freud and Philosophy’, Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86: 19–39.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McDowell, J. (1978). ‘Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?’ Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52: 13–29.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mitchell, J. (1986). ‘Introduction’, The Selected Melanie Klein, (ed.) J. Mitchell (London: Penguin), 9–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nehamas, A. (1981). ‘The Postulated Author: Critical Monism as a Regulative Ideal’, Critical Inquiry 8: 131–149.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scheffler, S. (1994). Human Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Segal, H. (1952). ‘A Psycho-Analytical Approach to Aesthetics’, in Sandra Gosso (ed.), Psychoanalysis and Art (London: Karnac), 42–61.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sharpe, R. A. (2004). Philosophy of Music: An Introduction (Chesham: Acumen).

    Google Scholar 

  • Smuts, A. (2009). ‘Art and Negative Affect’, Philosophy Compass 4(1): 39–55.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stecker, R. (1997). Artworks: Definition, Meaning, Value (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Tanner, M. (1994). Nietzsche (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Velleman, J. D. (1999). ‘A Rational Superego’, in his Self to Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 129–155.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams, B. (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana).

    Google Scholar 

  • Wimsatt, W. K., and M. C. Beardsley (1954). ‘The Intentional Fallacy’, in D. Newton-de Molina (ed.), On Literary Intention: Critical Essays. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), 1–13.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wollheim, R. (1979). ‘The Sheep and the Ceremony’, in his The Mind and Its Depths (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wollheim, R. (1980). ‘Criticism as Retrieval’, in his Art and Its Objects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 185–204.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Wollheim, R. (1987). Painting as an Art (London: Thames and Hudson).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Copyright information

© 2014 Derek Matravers

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Matravers, D. (2014). Negative Emotions and Creativity. In: Levinson, J. (eds) Suffering Art Gladly. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137313713_11

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics