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Error Is Obvious, Coordination Is the Puzzle

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Hayek and Behavioral Economics

Abstract

G.K. Chesterton describes original sin as “the only part of Christian theology which can really be proved.” He goes on to mock those who deny its existence while clinging to a belief in God:

If it be true (as it certainly is) that a man can feel exquisite happiness in skinning a cat, then the religious philosopher can only draw one of two deductions. He must either deny the existence of God, as all atheists do; or he must deny the present union between God and man, as all Christians do. The new theologians seem to think it a highly rationalistic solution to deny the cat. (Chesterton 1908, Ch. II)

Chesterton’s argument is straightforward: given the obvious reality of evil in human affairs, the reasonable conclusion must be either that there is no supreme good (such as God) or that man is somehow separated from it. He claims that the new theology of his day is confused, positing a perfect good but denying what would explain the manifest gap between our experience and that ideal. The two intellectually serious alternatives, he argues, are atheism on the one hand or a theism that acknowledges sin on the other.

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Authors
  1. Peter Boettke
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  2. W. Zachary Caceres
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  3. Adam Martin
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. San Diego State University, USA

    Roger Frantz (Professor of Economics) (Professor of Economics)

  2. Stanford University, USA

    Robert Leeson (Professor of Economics) (Professor of Economics)

  3. University of Notre Dame Australia, Australia

    Robert Leeson (Professor of Economics) (Professor of Economics)

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© 2013 Peter Boettke, W. Zachary Caceres, and Adam Martin

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Boettke, P., Caceres, W.Z., Martin, A. (2013). Error Is Obvious, Coordination Is the Puzzle. In: Frantz, R., Leeson, R. (eds) Hayek and Behavioral Economics. Archival Insights into the Evolution of Economics Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137278159_4

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