Abstract
A ‘heuristic’ is a method or rule for solving problems; in game theory it refers to a method for learning how to play. Such a rule is ‘adaptive’ if it is directed towards higher payoffs and is reasonably simple to implement. This article discusses a variety of such rules and the forms of equilibrium that they implement. It turns out that even sophisticated solution concepts, like subgame perfect equilibrium, can be achieved by relatively simple and intuitive methods.
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Young, H.P. (2018). Learning and Evolution in Games: Adaptive Heuristics. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2331
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2331
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