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The Military: Ambitious Institution, Ad lib Individuals

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The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation

Part of the book series: Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies ((RCS))

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Abstract

Although Clausewitz is correct in saying the war is the product of several factors, at its very core lays the military. Military activity may be initiated by the government and influenced by the people, but men and women, in uniform, on the ground, carry it out. Following the framework developed in Chapter 3, this chapter will examine the military’s part in the practice of civil–military cooperation.1 The chapter is based on a series of two related questions. First, we will examine how the military conceived of its role. Second, we shall turn to how they turned that understanding into practice, vis-à-vis civil–military cooperation.

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Notes

  1. Throughout this chapter, I will refer to the military and the Army. The military will refer to the entire armed forces (in this case, the Canadian Armed Forces, which is often referred to simply as the Canadian Forces, and abbreviated as the CF). The military is made up of naval, air, and land forces. However, in terms of civil–military cooperation in the areas I am focusing on, the land forces, referred to as the Army, are the most germane.

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© 2014 Christopher Ankersen

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Ankersen, C. (2014). The Military: Ambitious Institution, Ad lib Individuals. In: The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation. Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137003355_7

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