Skip to main content

Rivalry and Collusion

  • Living reference work entry
  • First Online:
The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management
  • 156 Accesses

Abstract

In economics, rivalry is the process by which firms compete to gain customers. Rivalry can be expressed through changes to the price and non-price (e.g., features and non-price terms of sale) characteristics of a good or service or through competition to produce an innovation (e.g., to add new features to an existing product or to develop new products). Collusion indicates the reduction or elimination of rivalry, as firms act collectively to suppress competition through coordination of prices, features and/or direct manipulation of the market (e.g., by deciding which firms will supply specific customers). With few exceptions, explicit collusion among rivals is treated as a violation of antitrust laws.

This entry was originally published on Palgrave Connect under ISBN 978-1-137-49190-9. The content has not been changed.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Aubert, C., W. Kovacic, and P. Rey. 2006. The impact of leniency and whistleblowing programs on cartels. International Journal of Industrial Organization 24: 1241–1266.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carton, D.W., and J.M. Perloff. 2005. Modern industrial organization, 4th ed. Boston: Pearson Addison-Wesley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levenstein, M.C., and V.Y. Suslow. 2006. What determines cartel success? Journal of Economic Literature 64: 43–95.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marshall, R.C., and L.M. Marx. 2012. The economics of collusion: Cartels and bidding rings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Motta, M. 2005. Competition policy: Theory and practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stigler, G. 1964. A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy 72: 44–61.c.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Christopher Pleatsikas .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Copyright information

© 2016 The Author(s)

About this entry

Cite this entry

Pleatsikas, C. (2016). Rivalry and Collusion. In: Augier, M., Teece, D. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94848-2_443-1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94848-2_443-1

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-94848-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Business and ManagementReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

Publish with us

Policies and ethics