Montaigne’s ‘Perfect’ Friendship

Abstract

In the history of the philosophy of friendship, few contributions have caught the attention of the popular and critical imagination as much as Michel de Montaigne’s Essais (1580, 1588, 1595), and in particular a chapter entitled ‘De l’amitié’ (Book 1, chapter 27).¹ This attention brought to Montaigne’s book is a curious phenomenon: in terms of the philosophy done in his own time, the Essais do not really qualify as philosophy, that is, as a treatise or dialogue containing consistent argumentation and commentary. Neither do they qualify as a compendium of moral philosophy, with its systematic presentation of topics and opinions. Nor do they qualify as a sourcebook for legal or political or ecclesiastic rhetoric, with sayings and examples arranged in alphabetical order, although some editions after Montaigne’s death in 1592 include an elaborate index of topics designed to facilitate just such a use. The Essais are altogether something else, and often frustrate philosophers seeking unequivocal positions and elaborate arguments, since Montaigne proposes neither, really. Even his Pyrrhonian skepticism, the most obviously ‘philosophical’ argumentation we encounter, is not without glaring inconsistencies, or at the very least is an intermittent feature of his book.²