Abstract
This work explored polarization over Israel’s Judicial Reform, introduced in January 2023. We find that the reform divided people into pro- and anti-reform camps, which differed in characteristics such as institutional trust, patriotism, and national identity. For example, the camps disagreed about trust in the government versus the judiciary. In line with motivated reasoning—biased reasoning processes used to reach desired conclusions—people’s pre-existing characteristics motivated polarized views of the reform as a threat to democracy (issue-based polarization) and negative emotions towards opponents (affective polarization). Further demonstrating a motivated process, pro-reform participants (the electorate majority), prioritized majority rule over other democratic features (e.g., minority rights) compared to anti-reform participants. Polarization differentially predicted downstream consequences (e.g., protest methods), indicating that the camps’ reactions were motivated by the extremity of their views and negative emotions. This work extends the understanding of potentially motivated polarization processes and their immediate downstream consequences.
Similar content being viewed by others
Introduction
Polarization is a global challenge which has set back the so-called democratic wave of the 1980s and 1990s, locking it into stagnation and backsliding1,2. Mass polarization (polarization hereafter), occurring between the voting population rather than political elites3, has been related to a variety of negative consequences, including decreased political participation4, lower general trust5, and intergroup conflict6,7. The 2023 judicial reform in Israel is an especially concerning example of such processes, as it involves polarization over an issue that reflects the way people understand democracy at its core. In this case, people do not merely disagree about a specific issue, like abortion or migration. Rather, they disagree on how such issues ought to be resolved in a democracy. Specifically, whereas some emphasize separation of power and a system of checks and balances between branches of government as central to democracy, others may regard majority rule as the key democratic principle. In this work we suggest that these and other polarized perceptions and opinions constitute motivated reasoning—reasoning processes used to reach desired conclusions and maintain desired views and opinions8. We show that polarization may stem from motivated opinions (e.g., politicized institutional trust) and is associated with downstream consequences such as endorsement of extreme protest methods and more pessimistic views of conflict resolution.
In January 2023, Israel’s newly elected government, led by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, made a series of propositions (hereafter, the judicial reform) which would diminish the role of the Supreme Court and curtail the power it can exercise over the country’s executive branch9,10. Although some groups in Israel expressed support for the proposed reform, to many local and international observers and stakeholders, the reform was a clear example of ongoing democratic backsliding, if not a soft coup d’état11,12. Of note, the parties comprising the government received only 48.38% of valid votes13, indicating that although the government (i.e., the executive) held the majority in the parliament (i.e., the legislative) and therefore could enforce the reform, it did not enjoy widespread support among voters. In response to this crisis, protests erupted across the country, expressing concerns regarding broad and far-reaching negative impact of the reform, including healthcare services and academic freedom14,15,16. These protests forced the government to temporarily halt the reform and enter into dialogue with representatives of the opposition on March 27, 2023. At the same time, the government proceeded to promote the legislation unilaterally. The elite-directed dialogue broke down by June 14, 2023. On July 11, 2023, the government passed the first substantial part of the reform, eliminating “reasonableness” as a criterion the Supreme Court can use to curb government decisions17.
The controversial judicial reform provides a unique opportunity to observe a newly emerging, dynamic, polarizing political issue as it unfolds. Understanding this specific issue is relevant globally as many regimes that self-identify as democracies have undergone similar processes (e.g., Poland, India, US, Brazil, Hungary, Turkey). Previous work suggested that leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orban have been actively using anti-liberal populist rhetoric18 to undermine their country’s institutions, particularly the electoral system, judiciary, and academia19 contributing to the process of democratic backsliding and dismantling the cultural and institutional aspects of democracy20. As such processes are taking place around the world21,22,23, it seems that no country is immune to the consequences of anti-liberal-democratic movements.
Even before the novel crisis centering around the judicial reform, Israel was a conflicted nation24,25. Conflicts can be traced to the ethno-religious disputes plaguing the country since its inception26,27 and the challenge posed to democracy by religious institutions’ involvement in secular governance28. Further, there is an ongoing controversy on how to conceptualize Israel’s regime, as Israel’s ethnic democracy model29,30 has already been critiqued for enabling majority tyranny, unlike the liberal democracy model which features comprehensive protections for minority groups31,32. Importantly, tensions between the executive and judiciary branches have been building for years33, peaking with the current far-right, conservative government. What sets this crisis and polarizing issue apart from previous conflictual issues is the general population’s high level of engagement, as well as the stakes the reform poses for their country’s continuing democracy. We argue that the newly proposed reform quickly polarized Israelis into opponents and supporters of the reform. Opponents presumably view the reform as a threat to democracy whereas supporters do not. We further suggest that this quick divide sparked by the reform was motivated by pre-existing beliefs (e.g., institutional trust) and identities (e.g., ethno-religious identity) shaping opponents’ and supporters’ conclusions and opinions about the reform.
When forming opinions and views about new information, people tend to engage in biased reasoning and information processing, motivated to align with pre-existing beliefs8. Numerous studies supported the notion that this tendency is not directed towards reaching accurate conclusions, but rather towards confirming and preserving desired views or ideological goals, for example positive views of one’s political ingroup34,35,36,37,38. Motivated reasoning can exacerbate polarization, as it undermines processing of information that contradicts existing beliefs39 and cements negative views of outgroups40. Biased information processing can enhance polarization over various policies by making supporters and opponents of an issue ignore information that does not align with their beliefs41. Negative views of outgroups can increase animosity between partisans by, for example, justifying harmful behavior against political opponents38,41,42. In this work we explore how pre-existing beliefs shape polarization over a new issue. For example, issue-based polarization over the judicial reform and affective polarization might be motivated by reform supporters’ high trust and reform opponents’ low trust in the government. We further explore how polarization motivates views on immediate downstream consequences. For example, endorsement of extreme protest methods by opponents with extreme views might be motivated by their side’s continuous protests against the reform.
As the reform aims to shift the power balance between the executive government and the judiciary, trust in democratic institutions—judiciary, executive government, parliament, and media—is an obvious key variable to explore. It has been suggested that the relationship between trust in democratic institutions and polarization follows a negative feedback loop43. Empirical findings show that institutional trust relates to lower levels of polarization44,45,46. Dovetailing on the notion of motivated reasoning, institutional trust can itself be politicized and polarized47,48,49,50, contributing to polarization in ideologically motivated ways. Although polarization can decrease institutional trust51, in the case of the Israeli judiciary reform, politicized institutional (dis)trust has preceded polarization over the reform, as (dis)trust existed prior to the rolling out of the reform (January 2023), at least among certain groups52,53. Moreover, the judicial reform has been rolled out by the government to target the judiciary. As such, peoples’ pre-existing trust in the government and the judiciary likely preceded and drove their initial responses to this reform, and not vice versa. Importantly, although the relationship between institutional trust and polarization likely takes the shape of a negative feedback loop over time, in the case of polarization over the judicial reform it is more plausible that this negative loop started with pre-existing institutional (dis)trust than with polarization over the newly introduced reform. Therefore, we explored institutional trust as a predictor rather than an outcome of polarization over the reform.
Two other likely candidates to motivate people’s views on the reform and polarize them are patriotism and national identity. We suggest that individuals who hold different views on patriotism and emphasize different national identities54 are likely to be polarized in their views on the reform. Patriotism is often split into blind patriotism (sometimes equated with nationalism) and constructive patriotism55,56, each representing a way of engaging with national identity and expressing loyalty for the associated community, institutions, and symbols. Blind patriotism is a rather extreme and unwavering expression of positive national affection. It is characterized by feelings of superiority and pride57,58, as well as a suppression of ambivalent or critical attitudes toward the nation59. Blind patriotism is exclusive, limiting the acceptance of certain groups into the scope of the nation and its representative culture. It is associated with high levels of identification with the dominant ethnic group and is often fused with a religious identity60,61. In Israel, nationalities are significantly confounded with ethno-religious identities61,62 (e.g., Jewish for the majority group). These identities are perceived as exclusive, genetically-based and immutable63,64, especially by religious groups65, present a relevant axis of political decision-making66, and are different from the inclusive civic identity (i.e., Israeli) which is common to all citizens61.
Different from blind patriotism, constructive patriotism reflects a more inclusive view of national belonging and manifests in acceptance of critical statements about one’s nation, its history, culture, politics, and people. As such, it is sometimes lauded as the benevolent side of national attachment, in that it allows for maintaining positive views of one’s own people without derogation of others67. It upholds a more civic, rather than ethno-religious, view of national belonging and is associated with liberal, universalist values68.
Whereas the link between trust in institutions and polarization is well established, little is known about the role of patriotism in polarization. An exception is polarization over migration69,70. For example, one study found that appeals to ethnic identity and blind patriotism can polarize voters over immigration69. As right-wing populist narratives often use national superiority to justify anti-liberal-democratic policies18, blind patriotism (i.e., unwavering national pride) and ethno-religious identity (i.e., Jewish) are likely to motivate biased support in an anti-democratic reform. On the other hand, constructive patriotism (i.e., accepting criticism of Israel) and the inclusive civic identity (i.e., Israeli) are likely to motivate biased opposition to it.
So far, we introduced factors that are likely to underlie motivated views on the reform and thus contribute to polarization. Additionally, we explored relevant psychological characteristics—generalized trust71 and universalism-benevolence values72. Previous research found a mutually reinforcing negative relationship between generalized trust and polarization73,74,75. Given its documented role in polarization, we included generalized trust as a person-oriented parallel to institutional trust76. Universalism and benevolence are two closely related social values which denote other-regarding preferences, prosocial orientation, and a willingness to extend such behaviors across group lines68. Universalism and benevolence values have been related to more liberal, left-leaning policies across national contexts77. As the judicial reform undermines liberal democratic values, we explored the potential role of endorsing universalism/benevolence values in polarization over the reform.
To examine polarization, we utilized a group-based approach78 and identified two camps—reflecting support of (pro-reform) and opposition to (anti-reform) the reform. We suggest that difference in views between these camps can motivate biased self-serving perceptions, both of others’ position on the reform as well as of the core issue at hand (i.e., understanding of democracy). First, self-serving motivated reasoning suggests that each camp is motivated to believe that most others hold a similar opinion, thus displaying the false consensus effect79. Second, even the importance each camp assigns to core features of democracy (e.g., majority rule, minority rights) is likely to be motivated to align with their polarized positions on the reform. For example, those whose current power position relies on majority rule principle are more likely endorse it than those who are currently harmed by this principle.
Finally, we examined potential downstream consequences of polarization that can be detrimental to social cohesion and impact intergroup relations. It is likely that people’s views on the reform (i.e., pro- vs. anti-reform) motivate how they would perceive the legitimacy of various responses to it. Whereas much work has been conducted on the long-term consequences of polarization (e.g., lower political interest, decision-making gridlock, erosion of democratic processes, and lower general trust4,5,6), little is known about the more immediate, practical effects of polarization amid an ongoing social conflict (but see ref. 80). To fill this gap, we investigated four central groups of outcomes that are particularly relevant to the current context: endorsement of extreme protest methods (e.g., general strike), support for protest control (e.g., stun grenades), attitudes to conflict management strategies81,82 (e.g., willingness to compromise), and delegitimization of political opponents (e.g., questioning their understanding of democracy). Our use of cross-sectional data precludes us from inferring causality; however, we argue that it is nevertheless useful to speak in terms of downstream consequences, as these consequences emerged after the judicial reform had split society into camps. Note, all the consequences we investigated may also act as reinforcers of polarization, thus creating a positive feedback loop.
In the current research, we adopted a data-driven exploratory approach to study polarization over the controversial judicial reform and its possible downstream consequences. Because we argue that the disagreements about the reform reflect contradictory views of democracy, our key dependent variable assessed the extent to which people view the reform as a threat to democracy. Our analysis showed that the reform split people into two opposing camps. We examined pre-existing differences between these pro- and anti-reform camps in national identity, patriotism, and institutional trust, as well as potentially motivated differences in perceptions between them (i.e., importance of democratic principles, false consensus). We extended the scope of our investigation to three types of polarization—issue-based78 (i.e., extremity of one’s view pro or against the reform), affective6,83 (i.e., extent of negative emotions towards political opponents), and perceived societal polarization84 (i.e., extent to which one views society as polarized in general.) Issue-based and affective polarization touch directly on the reform and the resulting pro- and anti-reform camps, whereas perceived societal polarization goes beyond the specific issue at hand. As little is known about how each of these polarization types relates to national identity, patriotism, and institutional trust (but see ref. 44 for affective polarization and institutional trust), we examined how the aforementioned pre-existing differences between camps relate to each type of polarization. Finally, whereas most previous research showed that all types of polarization are associated with negative long-term consequences (e.g., loss of social cohesion85, negative partisanship86, democratic backsliding87,88), we focused on shorter-term downstream consequences.
To summarize, we focused on the following research questions:
Q1: How do institutional trust and patriotism relate to individuals’ views on the unfolding, polarizing issue of the judicial reform?
Q2: How do people from different camps differ (e.g., in degree of polarization, in prioritizing central features of democracy)?
Q3: How do institutional trust and patriotism predict different types of polarization (i.e., issue-based, affective, and perceived societal), for pro- and anti-reform camps?
Q4: How do different types of polarization predict immediate downstream consequences (e.g., conflict management strategies) amid an unfolding social conflict for pro- and anti-reform camps?
Our research questions stem from two broad pre-registered aims. Specifically, we aimed to understand Israeli Jews’ polarized views on the reform (Q1 and Q2) and to examine potential downstream consequences of polarization (Q4). Another, more specific, pre-registered aim was to examine potential shifts in views on the reform. For this we collected data in two waves set approximately two months apart. Given that shift in views was relatively minor and only significant for the pro-reform camp, we report this finding in the Results section and do not discuss it. In addition to the pre-registered aims, as the literature addresses different types of polarization, we used the same predictors as those used to understand Israeli Jews’ polarized views on the reform to understand what predicts issue-based, affective, and perceived societal polarization (Q3).
Methods
Sample, recruitment, and exclusions
We collected data in two waves. In the first wave (T1; March 9–12, 2023), we recruited 822 participants via the Midgam Project Web Panel, an Israeli polling company, to take part in a large study on intergroup relations. We sampled a representative sample (in terms of age and gender) of only the majority Israeli population, as we did not sample two hard-to-reach minority groups (Ultra-Orthodox Jews and Palestinian citizens of Israel). To understand the situation in more depth, we ran a pre-registered follow-up wave (T2; May 8–11, 2023, pre-registered on May 8, https://aspredicted.org/JMP_QKT), contacting only 709 participants who completed the T1 survey and passed a pre-registered attention check. The majority (N = 584) responded to the call. This loss of respondents should not be regarded in terms of a classic drop-out rate because at T1 participants were unaware that we will contact them again at T2.
We excluded 30 participants who failed one pre-registered criterion (completed the survey in less than 4 min). Of the remaining 554 participants, 56 participants had incomplete data and could not be analyzed (i.e., political affiliation, demographic data, dependent variables). The final sample included 498 Israeli Jews (249 women, 249 men; ages 18–64, Mage = 42.27, SDage = 12.10). Information on gender was provided by participants (see Table 1). The majority identified as secular (61.04%). Regarding political orientation (1 = extreme left, 5 = center, 9 = extreme right), 7.23%, identified as left-leaning (1–3), 55.62% as center (4–6), and 37.15% as right-leaning (7–9).
In addition to the pre-registered exclusion we applied, we also pre-registered exclusions based on identical responses to opposing items. Upon additional review we realized that identical responses to these items do not necessarily indicate low-quality responses that merit exclusion (e.g., a person who disagrees with both the item The reform is crucial for Israel’s democracy and the item The reform is a threat to democracy), as these items are not logically opposing. Moreover, excluding participants based on this criterion reduced the sample by 40.6%. Therefore, we decided to forgo this exclusion criterion. For transparency, we reproduced the core analyses using the original pre-registered criteria and present the key figures and tables in Supplementary Methods 5.
Participants were compensated separately for each survey, as per the panel’s guidelines. This study was approved by the Psychology Department Ethic Review Board at Bar Ilan University (#2023/49/1 and #2023/30). We followed all relevant ethical regulations and obtained informed consent from participants.
Procedure and materials
Table 1 presents study variables, including example items, number of items for each variable, Cronbach’s α, scales, and the wave in which the variable was assessed (see Supplementary Methods 1 in the SI for a full list of translated items).
Pre-existing factors
As pre-registered, we assessed institutional trust (in judiciary, government, parliament, and media) in T1 and T2. Blind and constructive patriotism89, civic identity (i.e., identification with Israelis), and ethno-religious identity (i.e., identification with Jews) were only assessed in T1. Additionally we assessed relevant psychological characteristics: adherence to universalism/benevolence values90 (T1) and generalized trust (T2). We received demographic information from the panel, except for political orientation, gender, and religiosity.
View of reform as threat
We assessed participants’ views of the reform as a threat to democracy in T1 and T2. Inspecting the distribution of responses to this item provides a method for observing polarization and therefore we pre-registered views of the reform as a threat to democracy as one of the key dependent variables.
Issue-based polarization
Issue-based polarization manifests when people hold extreme positions regarding the reform-as-threat item. Specifically, if people are polarized about the issue, many people will perceive the reform as no threat at all (e.g., select “1” in response to this item, on the 7-point scale) and many others will perceive the reform as a great threat (e.g., select “7”). To assess issue-based polarization more directly, we created a measure of how extreme participants’ views were by calculating the absolute deviation of each participant’s response to the reform-as-threat item (in T1 and in T2) from the 7-point scale’s mid-point (4). We used the mid-point for two reasons: (1) to avoid underestimating the possibility one cluster tends more towards the extreme ends of the scale than the other, and (2) to ease interpretation of views extremity. Issue-based polarization reflects the degree to which views of the reform-as-threat are polarized (i.e., tend towards the extremes and away from the neutral position).
Affective polarization
Participants rated their negative (5 items) and positive (3 items, reverse-coded) emotions both towards those who support and those who oppose the reform, as to not bias participants’ responses. For each participant, we used only the items reflecting emotions towards the opposing camp. Higher scores indicated more negative affect towards the opposing camp.
Perceived societal polarization
Participants rated the extent to which they think Israel is polarized, without mentioning the reform. Higher scores indicated higher perceived polarization.
Motivated perceptions
We assessed two perceptions that can be motivated by participants’ views on the reform—false consensus and importance of democratic features. To assess false consensus, we looked at participants’ perceptions of the distribution of opinions about the reform in the population. Participants indicated the percentage of the population that supports, opposes, and has no opinion about the reform (adding up to 100). False consensus manifests when participants estimate their own camp (either pro- or anti-reform) as larger than the other camps. To assess importance of democratic features, we presented participants with six features—majority rule, separation of power between branches of government, protection of minority rights, independent and free media, free elections, and protection of human rights for everyone equally. Participants rated the extent to which they believe each feature is important to Israel’s democracy.
Motivated downstream consequences
Participants rated their opinions regarding downstream consequences that can be motivated by the extremity of their views on the reform (i.e., issue-based polarization) and their feeling towards opposing camps (i.e., affective polarization). Following Exploratory Factor Analysis (see Supplementary Methods 4 in SI for full description), we focused on four immediate downstream consequences of polarization: endorsement of extreme protest methods (e.g., civil revolt), support of extreme protest control (e.g., police violence), conflict management strategies (e.g., compromise, dialogue), and delegitimization of political opponents. Delegitimization was assessed in the context of the judicial reform. Participants rated characteristics of people who support the reform and of people who oppose it (e.g., “They do not understand what democracy is”, “They want revenge”). As with affective polarization, for each participant, we used only the items reflecting delegitimization of the opposing camp. Higher scores indicated greater delegitimization.
Statistics and reproducibility
We pre-registered hierarchal (multi-level) linear regressions as the analytical tool to answer our main questions. We conducted additional analyses (e.g., cluster analysis, Welch’s t-tests, mixed ANOVAs) when a more comprehensive exploration was required. All tests were two-tailed. All data was analyzed using R software 4.3.0 in RStudio 2023.03.1. Distributions of errors were assumed to be normal, but this was not formally tested. We applied the Greenhouse-Geiser correction for the sphericity assumption.
Results
We present the results in four sections, corresponding to the four research questions. To answer Q1, we established the polarized nature of views on the reform and its association with pre-existing factors (e.g., institutional trust, generalized trust). We also examined potential shifts in views across data collection waves. To answer Q2, we used cluster analysis to group participants based on their views of the reform and political orientation. We then compared the two clusters that emerged (pro- vs. anti-reform) on pre-existing factors, motivated perceptions, and downstream consequences. To answer Q3, we examined whether pre-existing factors predict issue-based, affective, and perceived polarization, and whether these associations vary between the clusters. To answer Q4, we examined how different types of polarization motivate various downstream consequences (e.g., endorsement of extreme protest actions).
Q1: Understanding views on the reform
Observing polarization
First, to establish that the judicial reform is indeed a highly polarized issue, we examined the distribution of participants’ agreement with the reform-as-threat item. The distribution deviated from normality (T1: Shapiro–Wilk test: W = 0.83, p < 0.001; kurtosis: −1.50, SE = 0.22; T2: Shapiro–Wilk test: W = 0.83, p < 0.001; kurtosis: −1.58, SE = 0.22), and is best described as bimodal, thus reflecting polarization (Fig. 1). Although the reform was viewed, on average, as more threatening in T1 (M = 4.43, SD = 2.40) than in T2 (M = 4.19, SD = 2.41; t(497) = 3.61, p < 0.001, d = 0.10), this difference was driven by a minority of participants. Most participants (56.22%) reported identical views across T1 and T2. For 33.53% of the sample, responses deviated up to two scale points, either above or below their initial ratings, whereas only 10.25% changed their minds more drastically.
Time 1 (T1) distribution appears in light blue, Time 2 (T2) distribution appears in dark blue. Responses ranged from 1 = Disagree completely to 7 = Agree completely. N = 498.
Predicting view of the reform as threat
To better understand views of the reform as a threat at T1 and T2, we fit a linear mixed model (LMM) predicting views from pre-existing factors—patriotism (constructive, blind), national identity (civic, ethno-religious), trust in democratic institutions (judiciary, government, parliament, media), and wave (T1 vs. T2). We controlled for demographic indicators (gender, age, education, subjective socio-economic status, degree of religiosity), political orientation, psychological characteristics (universalism/benevolence and generalized trust), and participants as a random intercept. To understand whether the relationship between institutional trust and views has shifted, we included interactions between wave and trust in each democratic institution. All predictors were mean-centered. Of note, this model examines predictors of views and does not yet address issue-based polarization.
The model (Table 2) explained a considerable proportion of the variance (RAdj2 = 0.63). Reflecting the heart of the current issue, greater trust in the judiciary was associated with higher perceived threat from the reform, whereas greater trust in government was associated with lower perceived threat. Greater trust in media was also associated with higher perceived threat. The more participants self-identified as left-leaning politically and reported greater levels of constructive patriotism and civic identity, the more they viewed the reform as a threat. Lower levels of blind patriotism were associated with higher perceived threat. The effect of wave was significant, indicating a decrease in perceived threat from T1 to T2. However, the wave × institutional trust interactions were not significant.
Q2: Characterizing pro- and anti-reform camps
Cluster analysis
To cluster participants into camps reflecting their views on the reform we conducted a hierarchical clustering using the factoextra package in R. Given that the reform is a highly politicized issue, we clustered participants based on their political orientation and their views of the reform as threat (i.e., the polarizing issue) averaged across T1 and T2. Two clusters emerged as the optimal number of clusters, supporting the existence of two main camps. A visual inspection of the associated dendogram and the Elbow method (see Supplementary Methods 2, Figs. S1 and S2 in SI) supported the two-cluster solution. The anti-reform cluster (N = 262) comprised participants who view the reform as a threat to democracy (M = 6.14, SD = 1.03), and whose political orientations average to the center (M = 4.99, SD = 1.22). The pro-reform cluster was similar in size (N = 236), did not view the reform as a threat (M = 2.29, SD = 1.44) and was politically right-leaning (M = 6.91, SD = 1.07).
Shifts in views by cluster
To further explore the observed decrease in perception of threat found in the “predicting view of the reform as threat” analysis, we conducted a repeated-measured ANOVA with a 2 (cluster: pro, anti) x 2 (time: T1, T2) on views of the reform. We found a main effect of cluster F(1, 496) = 1199.81, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.71, and a main effect of time, F(1, 496) = 13.99, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.03, indicating that the anti-reform cluster viewed the reform as more threatening and that the overall perceived threat decreased from T1 to T2. These main effects were qualified by a cluster × time interaction, F(1, 496) = 5.21, p = 0.023, ηp2 = 0.01. Pairwise comparisons indicated the shift was driven by pro-reform participants (MT1 = 2.48, SD = 1.84; MT2 = 2.09, SD = 1.48), t = 4.15, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.034. There was no significant shift among anti-reform participants (MT1 = 6.19, SD = 1.17; MT2 = 6.09, SD = 1.22), t = 1.06, p = 0.290, ηp2 = 0.002.
Comparisons between clusters
We compared clusters’ pre-existing factors (i.e., psychological characteristics, identity, patriotism, and institutional trust), polarization, and motivated downstream consequences (Fig. 2). We found difference in pre-existing factors between the camps that might be differentially motivating. Pro-reform participants held stronger ethno-religious and civic identities than anti-reform participants. Notably, pro-reform participants held an especially strong ethno-religious identity (6.33 on a 7-point scale). Anti-reform (vs. pro-reform) participants expressed more constructive patriotism and less blind patriotism. They also indicated more trust in the judiciary and media, and less trust in the government and parliament than pro-reform participants. Extremity of one’s view on the reform (i.e., issue-based polarization) was greater among anti-reform participants and they also perceived Israel as more polarized in general, as compared to pro-reform participants. There were also difference in downstream consequences; anti-reform participants simultaneously expressed greater support for conflict management and greater endorsement of extreme protest methods, but they supported extreme protest control methods less than pro-reform participants.
Results of t-tests comparing pro-reform (purple) and anti-reform (green) clusters on various study measures. Items were rated from 1 = completely disagree to 7 = completely agree (except for universalism/benevolence: 1–6; patriotism and institutional trust: 1–5). Dashed lines indicate upper scale limit. Variables with significant differences between clusters are bolded. PC = psychological characteristics; I = identity; Pat = patriotism; T = institutional trust; Pol = polarization; DC = downstream consequences. Circles denote cluster means and error bars denote 95% CIs. Ngeneralized trust = 490, all other Ns = 498.
Clusters also differed in political orientation (Fig. 3). Pro-reform participants leaned politically further to the right than anti-reform participants, t(495.61) = −18.71, p < 0.001, 95%CI[−2.12, −1.71], d = 1.67. Yet, anti-reform participants identified across the entire left-right political spectrum, indicating that this issue goes beyond party loyalties and represents a different axis of disagreement.
N = 498 participants indicated their political orientation on a 9-point scale (1 = extreme left, 5 = center, 9 = extreme right). Pro-reform cluster appears in purple, anti-reform cluster appears in green.
Motivated perceptions—false consensus
We were interested in whether participants estimate their own camp (pro- vs. anti-reform) as larger than the other camps (reflecting false consensus) and whether this biased perception might also be motivated by issue-based polarization (i.e., the extremity of one’s view on the issue). To do that, we ran a mixed-model ANOVA on estimated camp size, with cluster (pro, anti) and issue-based polarization (0 = neutral view, 1 = moderate view, 2 = extreme view, 3 = most extreme view) as the between-participants factors and estimated camp (pro, no opinion, anti) at the repeated-measures factor.
First, the cluster × estimated camp interaction, F(1.98,971.45) = 53.24, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.10, indicated a false consensus effect. Specifically, the pro-reform cluster estimated that most people support the reform (M = 50.82%, SD = 18.84) and that about one-third oppose it (M = 32.34%, SD = 13.25). The anti-reform cluster estimated that most people oppose the reform (M = 53.52%, SD = 16.64) and that about one-third support it (M = 31.12%, SD = 13.25). Both clusters estimated the neutral opinion as uncommon (MAntiReform = 15.36%, SD = 15.13; MProReform = 16.84%, SD = 14.75). This interaction was qualified by the cluster × issue-based polarization × estimated camp interaction, F(5.95,971.45) = 10.75, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.06 (Fig. 4). People who held extreme views expressed greater false consensus than people who were less extreme. Follow-up interaction contrasts indicated that the cluster × estimated camp size interaction, which reflects false consensus, was significant for the most extreme participants, F(2,490) = 138.97, p < 0.001, and the extreme participants, F(2490) = 29.21, p < 0.001. This two-way interaction was not significant for the moderate, F(2,490) = 0.75, p = 0.475, and neutral participants, F(2,490) = 1.93, p = 0.146.
Percent estimation of camp as a function of estimated camp (Pro = pro-reform, No-opinion, Anti = anti-reform), cluster (red: pro-reform, green: anti-reform) and level of issue-based polarization (0 = neutral view, 1 = moderate view, 2 = extreme view, 3 = most extreme view). N = 498. Error bars denote 95% CIs.
Note that because the percentages that participants assigned to the three camps sum up to 100, there was no variance between participants across the different estimated camp repeated-measures factor. Therefore, the main effects of the between-participants variables and their interaction are uninterpretable (for similar analysis, see ref. 91). The interaction between issue-based polarization and estimated camp size is also meaningless, as it provides information about a person’s extremity without the direction (pro- or anti-reform) of said extremity. Therefore, we reported above only the meaningful two-way and three-way interactions.
Motivated perceptions—features of democracy
We compared the clusters in terms of the importance they assigned to different democratic features (Fig. 5). Specifically, anti-reform (vs. pro-reform) participants assigned greater importance to five of the six features—separation of power between branches of government, t(458.31) = 4.76, p < 0.001, 95%CI[0.37, 0.88], d = 0.43, N = 494; protection of minority rights, t(422.07) = 7.25, p < 0.001, 95%CI[0.63, 1.11], d = 0.66, N = 496; independent and free media, t(398.59) = 6.20, p < 0.001, 95%CI[0.50, 0.97], d = 0.57, N = 495; free elections, t(444.38) = 3.26, p = 0.001, 95%CI[0.13, 0.54], d = 0.30, N = 496; protection of equal human rights, t(396.78) = 7.43, p < 0.001, 95%CI[0.68, 1.17], d = 0.68, N = 495. Majority rule was the only exception to this pattern—pro-reform participates (who are represented by the ruling majority—the government that proposed the reform) rated this democratic feature as more important than anti-reform participants, t(493) = −4.22, p < 0.001, 95%CI[−0.80, −0.29], d = 0.38, N = 495.
Ratings of importance of democracy features (1 = not important at all, 7 = very important) by cluster. Majority rule (light orange), separation of power (mustard), minority rights (green), free media (turquoise), free elections (purple), and equal human rights (pink). NMajority rule = 495, NSeparation of power = 494, NMinority rights = 496, NFree media = 495, NFree elections = 496, NEqual human rights = 495.
Q3: Predicting different types of polarization
For each of the three polarization types, we fitted a linear model using the same predictors (mean centered) as those predicting views of the reform as threat (Q1): patriotism (constructive, blind), national identity (civic, ethno-religious), trust in democratic institutions (judiciary, government, parliament, media). In this analysis, we included cluster and excluded political orientation, as cluster took into account political orientation. We again controlled for demographic indicators (gender, age, education, subjective socio-economic status, degree of religiosity) and psychological characteristics (universalism/benevolence, generalized trust). To further examine differences between camps, we included interactions with cluster. This allowed us to explore the motivated associations between each predictor and polarization. For example, for the pro-reform cluster, trust in government should positively associate with issue-based polarization (i.e., view extremity), reflecting that the more they trust the government, the more extreme their view (i.e., that the reform is not a threat) is; conversely, for the anti-reform cluster, trust in government should negatively associate with issue-based polarization, reflecting that the more they trust the government, the less extreme their view (that the reform is a threat) is.
Issue-based polarization
Issue-based polarization reflects how extreme participants’ views of the reform are. Of note, whereas Q1 addressed views on the reform, the current analysis predicts the degree to which those views are polarized. Because issue-based polarization was uniquely measured in both waves of data collection, we fit a linear mixed model (LMM), adding wave as a fixed effect and participants as a random intercept.
As Table 3 (Model 1) shows, in the anti-reform cluster, civic identity and constructive patriotism predicted more polarization. In the pro-reform cluster, ethno-religious identity predicted more polarization and constructive patriotism predicted less polarization. Institutional trust might also reflect that polarization is motivated. Specifically, in the anti-reform cluster, more trust in government predicted less polarization whereas more trust in media predicted more polarization. In the pro-reform cluster, more trust in government predicted more polarization whereas more trust in the judiciary predicted less polarization.
Affective polarization
As Table 3 (model 2) shows, across clusters, universalism/benevolence predicted less affective polarization. More constructive patriotism predicted more affective polarization in the anti-reform cluster. Trust in the judiciary, government, and media showed the same pattern as in issue-based polarization, suggesting that affective polarization might be motivated by institutional trust similarly to issue-based polarization.
Perceived societal polarization
In line with the notion that perceived societal polarization does not directly concern the current issue, we found that more universalism/benevolence values and less generalized trust associated with more polarization across clusters. Unlike issue-based and affective polarization, for perceived societal polarization the associations with national identity, patriotism, institutional trust, as well as their interactions with cluster were non-significant.
Q4: Predicting downstream consequences of polarization
Finally, we examined how issue-based, affective, and perceived societal polarization are associated with immediate downstream consequences. We included interactions of polarization types with the cluster variable to examine whether a given motivated consequence was differently associated with polarization for each cluster (i.e., suggesting that polarization could have driven participants from different clusters in opposing directions, reflected in a significant interaction term), or the association was similar for both clusters (reflected in main effects of polarization). From the perspective of motivated reasoning, we were mainly interested in issue-based and affective polarization which directly relate to the issue at hand.
Downstream consequences
We fitted linear models controlling for demographic characteristics as in previous analyses. Following an Exploratory Factor Analysis (see Supplementary Methods 4 in SI), we focused on four immediate downstream consequences of polarization. The results are presented in Table 4. As we already reported effects of cluster on downstream consequences when answering Q2 above, we do not reiterate them here.
Protest methods
Perceived polarization was associated with greater endorsement of extreme protest methods across clusters. Issue-based polarization interacted with cluster. Supporting the notion that endorsement of extreme protest methods might reflect motivated reasoning, among anti-reform participants (whose camp consistently protested the reform), the more extreme their views were, the more they endorsed protest methods. For pro-reform participants, the more extreme their views were, the less they endorsed protest methods.
Protest control
Issue-based and affective polarization interacted with cluster. Supporting the notion that endorsement of extreme protest control might be motivated, for anti-reform participants, the more extreme their views on the reform were, the less they endorsed protest control. For pro-reform participants, the more extreme their views were and the more negatively they felt about the anti-reform camp, the more they endorsed protest control.
Conflict management strategies
Issue-based and affective polarization were associated with less favorable views of conflict management strategies across clusters. Interactions with cluster were not significant.
Delegitimization of political opponents
Issue-based and affective polarization were associated with greater delegitimization. Perceived societal polarization interacted with cluster. For the anti-reform cluster, the more participants perceived society as polarized, the more they delegitimized their political opponents.
Discussion
We found that Israeli Jews are polarized over the judicial reform issue, reflecting two distinct camps—pro- and anti-reform. Though we observed some shifts in views of the reform as a threat to democracy, most participants did not change their views, and the observed shift was a result of a decrease in pro-reform participants’ perception of threat (i.e., they became more extreme in their views). Views of the reform transcend political orientation and party loyalties, and land instead on concepts of national identity, patriotism, and institutional trust. Even though most pro-reform participants were firmly right wing, opposition to the reform emerged across the entire political spectrum92. The anti- (vs. pro-) reform camp exemplified more liberal values: they expressed more universalism/benevolence values, more constructive patriotism, and had higher trust in the judiciary and media. The pro- (vs. anti-) reform camp appeared more conservative: they held a more exclusive ethno-religious identity, engaged in more blind patriotism, and had higher trust in the government. We suggest that these pre-existing differences motivated the groups’ opposing views on the newly emerged reform.
In the era of global democratic backsliding, we find support for the notion that trust in different democratic institutions might motivate polarized views on newly introduced political issues, especially when these issues concern democracy. The judicial reform in Israel is the government’s attempt to gain power over the judiciary. Reflecting motivated reasoning, trusting the government predicted issue-based and affective polarization (both of which are directly related to the reform) in opposing directions for the two camps. We found evidence for the importance of trust in media, which predicted greater issue-based and affective polarization among the anti-reform camp. This highlights the importance of media in democratic processes, but also suggests that its reach may be limited to people who believe that the media shares their ideology93,94.
Adding to the literature on patriotism and polarization, we found that constructive patriotism was associated with more perceived threat from the reform, whereas blind patriotism was associated with less perceived threat, indicating that patriotism plays a role in views of anti-liberal-democratic policies. Constructive patriotism also played a role in the reform-related issue-based and affective polarization. Willingness to critique one’s country, often associated with beneficial outcomes (e.g., positive outgroup attitudes)95,96, was indeed related to less issue-based polarization among the pro-reform camp. However, constructive patriotism also had a “dark side”, as it likely motivated greater issue-based and affective polarization among those who oppose the reform. It is possible that constructive patriotism specifically motivates polarization over liberal-democratic policies, so that a sense of national fallibility drives both greater emphasis on liberal-democratic principles and negative emotions towards those who threaten them. Given that patriotism was not assessed in the context of the reform (i.e., assessed only at T1, before mentioning the reform), it is unlikely that anti-reform participants’ constructive patriotism merely reflects criticism of the reform or the ruling government specifically. Rather, constructive patriotism and liberal-democratic values might motivate extreme views of threats to those values and dislike of people who support such anti-liberal policies.
National identity also seemed to play a motivating role, but only for issue-based polarization. Similarly to constructive patriotism, holding the more inclusive civic identity was associated with more issue-based polarization in the anti-reform camp. This camp likely regards criticism of governmental institutions and policies as a civic duty related to their civic identity as Israelis, thus motivating more extreme views of the reform. Ethno-religious identity, on the other hand, was associated with more extreme views in the pro-reform camp. These findings indicate a connection between more inclusive social identities and liberal-democratic attitudes, and vice versa—the connection between exclusive social identities and political preferences which lean away from liberal democracy97,98.
So far, we discussed findings supporting the notion that pre-existing ideologically based factors motived people’s views on an emerging political issue, polarizing them into two camps. Our findings further demonstrate perceptions which might be motivated by people’s membership in these camps—false consensus and prioritizing different democratic features. First, our results demonstrate false consensus, a self-serving motivated bias79. Each camp believed that a majority of fellow citizens shared their views, suggesting that people in our sample might have been motivated to believe that their opinion is supported by most of the population. Furthermore, adding both to the literature on polarization and on false consensus, we found that those who were more polarized about an issue (i.e., held more extreme views on the issue) showed greater false consensus, suggesting that this self- and group-serving bias might be motivated by extreme views. Taken together, our findings may indicate that in the context of polarization, people who hold extreme views may use the biased belief that they belong to the majority (i.e., false consensus) to motivate and justify unwillingness to compromise, animosity, and aggression towards opponents, further deepening the divide. Future research should more directly examine the consequences of false consensus in the context of polarization. A second motivated perception was related to the core issue at hand—the importance each camp assigns to core features of democracy. We found that indeed the pro-reform camp, who are currently in power (i.e., are represented by the elected government), prioritize the majority rule principle more than the anti-reform camp, who downplay the importance of this principle. Presumably, the anti-reform camp assign the lowest importance to this principle because the reform, which they perceive as a threat to democracy, was made possible based on majority rule. The lower importance that pro-reform participants assigned to other principles is also likely to be motivated by pre-existing institutional trust (separation of power, free media) and ethno-religious identity, as well as endorsement of blind patriotism (equal human rights, minority rights). Our results echo findings from candidate choice experiments99,100 which showed that participants with strong partisan identity and desire for ingroup advantage were willing to weaken restraints on the executive (i.e., government) in favor of their ideological agendas. The notion that patriotism, identity and ideology might underline endorsement of core democratic principles paints a concerning picture of how people form their political views.
This work extends our understanding of the consequences of polarization. Focusing on immediate, rather than long-term e.g., refs. 85,88 consequences, we find that people’s endorsement of extreme protest methods and protest control were motivated by polarized views of the issue. Specifically, anti-reform participants, whose camp was protesting the reform on a weekly basis, legitimized extreme protest methods (e.g., blocking roads) and delegitimized protest control (e.g., using stun grenades against protesters) the more extreme their views against the reform were. Pro-reform participants, on the other hand, delegitimized extreme protest methods and legitimized protest control the more extreme their views supporting the reform were. In the pro-reform cluster, more extreme affective polarization was associated with legitimizing aggressive protest control means, supporting the idea that emotional reaction play a role in motivated reasoning101,102. For conflict management strategies and delegitimization of political opponents, we found that the more extreme people’s views on the reform and negative emotions towards political opponents were the less they endorsed various conflict management strategies (e.g., willingness to compromise, dialogue) and the more they delegitimized opponents. This suggests that both issue-based and affective polarization motivate people to remain in their position, driving them away from the other side, potentially undermining conflict resolution.
Limitations
We acknowledge several methodological limitations of the current study. First, although we recruited a representative sample in terms of age and gender, we did so only for the majority Jewish population in Israel, excluding two minority groups: Ultra-Orthodox Jews and Palestinian citizens of Israel. As such, we were unable to use our findings, especially those regarding camp sizes, as indicators of actual views of the reform in the Israeli population. This prevented us from, for example, examining which camp (pro-reform, anti-reform, or both) over-estimated their own camp’s size in the population. Second, our investigation was correlational, thus limiting causal inferences. Nevertheless, we can, at least partially, rely on pre-existing differences between groups in Israel e.g., ref. 52 and on the fact that these differences certainly preceded the reform, to establish temporal precedence103. Similarly, the reform, and therefore any polarization over this issue, preceded the downstream consequences we focused on. Specifically, protest methods and protest control referred directly to protesting the reform, conflict management strategies referred directly to resolving this conflict, and delegitimization of political opponents centered around their understanding and motives regarding the reform. This temporal precedence, in addition to the associations that we documented, provide two of three requirements for causal inference103. Future work should recruit a more representative sample and add the third requirement for establishing causality—disqualification of alternative explanations.
The current research was conducted shortly after the judicial reform was introduced. Although differences in institutional trust, blind versus constructive patriotism, and ethno-religious versus civic identity between groups in general, and pro- and anti-reform camps in particular, existed before the reform, our data cannot account for the underlying causes of these differences. One likely candidate is education, and more specifically Israel’s education system, which is segregated by ethnic and religious group membership104. Future research should examine whether this segregation leads to differences in the way people construct their national identity, criticize (vs. not) their nation, trust (vs. not) democratic institutions, and understand democracy105,106,107,108. Another avenue for future research is to examine whether and how segregated education systems contribute to issue-based and affective polarization.
Conclusion
The current work shows that polarization over a specific issue can develop rapidly when based on pre-existing positions that motivate it. People’s polarized views are in turn associated with self- and group-serving perceptions and with endorsement of actions that match their ideology. Motivated cognitive processes are likely playing a role in the global phenomenon of democratic backsliding by contributing to the ways people prioritize different democratic principles and therefore how they understand democracy at its core.
Data availability
Anonymized raw data is available on OSF.
Code availability
R-code used to conduct the current analyses in R software 4.3.0 with RStudio 2023.03.1 is available on OSF.
References
Carothers, T. & O’Donohue, A. Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization. (Brookings Institution Press, 2019).
Somer, M. & McCoy, J. Déjà vu? Polarization and endangered democracies in the 21st century. Am. Behav. Sci. 62, 3–15 (2018).
Enders, A. M. Issues versus affect: how do elite and mass polarization compare? J. Politics 83, 1872–1877 (2021).
McCoy, J., Rahman, T. & Somer, M. Polarization and the global crisis of democracy: common patterns, dynamics, and pernicious consequences for democratic polities. Am. Behav. Sci. 62, 16–42 (2018).
Robison, J. & Mullinix, K. J. Elite polarization and public opinion: how polarization is communicated and its effects. Polit. Commun. 33, 261–282 (2016).
Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N. & Westwood, S. J. The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 22, 129–146 (2019).
Lozada, M. Us or them? Social representations and imaginaries of the other in Venezuela. Pap. Soc. Represent. 23, 21.1–21.16 (2014).
Kunda, Z. The case for motivated reasoning. Psychol. Bull. 108, 480–498 (1990).
Breuer, E. Justice Minister announced plans for judicial reform: What happens now? The Jerusalem Post (2023).
Constitution Committee approves for first reading proposed amendment to Basic Law: The Judiciary and Courts Bill. Knesset News. https://main.knesset.gov.il/en/news/pressreleases/pages/press13223e.aspx (2023).
The Proper Procedures for the Enactment of Constitutional Reform: Summary of Position Paper #3. The Israeli Law Professors’ Forum for Democracy. https://www.lawprofsforum.org/post/the-proper-procedures-for-the-enactment-of-constitutional-reform-summary-of-position-paper (2023).
The Revolutionary Regime Transformation: A Summary Opinion #5. The Israeli Law Professors’ Forum for Democracy https://www.lawprofsforum.org/post/the-revolutionary-regimetransformation-a-summary-opinion-5 (2023).
The central Elections Committee of the 25th Knesset. https://votes25.bechirot.gov.il/ (2023).
Chabin, M. Israeli scientists speak out against ‘destructive’ education policies. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adk2723 (2023).
Albin, E., Bressler, S., Rolls, A., Schwartz, M. & Shapiro, E. No democracy, no academia. Science 381, 715–715 (2023).
Haaretz. Thousands Israeli health professionals to join general strike in protest of judicial overhaul. Haaretz (2023).
Gold, R., Greene, R. A. & Tal, A. Israel passed a bill to limit the Supreme Court’s power. Here’s what comes next. CNN (2023).
Vachudova, A. M. Ethnopopulism and democratic backsliding in Central Europe. East Eur. Politics 36, 318–340 (2020).
Bozóki, A. & Hegedűs, D. An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the European Union. Democratization 25, 1173–1189 (2018).
Ágh, A. The Orbán regime as the ‘perfect autocracy’: the emergence of the ‘zombie democracy’ in Hungary. Politics in Central Europe 18, 1–25 (2022).
Bogaards, M. De-democratization in Hungary: diffusely defective democracy. Democratization 25, 1481–1499 (2018).
Fomina, J. & Kucharczyk, J. Populism and protest in Poland. J. Democr. 27, 58–68 (2016).
Daly, T. G. Understanding multi-directional democratic decay: lessons from the rise of Bolsonaro in Brazil. Law Ethics Hum. Rights 14, 199–226 (2020).
Gidron, N., Sheffer, L. & Mor, G. The Israel polarization panel dataset, 2019–2021. Elect. Stud. 80, 102512 (2022).
Coppedge, M. et al. V-Dem Dataset v13. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/VDEMDS23 (2023).
Jamal, A. The rise of ‘bad civil society’ in Israel: nationalist civil society organizations and the politics of delegitimization. Social Science Open Access Repository 2, 1–8 (2018).
Jamal, A. & Kensicki, A. Theorizing half-statelessness: a case study of the Nation-State Law in Israel. Citizensh. Stud. 24, 769–785 (2020).
Tepe, S. The perils of polarization and religious parties: the democratic challenges of political fragmentation in Israel and Turkey. Democratization 20, 831–856 (2013).
Smooha, S. Minority status in an ethnic democracy: the status of the Arab minority in Israel. Ethn. Racial Stud. 13, 389–413 (1990).
Smooha, S. The model of ethnic democracy: Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Nations Natl 8, 475–503 (2002).
Berent, M. The ethnic democracy debate: how unique is Israel?: The ethnic democracy debate. Nations Natl 16, 657–674 (2010).
Ghanem, A. The expanding ethnocracy Judaization of the public sphere. Israel Stud. Rev. 26, 21–27 (2011).
Ben Porat, G. & Filc, D. Remember to be Jewish: religious populism in Israel. Politics Relig. 15, 61–84 (2022).
Knobloch-Westerwick, S., Mothes, C. & Polavin, N. Confirmation bias, ingroup bias, and negativity bias in selective exposure to political information. Commun. Res. 47, 104–124 (2020).
Arieli, S., Amit, A. & Mentser, S. Identity-motivated reasoning: biased judgments regarding political leaders and their actions. Cognition 188, 64–73 (2019).
Derreumaux, Y., Bergh, R. & Hughes, B. L. Partisan-motivated sampling: Re-examining politically motivated reasoning across the information processing stream. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 123, 316–336 (2022).
Ditto, P. H. et al. At least bias is bipartisan: a meta-analytic comparison of partisan bias in liberals and conservatives. Perspect Psychol. Sci. 14, 273–291 (2019).
Sharvit, K., Brambilla, M., Babush, M. & Colucci, F. P. To feel or not to feel when my group harms others? The regulation of collective guilt as motivated reasoning. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull 41, 1223–1235 (2015).
Jenke, L. Affective polarization and misinformation belief. Polit. Behav. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-022-09851-w. (2023).
Hadarics, M. & Kende, A. Negative stereotypes as motivated justifications for moral exclusion. J. Soc. Psychol. 159, 257–269 (2019).
Taber, C. S. & Lodge, M. Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs. Am. J. Political Sci. 50, 755–769 (2006).
Taber, C. S. & Lodge, M. The illusion of choice in democratic politics: the unconscious impact of motivated political reasoning. Polit. Psychol. 37, 61–85 (2016).
Vallier, K. Trust in a Polarized Age. (Oxford University Press, 2021).
Reiljan, A. & Ryan, A. Ideological tripolarization, partisan tribalism and institutional trust: the foundations of affective polarization in the Swedish multiparty system. Scand. Polit. Stud. 44, 195–219 (2021).
Reiljan, A., Garzia, D., Ferreira Da Silva, F. & Trechsel, A. H. Patterns of affective polarization toward parties and leaders across the democratic world. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000485 (2023).
Banda, K. K. & Kirkland, J. H. Legislative party polarization and trust in state legislatures. Am. Polit. Res. 46, 596–628 (2018).
Boda, Z. & Medve-Bálint, G. Politicized institutional trust in East Central Europe. Taiwan J. Democr. 16, 27–49 (2020).
Rekker, R. The nature and origins of political polarization over science. Public Underst. Sci. 30, 352–368 (2021).
Hetherington, M. “Why polarized trust matters”. Forum 13, 445–458 (2015).
Hetherington, M. J. & Rudolph, T. J. Why Washington Won’t Work: Polarization, Political Trust, and the Governing Crisis (University of Chicago Press, 2015).
Jones, D. R. Declining trust in congress: effects of polarization and consequences for democracy. Forum 13, 375–394 (2015).
Dekel, R. & Tuval-Mashiach, R. Multiple losses of social resources following collective trauma: the case of the forced relocation from Gush Katif. Psychol. Trauma: Theory Res. Pract. Policy 4, 56–65 (2012).
Hermann, T. et al. The National-Religious Sector in Israel 2014: Main Findings (Israel Democracy Institute, 2014).
Ben-Rafael, E. & Peres, Y. Is Israel One? (Brill, 2005).
Davidov, E. Measurement equivalence of nationalism and constructive patriotism in the ISSP: 34 countries in a comparative perspective. Polit. Anal. 17, 64–82 (2009).
Schatz, R. T., Staub, E. & Lavine, H. On the varieties of national attachment: blind versus constructive patriotism. Polit. Psychol. 20, 151–174 (1999).
Blank, T. & Schmidt, P. National identity in a United Germany: nationalism or patriotism? An empirical test with representative data. Polit. Psychol. 24, 289–312 (2003).
Hechter, M. Nationalism and rationality. JWSR 308–329. https://doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2000.226. (2000).
Perry, S. L. & Schleifer, C. My country, white or wrong: Christian nationalism, race, and blind patriotism. Ethn. Racial Stud. 46, 1249–1268 (2023).
Whitehead, A. L. & Perry, S. L. Taking America Back for God: Christian Nationalism in the United States. (Oxford University Press, 2020).
Handelman, D. Contradictions between citizenship and nationality: their consequences for ethnicity and inequality in Israel. Int. J. Polit. Cult. Soc. 7, 441–459 (1994).
Ram, U. National, ethnic or civic? Contensting paradigms of memory, identity and culture in Israel. Stud. Philos. Educ. 19, 405–422 (2000).
Diesendruck, G., Birnbaum, D., Deeb, I. & Segall, G. Learning what is essential: relative and absolute changes in children’s beliefs about the heritability of ethnicity. J. Cogn. Dev. 14, 546–560 (2013).
Katzir, M., Hoffmann, M. & Liberman, N. Disgust as an essentialist emotion that signals nonviolent outgrouping with potentially low social costs. Emotion 19, 841–862 (2019).
Segall, G., Birnbaum, D., Deeb, I. & Diesendruck, G. The intergenerational transmission of ethnic essentialism: how parents talk counts the most. Dev. Sci. 18, 543–555 (2015).
Yuchtman-Yaar, E., Alkalay, Y. & Aival, T. Effects of religious identity and ethnicity on the Israeli-Jewish electorate. Isr. Stud. Rev. 33, 1–20 (2018).
De Figueiredo, R. J. P. & Elkins, Z. Are patriots bigots? An inquiry into the vices of in-group pride. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 47, 171–188 (2003).
Schwartz, S. H. Universalism values and the inclusiveness of our moral universe. J. Cross-Cult. Psychol. 38, 711–728 (2007).
Hellström, A., Nilsson, T. & Stoltz, P. Nationalism vs. nationalism: the challenge of the Sweden democrats in the Swedish public debate. Gov. Oppos. 47, 186–205 (2012).
Berti, C. Right-wing populism and the criminalization of sea-rescue NGOs: the ‘Sea-Watch 3’ case in Italy, and Matteo Salvini’s communication on Facebook. Media Cult. Soc. 43, 532–550 (2021).
Yamagishi, T. & Yamagishi, M. Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan. Motiv. Emot. 18, 129–166 (1994).
Schwartz, S. H. et al. Refining the theory of basic individual values. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 103, 663–688 (2012).
Rapp, C. Moral opinion polarization and the erosion of trust. Soc. Sci. Res. 58, 34–45 (2016).
Torcal, M. & Thomson, Z. A. Social trust and affective polarization in Spain (2014–19). Elect. Stud. 81, 102582 (2023).
Skoog, L. & Karlsson, D. Perceptions of polarization among political representatives. Polit. Res. Exch. 4, 2124923 (2022).
Uslaner, E. M. The moral foundations of Trust. SSRN J. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.824504 (2002).
Piurko, Y., Schwartz, S. H. & Davidov, E. Basic personal values and the meaning of left‐right political orientations in 20 countries. Polit. Psychol. 32, 537–561 (2011).
Tang, T., Ghorbani, A., Squazzoni, F. & Chorus, C. G. Together alone: a group-based polarization measurement. Qual. Quant. 56, 3587–3619 (2022).
Ross, L., Greene, D. & House, P. The “false consensus effect”: an egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 13, 279–301 (1977).
Enders, A. M. & Armaly, M. T. The differential effects of actual and perceived polarization. Polit. Behav. 41, 815–839 (2019).
Elad-Strenger, J. & Shahar, G. Revisiting the effects of societal threat perceptions on conflict-related positions: a three-wave study. J. Confl. Resolut. 62, 1753–1783 (2018).
Lewicki, R. J., Hiam, A. & Olander, K., W. in Think Before You Speak: A Complete Guide to Strategic Negotiation 54–75 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996).
Brienza, J. P., Kung, F. Y. H. & Chao, M. M. Wise reasoning, intergroup positivity, and attitude polarization across contexts. Nat. Commun. 12, 3313 (2021).
Yang, J. et al. Why are “others” so polarized? Perceived political polarization and media use in 10 countries. J. Comput-Mediat. Comm. 21, 349–367 (2016).
Iyengar, S., Sood, G. & Lelkes, Y. Affect, not ideology. Public Opin. Q. 76, 405–431 (2012).
Abramowitz, A. & McCoy, J. United States: racial resentment, negative partisanship, and polarization in Trump’s America. Ann. Am. Acad. Political Soc. Sci. 681, 137–156 (2019).
Kingzette, J. et al. How affective polarization undermines support for democratic norms. Public Opin. Q. 85, 663–677 (2021).
Torcal, M. & Magalhães, P. C. Ideological extremism, perceived party system polarization, and support for democracy. Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev. 14, 188–205 (2022).
ISSP Research Group. International Social Survey Programme: National Identity III - ISSP 2013International Social Survey Programme: National Identity III - ISSP 2013. GESIS Data Archive. https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12312 (2015).
Schwartz, S. H. et al. Extending the cross-cultural validity of the theory of basic human values with a different method of measurement. J. Cross-Cult. Psychol. 32, 519–542 (2001).
Halali, E., Dorfman, A., Jun, S. & Halevy, N. More for us or more for me? Social dominance as parochial egoism. Soc. Psychol. Person. Sci. 9, 254–262 (2018).
Proch, J., Elad‐Strenger, J. & Kessler, T. Liberalism and conservatism, for a change! rethinking the association between political orientation and relation to societal change. Polit. Psychol. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12559 (2018).
Lammers, J., Crusius, J. & Gast, A. Correcting misperceptions of exponential coronavirus growth increases support for social distancing. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 117, 16264–16266 (2020).
Pennycook, G., McPhetres, J., Bago, B. & Rand, D. G. Beliefs About COVID-19 in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States: a novel test of political polarization and motivated reasoning. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 48, 750–765 (2022).
Schatz, R. T. in Handbook of Patriotism (ed. Sardoč, M.) 613–631 (Springer International Publishing, 2020).
Ariely, G. Globalization, immigration and national identity: how the level of globalization affects the relations between nationalism, constructive patriotism and attitudes toward immigrants? Group Process. Intergr. Relat. 15, 539–557 (2012).
Erhardt, J., Wamsler, S. & Freitag, M. National identity between democracy and autocracy: a comparative analysis of 24 countries. Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev. 13, 59–76 (2021).
Piwoni, E. & Mußotter, M. The evolution of the civic–ethnic distinction as a partial success story: lessons for the nationalism–patriotism distinction. Nations Natl 29, 906–921 (2023).
Gidengil, E., Stolle, D. & Bergeron‐Boutin, O. The partisan nature of support for democratic backsliding: a comparative perspective. Eur. J. Polit. Res. 61, 901–929 (2022).
Graham, M. H. & Svolik, M. W. Democracy in America? Partisanship, polarization, and the robustness of support for democracy in the United States. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 114, 392–409 (2020).
Porat, R., Tamir, M. & Halperin, E. Group-based emotion regulation: a motivated approach. Emotion 20, 16–20 (2020).
Spanovic, M., Lickel, B., Denson, T. F. & Petrovic, N. Fear and anger as predictors of motivation for intergroup aggression: evidence from Serbia and Republika Srpska. Group Process. Intergr. Relat. 13, 725–739 (2010).
Shadish, W. R., Cook, T. D. & Campbell, D. T. Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference. (Houghton Mifflin, 2001).
Blass, N. in State of the Nation Report 2018 (ed. Weiss, A.) 157–177 (Taub Center, 2018).
Resnik, J. Particularistic vs. universalistic content in the Israeli education system. Curriculum Inq. 29, 485–511 (1999).
Pinson, H. Neo Zionist right-wing populist discourse and activism in the Israel education system. Glob. Soc. Educ. 20, 124–137 (2022).
Pinson, H. In Citizenship, Education and Social Conflict (Routledge, 2010).
Pinson, H. & Agbaria, A. K. Ethno-nationalism in citizenship education in Israel: an analysis of the official civics textbook. Br. J. Sociol. Educ. 42, 733–751 (2021).
Acknowledgements
The authors received no specific funding for this work.
Funding
Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Contributions
D.S.: Conceptualization, data curation, formal analyses, methodology, writing—original draft, writing—review & editing. A.D.: Conceptualization, data curation, formal analyses, funding acquisition, methodology, visualization, supervision, writing—original draft, writing—review & editing. M.K.: Conceptualization, data curation, formal analyses, funding acquisition, methodology, visualization, supervision, writing—original draft, writing—review & editing.
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Competing interests
The authors declare no competing interests.
Peer review
Peer review information
Communications Psychology thanks Mete Sefa Uysal, Smadar Cohen-Chen and the other, anonymous, reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work. Primary Handling Editors: Antonia Eisenkoeck and Marike Schiffer. A peer review file is available.
Additional information
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Supplementary information
Rights and permissions
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
About this article
Cite this article
Simunovic, D., Dorfman, A. & Katzir, M. Exploring motivated reasoning in polarization over the unfolding 2023 judicial reform in Israel. Commun Psychol 2, 59 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1038/s44271-024-00080-x
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s44271-024-00080-x
- Springer Nature Limited