Abstract
The central purpose of this chapter is to discuss some important implications of any credible ethics of belief for the nature of belief. By an “ethics of belief”, we mean an account of what it is to form and hold one’s beliefs responsibly, praiseworthily, or blameworthily. Thus, the aim is to lay out some implications of such an ethics of belief for the metaphysics of belief.
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© 2013 Nikolaj Nottelmann and Rik Peels
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Nottelmann, N., Peels, R. (2013). Some Metaphysical Implications of a Credible Ethics of Belief. In: Nottelmann, N. (eds) New Essays on Belief. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137026521_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137026521_12
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