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Law, Public Enforcement of

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Abstract

This article surveys the economic analysis of public enforcement of law – the use of public agents (inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. We first discuss the basic elements of the theory: the probability of imposition of sanctions, the magnitude and form of sanctions (fines, imprisonment), and the rule of liability. We then examine a variety of extensions, including the costs of imposing fines, mistakes, marginal deterrence, settlement, self-reporting, repeat offences, and incapacitation.

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Acknowledgments

A. Mitchell Polinsky’s research was supported by the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics at Stanford Law School. Steven Shavell’s research was supported by the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business at Harvard Law School.

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  1. http://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5

    Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell

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  1. Mitchell Polinsky
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Polinsky, M., Shavell, S. (2018). Law, Public Enforcement of. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2745

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