The Critique of Non-Metaphysical Readings of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right

Abstract

The questions whether social or political philosophy should be explicitly grounded in metaphysical theory and whether it is plausible to propose answers to central problems of political philosophy without explicating one’s metaphysical assumptions, are still current in systematic discussions more than 180 years after Hegel’s death. In this chapter, I intend to show that quite contrary stances towards these questions make for a division of the present-day reception of Hegel’s political philosophy. Representatives of the two camps I refer to agree that Hegel held the view that social and political theorizing form parts of a systematic philosophical enterprise that encompasses, and is ultimately grounded in, a metaphysical conception. What divides them is the issue of how to deal with the foundational role of metaphysics that extends to Hegel’s practical philosophy.¹ In the following, I take a closer look at one particular instance: Axel Honneth’s (born 1949) outline of what he takes to be the best feasible approach to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Honneth, one of the leading scholars in the tradition of ‘Critical Theory’ who had already drawn on the young Hegel in his The Struggle for Recognition ², has since then turned to the mature Hegel’s political philosophy as a source of inspiration. More specifically, he aims at re-appropriating central Hegelian claims without taking on board Hegel’s metaphysical presuppositions.