Abstract
I’ve set out and defended an account of the vertical relations between the mental and more fundamental levels in terms of a theory of material constitution (Pereboom 2002, 2011). A controversial feature of this account is that it rejects identity as the distinctive interlevel relation, by contrast with standard reductive positions and, perhaps surprisingly, with the rival nonreductive subset view. Instead, it appeals to a fundamental made-up-of relation. The criticism that this relation and the theory are obscure is diagnosed as presupposing the unfounded rationalist claim that accounts of this sort can only appeal to conceptual analysis and logical relations such as identity.
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Notes
- 1.
Paul argues for this view partly on the ground that aspects or property instances feature the right fineness of grain, by contrast with events, at least on some accounts. I prefer to construe property instances just as ways particular things are, as in David Robb’s (2007) characterization, which he contrasts with abstracta. Token causal powers will then also be ways particular things are.
- 2.
Here is Melnyk’s (2003: 20–32, 2014) account of realization, which, in his view, secures physicalism:
Let “p” name a particular actual physical state token, and “m” a particular actual mental state token. Then p realizes m (in the intended sense) only if
(i) m is a token of a mental state type with a certain higher-order essence, that is, m is a token of a mental state type M such that for a token of M to exist just is for there to exist a token of some (lower-order) state type such that tokens of that (lower-order) state type play role R M , the role distinctive of M;
(ii) p is a token of a physical state type P such that, necessarily, given the physical laws, tokens of P under physical circumstances C play role R M ; and
(iii) the physical laws hold and physical circumstances C obtain.
- 3.
Thanks to Louis DeRosset, David Christensen, Jessica Wilson, Ted Sider, Laurie Paul, Karen Bennett, Nico Silins, Sydney Shoemaker, Lynne Baker, and Carl Gillett for valuable comments and discussion.
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Pereboom, D. (2016). Anti-Reductionism, Anti-Rationalism, and the Material Constitution of the Mental. In: Aizawa, K., Gillett, C. (eds) Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground. New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6_5
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