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Risk and Blame in the Public Sector

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The Palgrave Handbook of Public Administration and Management in Europe

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Abstract

Serious incidents are often followed by a framing contest during which, for instance, a consensus is reached whether the incident was a crisis, how serious the crisis was, what caused the crisis, and whether someone can be blamed for the crisis or its mismanagement. If someone can be blamed, a blame game can ensue. Improper handling of this blame could result in resignation or electoral loss—hence actors’ preoccupation with how to avoid and deal with blame. This chapter describes how blame games work, focusing on presentational strategies, rituals, context, and sub-blame games.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

    Sandra L. Resodihardjo

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  1. Sandra L. Resodihardjo
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Correspondence to Sandra L. Resodihardjo .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department for Public Leadership and Social Enterprise—PulSE Faculty of Business and Law , The Open University, Milton Keynes, United Kingdom

    Edoardo Ongaro

  2. Institute for Management Research, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

    Sandra Van Thiel

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Resodihardjo, S.L. (2018). Risk and Blame in the Public Sector. In: Ongaro, E., Van Thiel, S. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Public Administration and Management in Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55269-3_35

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