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Bargaining Models

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The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management

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Abstract

Negotiation is a pervasive feature of social exchange. Bargaining theory and its related models examine a problem in which rational individuals who pursue their own interests must reach an agreement to divide the gains from their cooperation. This article builds on two pillars of bargaining literature: Nash’s (1950) axiomatic solution and Rubinstein’s (1982) bargaining game with alternating offers. It also comments briefly on recent applications of bargaining and Cooperative and Non-cooperative Game Theory to strategy.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Bocconi University, Milan, Italy

    Claudio Panico

Authors
  1. Claudio Panico
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Correspondence to Claudio Panico .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. GSBPP, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA

    Mie Augier

  2. Berkeley Research Group, LLC, Emeryville, CA, USA

    David J. Teece

  3. Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA

    David J. Teece

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© 2018 The Author(s)

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Cite this entry

Panico, C. (2018). Bargaining Models. In: Augier, M., Teece, D.J. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-00772-8_402

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