Abstract
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the bank diversification into non-banking activities focusing on European conglomerates, while at the same time offering an update of studies on bank diversification. The financial conglomerates’ journey can be split in two periods by using the late 1990s as the cut off point. The chapter starts by discussing the corporate structure of financial conglomerates and then presenting the driving forces behind the evolution of these heterogeneous institutions. Then it moves on to review the theoretical arguments behind the creation of these universal banks and supports the discussion by presenting the empirical findings on the effects of product diversification in the banking sector. Finally, the discussion delves into the evolution of bank diversification into non-banking activities, while offering key statistics and a summary of key regulatory reforms. The chapter concludes the discussion by laying out some aspects of modern financial markets that require further thought and could ignite new research.
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Notes
- 1.
We adopt the definition of financial conglomerates/universal banks of Vander Vennet (2002). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates offer similar definitions. The latter defines financial conglomerates as “any group of companies under common control whose exclusive or predominant activities consist of providing significant services in at least two different financial sectors (banking, securities, insurance)”.
- 2.
During the 2007 financial crisis, co-movement among financial intermediaries’ assets and liabilities distorted the supply of capital and significantly disrupted the economic system. Such systemic failure is usually attributable to (a) common asset shock (for example, mortgages, equities and so on), (b) contagion (for example, investors’ psychology, panic and so on) and/or (c) interconnected financial intermediaries and to their funding maturity (Allen et al. 2012).
- 3.
The US response came through the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 with the UK following with the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act in 2013. The EU, a long-established hub for universal banks and financial conglomerates, is currently engaged in a decisive overhaul of bank regulation and supervision.
- 4.
Michel Barnier, Commissioner for internal market and services, set up a High-level Expert Group and appointed Erkki Liikanen, Governor of the Bank of Finland and a former member of the European Commission, as Chairman. The group’s mandate was to assess the need for structural reform of the EU banking sector. Commissioner Barnier added among others: “The proposed measures will further strengthen financial stability and ensure taxpayers do not end up paying for the mistakes of banks…The proposals are carefully calibrated to ensure a delicate balance between financial stability and creating the right conditions for lending to the real economy, particularly important for competitiveness and growth”. See European Commission’s pages on Structural Reform of the EU Banking Sector.
- 5.
The overlap in the two sectors is even more apparent in modern capital markets, where products extensively used by banks, such as credit-default swaps, closely resemble a casualty insurance policy; albeit without either an insurable-interest requirement or any role for an insurance adjuster.
- 6.
Different types of combinations took place. (1) Bank acquisitions of life insurers (for example, Lloyds Bank and Abbey Life, UK; Rabobank and Interpolis, Netherlands). (2) Mergers of banks and insurers (for example, Nationale-Nederlanden and NMB Postbank, Netherlands). (3) Joint ventures (for example, Generale Bank and AC Group, Belgium; RBS and Scottish Equitable, UK). (4) Banks establishing life insurance subsidiaries (for example, Deutsche Bank, Germany; Crédit Agricole, France). (5) Insurers acquiring banks (for example, GAN and CIC in France). (6) Insurers establishing banks (for example, Mapfre, Spain; Baltica, Denmark). (7) Distribution agreements often supported by cross-shareholdings (for example, Generali and Mediobanca, Italy; Allianz and Dresdner Bank, Germany).
- 7.
In the EU, the Second Banking Directive of 1989 legally endorsed universal banking; whilst the 1999 Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA) ended over 50 years the functional separation of commercial banking and investment banking in the US. Less than a decade later, the sub-prime crisis ignited and the global economy headed into the worst recession since the 1930s, which ironically was when the USA and others implemented functional separation as a means to ensure financial stability.
- 8.
Shoots of recovery started to emerge in 2013. See “Financial conglomerates and theoretical arguments” for more details.
- 9.
Merck Martel et al. (2012) classify large internationally active banks into two specialized business models (commercial banks; investment banks) and two universal business models (investment banking oriented universal banks; commercial banking oriented universal banks) based mainly on bank asset and funding structures.
- 10.
In 1999, the G7 created the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to consider likely problems arising from the wind-up of a large, financial conglomerate. A Group of Ten Report (2001) later considered the potential problems associated with the growth of financial conglomerates.
- 11.
Of the 16 LCFIs, 13 remain. Lehman Brothers is the most notable casualty. Merrill Lynch is now part of Bank of America. Just before the crisis, a consortium of banks bought ABN AMRO including RBS, which the UK government later had to nationalize. Morgan Stanley converted from securities firm to a bank. Other LCFIs had to be supported by their governments in both the US and Europe.
- 12.
Kane (1988) uses the term ‘regulatory dialectic’ to describe the cyclical interactions between regulation, regulatory avoidance and re-regulation, or de-regulation. It is also worth noting that these reforms are usually based on a de jure implementation. There is evidence, however, of a de facto structure in some European markets that existed for decades (Kalotychou and Staikouras 2007).
- 13.
Allen and Santomero (2001) find that banks located in countries with highly developed financial markets, such as the USA and UK, are losing market share to finance companies, mutual funds and securities markets, which contrasts to the experience of banks in Germany, France and Japan. Walter (2009) documents a more prominent decline in commercial banks’ share of financial flows in the US than in the EU.
- 14.
The US Department of Labor defines BHCs as “establishments primarily engaged in holding or owning the securities of banks for the sole purpose of exercising some degree of control over the activities of bank companies whose securities they hold.”
- 15.
Goddard et al. (2007) provide an extensive list of key European legislative changes that have facilitated the integration of European banking and financial markets. Goddard et al. (2010) and Andriosopoulos et al. (2015) discuss legislative and regulatory developments in the EU (15 member states) and US banking industries, respectively.
- 16.
Statistics are provided for the EU (28 member states), 5 candidate countries for EU membership (Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey), 1 potential candidate country for accession in the EU (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and 17 other European and/or transcontinental countries/states (Andorra, Belarus, Faroe Islands, Georgia, Greenland, Guernsey, Iceland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Monaco, Norway, the Russian Federation, San Marino, Switzerland, and Ukraine). Note, only countries/states that hosted bidder and/or target banks involved in M&A during the sample period are included. We source data from Thomson Financial.
- 17.
In 2007, the value of bank–securities deals stood at USD 31.3 billion, that is, a ninefold increase on 2006.
- 18.
Brunnermeier et al. (2012) report that the average (value-weighted) ratio of non-interest income-to-net interest income for US banks had increased approximately from 0.5 in 2000 to 1.5 in 2007.
- 19.
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The authors are grateful to Thorsten Beck and Barbara Casu for their constructive feedback. Special thanks to Tuna Alkan for dedicated research assistance at the early stages of this study. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Dontis-Charitos, P., Staikouras, S., Williams, J. (2016). Bank Diversification and Financial Conglomerates in Europe. In: Beck, T., Casu, B. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of European Banking. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52144-6_3
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