Abstract
This research focuses on the role of subnational units in the enforcement of interstate regulations of natural gas pipeline safety in the USA. It does so by developing a theoretical model of interstate regulatory enforcement of natural gas pipelines at both the national and subnational units, utilising the Advocacy Coalition Framework developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993). Particular emphasis is placed on the role of public and private actors at the local and state levels in monitoring, enforcing, and correcting issues with pipeline construction and maintenance. This work addresses this problem through an empirical approach that estimates a mixed-effects model of incidence (number of fines issued) and compliance rates (measured as the percent of the number of incidents corrected by the number of incidents reported) at the state and local levels, accounting for intertemporal variation by a geographic, existing infrastructure of natural gas pipelines and socioeconomic, regulatory type, and political factors (Energy Policy 35(1): 650–671, 2007). Moreover, this research addresses whether differences in approaches to enforcement styles (cooperative vs. coercive) of natural gas pipelines at the subnational unit result in increases in compliance and incidence rates among natural gas pipeline operators. Overall findings suggest that enforcement style and the frequency of contacts between regulators and regulated entities significantly increase compliance rates. The results indicate that increased input from subnational actors would further increase pipeline safety rates overall.
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Brogan, M.J. (2017). National Standards, Subnational Enforcement: Regulating US Natural Gas Pipelines. In: Asquer, A., Becchis, F., Russolillo, D. (eds) The Political Economy of Local Regulation. Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58828-9_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58828-9_10
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