Abstract
Contemporary philosophers inherit an anti-psychologistic tradition. The central figures in the early history of both the continental and analytic movements opposed what they saw as the encroachment of psychologists and their fellow travelers on the territory of philosophers (see Kusch 1995 and Dummett 1993).† Most prominently, both Frege and Husserl argued that we should avoid corrupting the study of thought with psychologism. As they understood it, psychologism is the view that the best way to understand thought is to look to the empirical study of what we (or our brains) happen to do when we’re thinking. Thought itself, on their view should be understood apart from the empirical investigation of mind, let alone the study of the gory details of the brain and nervous system.
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© 2014 John Symons and Paco Calvo
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Symons, J., Calvo, P. (2014). Computing with Bodies: Morphology, Function, and Computational Theory. In: Wolfe, C.T. (eds) Brain Theory. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230369580_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230369580_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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