Abstract
We humans spend a considerable amount of time talking about our own mental lives, as well as the mental lives of others. We are interested in the murderer’s motives, our children’s feelings, the zealot’s beliefs, the ravings of the madman, and the perceptions of the eyewitness. This interest leads to the ascription of mental states: beliefs, desires, intentions, perceptions and emotions, to name a few. And though we are very good at ascribing mental states in many ordinary contexts, we find it difficult to know what to say in a range of more unusual cases. Consider the following vignettes:
Self-Deception: Although it should be plainly obvious to Bridget that her son is dealing drugs from his bedroom, Bridget doesn’t explicitly acknowledge the evidence, and insists that the constant traffic to and from her son’s room is a result of an active social life. However, Bridget also becomes uncomfortable whenever the topic of drugs is raised, and much of her behaviour suggests that she does believe that her son is dealing drugs.
Delusion: Sharon has the Capgras delusion and asserts that her parents have been replaced by impostors. However, she doesn’t seem to be particularly concerned about the fate of her parents, whom she clearly cares for. Furthermore, her willingness to assert that the people who claim to be her parents are not who they claim to be appears to be highly context-dependent. For example, when Sharon is in visual contact with her parents she insists that they are impostors, but she recognizes their identity when talking to them on the telephone.
Skywalk: Sonali is prepared to assert that the glass-bottomed bridge over the Grand Canyon is perfectly safe, but when she is asked to cross it her palms sweat, she clings to the railings, and she finds herself unable to walk onto the platform.
Implicit Attitudes: Although Max rejects racism and sexism in his explicit statements, his performance on a wide range of implicit measures (startle responses, identification tasks, etc.) indicates that he has systematic tendencies to treat men differently from woman and blacks differently from whites.
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© 2013 Tim Bayne and Anandi Hattiangadi
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Bayne, T., Hattiangadi, A. (2013). Belief and Its Bedfellows. In: Nottelmann, N. (eds) New Essays on Belief. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137026521_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137026521_7
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