1 Introduction

Ports are pivotal infrastructures that underpin a nation’s urban, regional, and maritime economies, serving as vital nodes in the smooth flow of global goods and linking the world’s economic arteries. With the relentless march of globalization in the realms of economy and trade, ports have evolved into efficient distribution centers and comprehensive logistics hubs catering to various modes of transportation. An astounding 90% of global trade relies on the intricate network of ports and their seamless operations (Li et al., 2022). However, with this prominence come heightened vulnerabilities as ports worldwide face many challenges, ranging from theft to potential terrorist threats. Recognizing the critical role of ports in their nation’s economic vitality and their role in the global economic landscape, countries worldwide established the International Maritime Organization. The primary objective of this organization is to ensure the safety and security of ports and their operations. In a significant stride toward enhancing port security, the International Maritime Organization adopted the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code during the Maritime Security Diplomatic Conference held in London in December 2002. This code, which became operational on July 1, 2004, mandates contracting governments to institute security protocols for ships and port facilities. Gwadar Port, situated on the Arabian Sea’s coast in the southern region of Baluchistan Province, Pakistan, stands as an emblem of strategic maritime importance. Surrounded by the sea on three sides, it boasts a vast and deep harbor with an average depth of 14.5 meters, remaining ice-free throughout the year. Gwadar Port lies approximately 460 kilometers from Karachi Port and 400 kilometers from Port Qasim, with Iran to the west, just 120 kilometers from the Iranian border, and about 600 kilometers from India. Given its strategic location, Gwadar Port has piqued the interest of foreign investors. In 1998, the United States contemplated contributing to the development of Gwadar Port; however, various circumstances led to the abandonment of the plan. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, at Pakistan’s request, China stepped in to support the construction of Gwadar Port. This initiative marked one of China’s most substantial overseas investment projects. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a transformative undertaking, has injected substantial resources into this project. Initially valued at $46 billion, the actual investment has surged to over $50 billion. This monumental investment has spurred the creation of large-scale infrastructural links connecting China with South and Central Asia (Sengupta, 2024). It promises substantial economic dividends, benefiting approximately 3 billion people across the region and strengthening China’s energy and food security. In this evolving landscape of economic development and geopolitics, Gwadar Port finds itself at the center of intricate security considerations and management protocols. Its strategic significance extends beyond its economic role, playing a pivotal role in reshaping geopolitical dynamics, particularly in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The development of Gwadar Port as part of the CPEC raises concerns and strategic considerations that go beyond economic interests. As Gwadar Port gains importance for international collaboration and economic activities, it has also become a potential military asset. China’s interest in Gwadar Port as a strategic naval outpost is a topic of significant geopolitical discussion. The location of the port gives China strategic depth in the western Indian Ocean, enabling it to project power and potentially offset the naval influence of the United States and India. If China develops its naval capabilities in the Arabian Sea, it could exert control over critical maritime chokepoints, such as the Strait of Hormuz (Asef & Alam, 2020). The potential military use of Gwadar Port by China has significant implications. If the port were to become a permanent base for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), it would represent a major shift in the balance of power in the Indian Ocean. This strategy’s positioning could challenge India’s regional dominance and military capabilities, creating a new dynamic in the geopolitical landscape (Gill, 2019). To fully comprehend the significance of Gwadar Port, security management research must look beyond the economic aspect and account for geopolitical considerations. A comprehensive research approach should incorporate maritime safety, economic activities, and security challenges linked with the port project. It is crucial to understand the multifaceted dimension of Gwadar Port’s strategic importance to develop effective security strategies that not only protect economic interests but also address geopolitical implications. As Gwadar Port continues to grow as a significant player in regional connectivity and economic development, research efforts must keep up with the complexities of this strategic landscape and contribute to the formulation of policies that ensure the continued success and security of Gwadar Port in the ever-changing global scenario.

1.1 Theoretical framework

This research thoroughly analyses and recommends strategies for enhancing maritime security at Gwadar Port, Pakistan. It begins by recognizing the pivotal role of ports in global trade, followed by a detailed exploration of the economic and geopolitical context surrounding Gwadar Port. Emphasis is placed on its transformative impact on the China–Pakistan relationship and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Ali et al., 2024; Asef & Alam, 2020). This paper scrutinizes China’s strategic interests, potential military implications, and the security challenges posed by radical organizations. The evaluation is extended to encompass the multifaceted role of government agencies and local dynamics, considering economic disparities and local resistance. Special attention is given to the establishment of Task Force 88 as a crucial initiative to secure the port and counter potential sabotage (Kardon et al., 2020). Furthermore, the research explores historical naval base speculations and China’s current managerial role in Gwadar Port (Boni, 2016). By synthesizing these diverse elements, the paper aims to present a comprehensive understanding of the complex factors influencing maritime security at the port and proposes insightful measures (Javaid, 2023). This research exclusively adopts a qualitative research approach, employing content analysis to unpick the geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of Gwadar Port in the context of the CPEC and the BRI. Rooted in pertinent theoretical frameworks such as geoeconomics and liberalism, the realist perspective argues that the seas serve as the battleground for superpower or regional power competition. Current dialogues have centered on the ascendancy of China as a formidable naval force and the strategic shifts of the United States toward Asia. Additionally, attention has been drawn to the advances in naval capabilities by the emerging powers and the heightened competition for resources in the Arctic region (Blunden, 2009). The study systematically reviews official documents, government reports, and publications from developmental organizations to collect data. This methodological approach reflects an acknowledgment of the multifaceted nature of maritime security, which involves complex interactions among diverse elements. This research endeavor seeks to enrich the current body of knowledge by adopting a theoretical framework that facilitates a holistic comprehension of the economic, political, and geographical dynamics of maritime security. By drawing on theories such as geoeconomics, the research seeks to offer nuanced insights into the detailed dynamics surrounding Gwadar Port, ensuring a thorough qualitative exploration (Kong & Liu, 2021). Figure 1 describes the detailed framework of the research paper.

Fig. 1
figure 1

Integrated approach to strengthening maritime security

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1.2 Literature review

Maritime security stands as a focal point in the global arena, particularly as strategic ports emerge as vital conduits for fostering economic prosperity and maintaining regional equilibrium. This literature review thoroughly explores the complexities inherent in augmenting maritime security through a cohesive and integrated methodology with a specific focus on the case study of Gwadar Port in Pakistan. By synthesizing contemporary research and scholarly insights, this section endeavors to offer a comprehensive elucidation of the obstacles, tactics, and volatile dynamics involved in bolstering maritime security at Gwadar Port.

1.3 Reviewing maritime security beyond conventional frameworks

Throughout history, people have often perceived the sea as an unpredictable and dangerous place, unlike the perceived safety of the land. As John Mack rightly says, humans have always attempted to conquer the sea, but much of history and political discourse has relegated it to a secondary role (Jowitt et al., 2020). The sea is often seen as a passive background to land-based activities or merely a means of connecting coastal and inland affairs. This trend also extends to the field of international relations and security studies, where the sea is primarily viewed through lenses of power projection, interstate conflict, piracy threats or as a facilitator of global connections. In the past, the study of security matters related to maritime activities has been viewed from a conservative viewpoint based on either realist or liberalist theories. However, these viewpoints have not been influenced substantially by constructivist or critical security studies. Realist interpretations tend to view the sea as a theater for superpower rivalries or regional power struggles. This perspective tends to focus on issues such as China’s naval expansion, the US pivot to Asia, or resource competition in the Arctic (Yoon, 2021). Scholars who study sea power from a classical realist and geopolitical perspective dominate this perspective and emphasize historical analysis and military competition while overlooking the influence of bottom-up factors on international order. There are different interpretations regarding the regulation of maritime activities. The conservative interpretation emphasizes the role of individual states in the regulation of such activities, while the liberal interpretation focuses on the rise of international regimes governing maritime activities and highlights collective regulation and the legal framework. However, the liberal perspective often overlooks broader issues of maritime security governance and concentrates on technical regulations and formal international law (Staiano, 2022). Despite the evolution of security studies, maritime security has often been overlooked and traditional concerns about states, armed forces, and wars still dominate the discourse, and maritime security is a fairly new concept within security studies. Unlike traditional security studies that have encompassed a wide range of nontraditional security issues and actors, maritime security has lagged. The delay in integrating modern security theories, such as constructivism or critical security studies, has hindered the development of a comprehensive understanding of the current challenges in maritime security (Bueger & Edwards, 2020).

1.4 Gwadar Port’s impact on Indian Ocean geopolitics and global security

The IOR represents a critical juncture linking significant global domains, characterized by a confluence of security challenges, trade intricacies, and the strategic involvement of key stakeholders (Afzaal & Naqvi, 2024). Gwadar Port, as a linchpin of the BRI, serves as a focal point for heightened geopolitical tensions, particularly among major stakeholders such as China, India, and the United States. The discourse underscores the critical necessity of ensuring secure navigation within the IOR, recognizing its pivotal role in facilitating global economic engagement (Gonzalez Levaggi, 2024). Opportunities for enhancing maritime security through technological advancements and innovative approaches are explored, recognizing the complex geopolitical landscape and potential threats (Ali et al., 2024).

1.5 Strengthening security management for china and pakistan’s interests

Gwadar Port is of paramount significance for Pakistan’s economy, envisioned as playing a transformative role as the largest port in the Middle East and Pakistan’s future commercial center (Naz & Ali, 2018). Advocating for strengthened maritime cooperation, policy dialogue, and strategic communication, their study emphasizes the need for a comprehensive approach to maritime issues. Recognizing the port’s role in national security, the study emphasizes the importance of research on security management to ensure domestic security (Chang & Khan, 2019).

1.6 Ensuring domestic security in Pakistan through Gwadar Port

Port infrastructure, acting as a transportation hub and strategic asset for national security, demands attention (Feng et al., 2020). Recognizing the complex interactions among stakeholders, the paper emphasizes potential disruptions to national economic, political, and cultural security due to port instability (Chang & Khan, 2019). Strengthening research on Gwadar Port’s security management becomes imperative to ensure domestic security in Pakistan.

1.7 Supporting the belt and road strategy

Gwadar Port’s accelerated development aligns with the BRI, emphasizing the construction of an international intermodal transport corridor (Ruan, 2019). The research suggests that security management is crucial for the successful implementation of the BRI. The article emphasizes the importance of protecting Gwadar Port, which plays a significant role in upgrading to an international shipping center. Safeguarding the port is necessary to maintain its pivotal connection services for the BRI and to promote economic exchange between China and other countries (Ruan, 2019).

1.8 Security situation of Gwadar Port in Pakistan

Despite the immense economic and strategic potential of Gwadar Port, significant hurdles hinder its progress. The major issues include inadequate infrastructure and persistent security vulnerabilities within Baluchistan Province, as highlighted in a recent study by the researcher (Kardon et al., 2020). The article also highlights the ongoing threat posed by terrorist organizations, especially the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA). However, the Pakistani government has demonstrated its commitment to tackling these by deploying the Pakistani Marine Corps and implementing other security measures (Kardon et al., 2020). Gwadar Port, with continued support from China and Pakistan, is expected to emerge as a prominent trade center despite concerns regarding its security. To comprehend the various challenges and opportunities related to the maritime security of Gwadar Port, a literature review was performed, which can assist in developing an integrated approach to maintain its crucial role in global and regional trade dynamics.

2 Challenges in Gwadar Port’s maritime landscape: security, development, and collaborative concerns

2.1 Gwadar Port provides strategic depth

Gwadar deep-water port is a strategic maritime outpost on the Markland Coast. As the third largest port in the world, Gwadar Port is located at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, only 180 nautical miles from the Strait of Hormuz, approximately 400 kilometers away. The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic global supply line, with around 16–17 million people passing through it (Sakhuja, 2013). Every day, 20–30 oil tankers pass through this checkpoint. During peak traffic hours, from a strategic and military perspective, every 6 minutes, one oil tanker follows another. Gwadar Port is a strategic outpost monitoring the activities of the Eastern enemy’s Navy in the area (Khan et al., 2023). In addition, the proximity of Gwadar Port to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz will give Pakistan a new seaport on the Indian Ocean, and this port has a strategic position. Nevertheless, due to Pakistan’s relatively backward economy and the port’s distance from Karachi, it is quite distant (Fazl-e-Haider, 2013). Therefore, Gwadar Port has not been developed for a long time. However, the Kargil War between India and Pakistan in 1998 exposed the vulnerability of Karachi as the country’s principal port. In 2002, General Pervez Musharraf, the then President and Chief Executive, had a deep understanding of the vulnerability of Karachi Port during the Kargil War, which led him to launch the Gwadar Port project. Pakistan’s geostrategic and geopolitical positions are as important as other related projects and have major national security significance (Fazl-e-Haider, 2013). The proximity of Gwadar Port to the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and Eurasia and the significant energy and trade bottlenecks in the world highlight its unique importance in the region. Its strategic location in the Arabian Sea allows it to use electronic surveillance to monitor naval activities throughout the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Gwadar Port remains the focus of military power in the Indian Ocean. Throughout history, the warm waters of Gwadar have attracted Greeks, Arabs, Portuguese, Iranians, Russians, and British (Subrahmanyam, 2024). The development of Gwadar Port not only enhances Pakistan’s economic security by reducing reliance on Karachi Port but also strengthens China’s economic and energy security by offering an alternative to the vulnerable Indian Ocean route. Gwadar Port’s linkages to China’s Xinjiang province and the envisioned railway connections accentuate its pivotal role in expediting trade and energy transit. Gwadar Port has the potential to become a significant logistical hub for naval operations in the IOR, which would help safeguard trade amid geopolitical tensions and economic challenges. The port is a crucial asset for Pakistan and China, as it provides them with greater economic strength and security. It is an essential part of China’s plan to expand trade routes and reduce the risks associated with maritime transportation. Gwadar Port plays a central role in reshaping regional dynamics and strengthens trade and energy security for both countries.

2.2 Revealing Gwadar Port’s resilience against internal and external threats to Pakistan’s maritime gateway

Gwadar Port faces significant obstacles in terms of security. The main threats to its security are some radical organizations. These organizations include the BLA, the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), and political parties with radical factions (Abid & Ashfaq, 2015). These organizations exist to destabilize Pakistan. They attempt to attack projects funded by China, which will inevitably affect China’s future interests in Gwadar Port (Kilcullen, 2011). The successful operation of Gwadar Port faces many obstacles, but its main threats are twofold: first, the conflict situation in Baluchistan Province and the global insurgency of Islamists (Kronstadt, 2010). Because Gwadar Port is a part of Baluchistan Province, the ongoing rebel situation there is considered one of the biggest challenges to the project’s successful operation, and any security situation will affect Gwadar Port’s operations. The reason for this is that the people of Baluchistan Province have had an abnormal relationship with the federal government of Pakistan from the outset. The Baluchistan people have always been subjected to economic oppression and political marginalization and, therefore, have always opposed the federal government. Some tribes in Baluchistan have been involved in several armed uprisings. One of the main reasons for opposing the federal government is the unreasonable distribution of natural resources and wealth. However, Baluchistan Province has the most strategic location, being the region with the lowest level of urbanization and mechanization in Pakistan, and its income and literacy rates are among the lowest in the country compared to other provinces; more than 50% of residents live below the poverty line. In this situation, the Baluchistan rebel group believes that the CPEC is a foreign occupation of its homeland and natural resources, which will further disrupt Baluchistan’s tribal economy. In addition, Baluchistan nationalists believe that this project is a policy of Punjabi expansionism and the federal government to strengthen control over Baluchistan’s wealth and natural resources (Wolf, 2019). Second, we also know that the Gwadar Port project will become a part of the CPEC, and there are some security risks in the CPEC. Uyghurs and other Muslim have similar origins and the development level of Xinjiang region is not very high; poverty is still commonplace in the local area. Due to the influence of extreme ideas, this region has frequently experienced terrorist and violent attacks in the past 20 to 30 years, and ethnic relations are in a state of extreme tension. In Xinjiang, the radical organization ETIM has led to extremist tensions (Trédaniel & Lee, 2018). The Chinese government believes that the ETIM is a combination of three evil forces: extremism, separatism, and terrorism. During the construction phase of many projects in Pakistan, several incidents of armed groups kidnapping and executing Chinese workers have mostly been associated with the ETIM. Of course, Baluchistan nationalist separatists are the most prominent opponents of China’s investment in Pakistan. In 2006, three Chinese engineers were killed by the BLA in a town center in western Karachi. Just a week before the US President’s visit to Pakistan, at least 20 Pakistani laborers in the Turbat region were brutally killed by BLA gunmen. Separatists not only carry out terrorist acts in Baluchistan Province but also frequently attack government agencies, power hubs, and transmission lines (Falak, 2015).

2.3 Terrorist incidents in Baluchistan during 2021–2023

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Baluchistan has recorded 36 Security Force (SF) personnel fatalities in 22 terrorism-related incidents so far in the year of writing (data up to February 19, 2023). During the corresponding period of 2022, the province recorded 33 SF fatalities in 14 terrorism-related incidents. Through 2022, 202 SF fatalities were recorded in the province, a rise of 92.38% over 2021, at 105 SF fatalities. The 2022 tally was the highest since the SATP database started documenting fatalities in Pakistan. The preceding high in the province was 177 in 2012, at a time when terrorism was rampant across Pakistan. The overall fatalities in Baluchistan in 2022 totaled 406 (88 civilians, 202 SF personnel, and 116 terrorists) in 160 incidents of killing, as against 308 such fatalities (111 civilians, 107 SF personnel, and 90 terrorists) in 111 such incidents in 2021 registering an increase of 31.82% (Balochistan, 2024) (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2
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Terrorism assessment (Balochistan, 2024)

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2.4 Pakistan’s Gwadar Port faces external security challenges

India and Afghanistan are the main external factors that ensure the security of Pakistan and Gwadar Port. Since its founding, Pakistan has faced extremist threats to its territorial integrity from Afghanistan due to its shared western border. With NATO’s invasion of Afghanistan, India, Russia, and America have been doing their utmost to destabilize Pakistan. After the 9/11 incident, cooperation between Pakistan and Iran reached its peak in the Indian Ocean naval cooperation (Sabena, 2014). Significant conflicts between the construction of the CPEC and the strategic and economic competitiveness of India and Iran, as well as the unstable political situation and security situation in Pakistan, may have had a significant impact on the development of the CPEC infrastructure near the Afghan border (Sridharan, 2020). The biggest challenge is the occasional wars with neighboring India and India’s strong influence in Afghanistan. In addition, Russia’s monopoly on oil pipelines in the Caspian Sea region is another complex geopolitical issue in the IOR. China’s planned construction of a new oil pipeline at Gwadar Port threatens oil pipelines extending to Europe and overseas. India’s takeover of Chabahar Port in Iran is to counter China’s management of Gwadar Port and another grand design by India. It has strategic advantages over Iran and Afghanistan, a superior geographical and sociocultural location, and Iran has established the shortest connection between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. It is said that India’s hostile state of affairs with Pakistan due to its territorial conflict poses the greatest potential threat to the security of Gwadar Port, while the Taliban hiding in Afghanistan is also a major threat to its safety.

2.5 Maritime safety and threats

Although there is currently no globally recognized definition of maritime safety, according to Maritime Safety Law, it refers to stable order in the oceans. Maritime safety management means responding to regional and global threats following the rules, procedures, and policies stipulated in Maritime Safety Law. Pakistan’s maritime security management agencies include the Pakistan Navy, the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency, and the Pakistan Coast Guard. According to Bateman (2016), maritime safety management is required in the IOR, and maritime safety management requires cooperation. The safety of maritime navigation depends on overall maritime safety, and effective safety management relies on sovereign protection, maritime law enforcement, maritime safety/search and rescue/disaster responses, marine environmental protection, resource management and protection, marine scientific research, oceanographic investigation, and good maritime order to combat transnational crime. The current situation at sea in Pakistan indicates that Gwadar Port needs to strengthen its maritime safety management. The growing religious radicalism in the Middle East and terrorism in South Asia are the biggest issues affecting the security of Gwadar Port. First, there are external threats, such as armed factions or insurgents attacking seaports and ships and planting floating bombs, which may lead to regional and international trade stagnation and collapse. Second, by using container transportation, rebels can smuggle weapons and drugs, engage in human trafficking activities and recruit new members (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017).

2.6 Confronting the dual menace of piracy and commercial threats

In 2022, the Indian Ocean witnessed 84 reported piracy cases, primarily centered on the Malacca Strait (de la Rasilla, 2022). The Pakistani government’s effective security management at Gwadar Port is evidenced by the reduction in piracy incidents in its waters. In contrast to the widespread activities of Somali pirates from 2008 to 2010, extending into the Arabian Sea, piracy increased in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean until 2012. This emphasizes the crucial role of robust security measures, showcasing Gwadar Port’s success in curbing piracy within its jurisdiction (Hamza & Priotti, 2020). Fast forward to 2015, and although there are still suspicious sightings in this area, it is evident that pirates near the Indian Ocean, especially in the waters of Gwadar Port, have been contained effectively. The reasons for this effectiveness are naturally multifaceted, but ultimately, reducing piracy in the IOR is the result of joint efforts by foreign and Pakistani navies. In addition, the role of other factors cannot be ignored, such as the development of local security forces in Gwadar Port, which has also played a role in limiting Somali pirates’ activities. According to the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Pakistan has been deemed no longer a high-risk area for pirate attacks, contributing to the safety of the sea. As a result, many activities related to the sea, such as fishing and marine research exploration, have resumed their usual operations. However, the port is facing a complex network of commercial challenges that are closely linked to broader maritime issues. These challenges include illicit activities such as smuggling, where illegal items such as drugs, weapons, and prohibited goods are transported covertly through the port’s infrastructure. The constant threat of hijacking persists, which involves the unauthorized seizure of vessels for ransom or the illicit diversion of cargo. The vulnerabilities extend to the transportation of critical commodities such as oil, chemicals, and liquefied natural gas, making them susceptible to theft, sabotage, and potential terrorist action. Gwadar Port also faces serious security risks due to the infiltration of terrorists, weapons, drugs, and people within commercial trade. This poses a significant challenge to the port’s security framework and requires proactive measures to address it. The increasing incidence of smuggling in maritime trade around the world further underscores the urgent need to tackle this issue. Gwadar Port has various vulnerabilities and has added complexity to a security apparatus that reveals weaknesses. The effectiveness of law enforcement in mitigating these potential threats decisively appears inadequate. Although the port security framework remains crucial, it appears to have gaps that permit exploitation by malicious actors. The contemporary maritime challenges are complex and require a more robust and proactive approach from enforcement agencies. Gwadar Port’s susceptibility to assault on liquefied natural gas terminals and the potential use of surrounding land by insurgents for launching attacks further underscore the multifaceted security challenges unique to the region. Addressing these vulnerabilities demands an urgent reassessment of the security infrastructure’s capabilities and an intensification of law enforcement efforts to buffer Gwadar Port against evolving commercial threats, ensuring its resilience within an increasingly complex maritime environment.

2.7 Security hurdles and infrastructure quagmires in the pursuit of development

Disjointed efforts impede effective security management at Gwadar Port. The main issue is the lack of coordination between various security agencies, like the Gwadar Port Maritime Bureau, the police, the Navy, and the Pakistan Army. This autonomous function creates a decentralized oversight system aptly named ‘multidragon water control’, and fragmentation further intensifies due to isolated operations within the Gwadar Port Authority (GPA), the Gwadar Development Authority (GDA) district body and the Executive Department. These bodies operate in silos, lacking effective coordination and collaboration (Gwadar Investment and Industrial Development Reference Guide, 2016). To exacerbate matters, security management leans heavily on government initiatives, with low participation from civil society and the public. This centralized approach demands continuous government investment and the recruitment of soldiers and police for effective security management. However, financial constraints and the potential for terrorists to exploit civilian cover present formidable obstacles, emphasizing the need for a collaborative approach between soldiers and civilians to fortify the security foundations of Gwadar Port. The security infrastructure of Gwadar Port amplifies these challenges, being characterized by relative weakness. The port faces many hurdles because of its incomplete infrastructure. The Gwadar airport runways are still unpaved, and the China–Pakistan Railway is still under construction. Telecommunication facilities are still limited to a few areas, with reliable service limited to some luxury hotels. The electricity shortage is also a major issue for the region, with power outages that sometimes last for more than 12 hours. In addition, clean water supply, sanitation, and pollution are challenges to effective security management at the port.

2.8 Insufficient participation by China in the security and management of Gwadar Port

As the operator and manager of Gwadar Port, China has not done enough to participate in its safety management. Although Pakistan employs 500 Chinese in its security team, China’s security team has not been established. In particular, China’s armed police and Navy are not stationed in Gwadar Port. Although the Pakistani Ministry of Defense once asked the Chinese Ministry of Defense to establish a military base in Gwadar Port, the Chinese government did not include the deployment of troops in consideration of noninterference in foreign internal affairs, which also made China’s participation in the port’s security management insufficient (Duchâtel et al., 2014). The challenges facing Gwadar Port’s development raised concerns about China’s role in its management. Despite its ambitions to be a significant oil transportation hub, Gwadar Port lacks essential infrastructure such as oil terminals, refineries, storage facilities, and adequate berths for larger vessels. This insufficiency creates a barrier to accommodating the very large crude carriers that are crucial for the international movement of oil. Political analyst Jan Muhammad Baloch highlights the discrepancy between plans and reality. Gwadar Port’s ambitions far outstrip its current capabilities (Fazl-e-Haider, 2023). The original plan envisioned more than 100 berths, but only four are in service, which limits the port’s capacity. Baloch’s concerns about instability and security are also major challenges to further development. Because of these obstacles, the current depth of the port falls short of the 18 meters required for handling large vessels. Even reaching its natural operational depth of 14.5 meters a goal set two decades ago, remains elusive, let alone the ambitious target of 20 meters (Fazl-e-Haider, 2023). These issues raised serious questions about China’s active role in managing Gwadar Port. The lack of essential infrastructure and some unresolved operational constraints cast doubt on China’s promises to convert Gwadar Port into a major oil transportation center.

2.9 Discussion and analysis of the reasons affecting the security management of Gwadar Port

Ensuring the security of Gwadar Port is a complex issue due to several connected issues. Among these, the most important is the political system of Pakistan, which is federal and means that the provinces have limited authority and power. Also, the tribal system of Baluchistan Province, where Gwadar Port is located, creates conflicts between the central government and the various tribes of the province, and this discord fuels security concerns for the port (Muzaffar et al., 2021). The role of the public in Gwadar Port is another challenge. Local people are concerned about being sidelined from positions of power as the port is modernized. Along with economic struggles and high unemployment, this discourages public interest in security initiatives. Therefore, the lack of local engagement creates further complications (Fazl-e-Haider, 2023). The issue of shared interests between the Baloch people and Chinese investors in the CPEC project is a major challenge. An agreement has already been signed between Chinese investors and the Pakistani government stating that 91% of the revenue generated by Gwadar Port will go to the Chinese investor, while the remainder will be shared among local tribes. This creates feelings of exploitation and raises concerns about the fair distribution of profits (Hanif, 2021). The weak economy of Pakistan is another serious challenge. Limited resources due to geographical constraints, the low level of literacy and its overall standard, and reliance on foreign funds are hurdles to the development of essential security infrastructure and capabilities in Gwadar Port (Sheikh et al., 2022). Law enforcement agencies and the government of Pakistan have still not reached a consensus about the deployment of forces, particularly foreign troops, in the region for security. The lack of consensus about such an important issue creates a serious question on the development of security matters for the port (Boni, 2016). The financial crisis of the Pakistani economy prevents the allocation of sufficient funds for the security of Gwadar Port. This is a serious gap in the safety of the port, given its critical and strategic importance and the urgent need to ensure the safety of local and foreign workers. Therefore, it is imperative to increase funds to enhance the security of the port for smooth development (Ali, 2020). The completion and ongoing development of motorways under the CPEC, amounting to 1622 kilometers, represents a substantial proportion of Pakistan’s total motorway network. However, this interconnected transportation infrastructure, while enhancing cross-border trade efficiency by linking different regions to major ports, including Gwadar, is subject to limitations and potential vulnerabilities. The complex reliance on road transport and the evolving dynamics of the CPEC necessitate a comprehensive approach to address infrastructure challenges and ensure the robust security of such key strategic assets as Gwadar Port (Su, 2023).

3 Strategic measures for safeguarding Gwadar Port: a comprehensive case study on safety management

3.1 Assessing security management measures, effectiveness, and establishing an organizational framework

After completing the initial construction phase of Gwadar Port in 2005, the Pakistani government initiated a global bidding process for the operation rights. Surprisingly, Singapore International Ports Group Limited (PSA) emerged as the winning bidder in 2007, taking over the 40-year operating rights (Barillé, 2020). Despite the Pakistani government’s expectation that PSA, as the world’s second-largest port management company, would spur local economic development, Gwadar Port remained largely idle for the next seven years. Dissatisfied with the outcome, both parties terminated the contract in 2012. Subsequently, in February 2013, the management rights transitioned to China Overseas Group Co., Ltd., marking a significant shift in the port’s operational dynamics (Muhammadi et al., 2022). To address the security challenges confronting Gwadar Port, the Pakistani government established key entities, including the Gwadar Port Maritime Authority, the GPA, the GDA, the District Council, administrative departments, and a dedicated police force (Rahman et al., 2022). The Gwadar Port Maritime Authority, affiliated with the Maritime Authority of the Federal Government of Pakistan, assumed responsibility for water safety supervision, ship pollution prevention, ship and marine facility inspection, navigation security management, and administrative law enforcement. Concurrently, the GPA, under the Port and Shipping Division of the Federal Government, handled port planning, construction, and management. The GDA, reporting directly to the Chief Minister of Baluchistan Province, oversaw overall planning, land use, infrastructure construction, and environmental supervision in all administrative regions of Gwadar except for ports. To ensure the safety of Gwadar Port, the Federal Government allocated a special fund of 1 billion rupees in 2004–2005 to establish the Baluchistan Constabulary. This force, consisting of approximately 700 to 800 personnel, primarily protects Gwadar Port and other critical economic facilities in the province. Gwadar Port has a high number of police officers, exceeding the global average by a factor of three. This means that there is a significant police presence per person compared to international standards. Along with this, the government of Pakistan also deployed 3000 military personnel for the security of Chinese officials and workers, and about 1000 soldiers are specially trained and deployed in the region of Gwadar to safeguard different ongoing projects. This large-scale deployment of forces aims to secure and make the region safe. Due to the importance and sensitivity of the CPEC projects, the Pakistani government established a special division of the army for security and a safe working environment. This specialized force constitutes a significant proportion of the total security personnel deployed along the corridor, highlighting the importance of Gwadar’s strategic position in regional economic development. The deployment of about 20,000 military and other law enforcement agencies demonstrates Pakistan’s unwavering commitment to maintaining the port’s stability and facilitating its progress (Kardon et al., 2020).

3.2 Significant reduction in terrorist and kidnapping incidents

Pakistan is known for having the most intense terrorist activities in the world. The level of terrorism in Baluchistan Province, where Gwadar Port is located, is very severe. Terrorist incidents caused by terrorist organizations such as the BLA, the Baluchistan Liberation Front, and the Baluchistan Republic Army account for over 80% of domestic terrorist incidents in Pakistan. In 2013, out of 487 terrorist attacks in Baluchistan, 424 (87%) were caused by these rebel organizations (Boni, 2016). In 2015, such rebel organizations carried out 194 more terrorist attacks, accounting for 89% of the total 218 terrorist attacks in Pakistan in that year, resulting in a total of 213 deaths and 286 injuries. Compared to Baluchistan and other regions of Pakistan, Gwadar Port, located in a province with frequent terrorist activities, has only experienced a few terrorist incidents since its construction began in 2003 (Elliott, 2020). Moreover, there have only been two or three kidnappings and terrorist incidents targeting Chinese workers, which is a significant reduction for countries like Pakistan, where terrorist activities are otherwise rampant.

3.3 Strengthening collaboration between security management departments at Gwadar Port

The security management of Gwadar Port is a holistic management or governance that requires the Federal Government of Pakistan to strengthen communication and coordination with the Baluchistan Provincial Government. Functioning as district councils led by elected chairpersons and administrative departments represented by deputy chief executives, the Gwadar Port Maritime Authority, the GPA, and the GDA, in conjunction with the Navy, the police, the army and other management departments involved in the security of the port, established a mechanism for coordination among multiple parties and conducted in-depth cooperation in six aspects (Fig. 3). One is to strengthen the construction of infrastructure such as networks; the second is to build the Gwadar Port Safety Monitoring Network jointly, promote its construction and achieve the interconnection and sharing of essential data on Gwadar Port safety. The third is led by the Pakistan National Data and Information Administration to jointly build a Chinese information database for protected individuals in Gwadar Port, to register the information of Chinese individuals protected there, upload the information of Chinese citizens residing or staying temporarily in Gwadar Port to various security management department information systems, and share it with the federal and provincial governments. The fourth is to optimize and enhance the holographic service system for the port’s security management, increase scientific research investment, integrate multiple data resources, and further leverage technologies such as data visualization, extensive data analysis, and artificial intelligence in the port’s security management. The fifth is to establish an efficient mechanism for managing linkage security and jointly promote the construction of a security management mechanism for ‘early detection, early ventilation, early warning, and early linkage’ in Gwadar Port. The sixth is to establish a multilevel communication system, promote the normalized and efficient operation of the security management cooperation mechanism in the port, strengthen multiparty business and technical cooperation, and conduct joint discussions on security risks in the port (Zou, 2021).

Fig. 3
figure 3

Collaboration of security management

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3.4 Encourage public participation in Gwadar Port security management

The public safety of Gwadar Port is related to the safety of every household and individual’s life and property there. Although the safety of Gwadar Port is mainly handled and provided by professionals, the public is not isolated from this society, and modern society is a risk society, with some sources of risk increasing. According to the principle of corresponding rights and obligations, ordinary people enjoy port security benefits and are obligated to maintain and ensure safety. This underscores a need not only for a risk society but also for governance practices. The management of the security of Gwadar Port is not only the responsibility of the Pakistani government but also the responsibility and obligation of ordinary people and social organizations. Therefore, as one of the main subjects of governance, ordinary people and social organizations must take their own initiative to achieve the joint construction, governance, and sharing of the port’s security. Effective ways must be found for the public to participate in the public safety governance of the port and achieve a positive interaction between Gwadar City government management and social self-regulation. Social co-governance involves risk exchange, rewards for contribution, and typical illustration On the one hand, it is necessary to incorporate public safety education into the national system of education, construct a spiritual civilization as soon as possible, and strengthen safety and general welfare publicity through various channels. On the other hand, it is necessary to guide social public opinion and public emotions and create a social atmosphere wherein ‘caring about public safety is caring about one’s safety’, attributed by Xi Jinping, the General secretary of the Communist Party of China.

3.5 Accelerating economic development

The continuous investment of Chinese enterprises in Gwadar Port and the constant improvement of China’s industrial park construction will drive the rapid development of Gwadar Port, its local economy, and even the economy of Pakistan. According to the blueprint, when Gwadar Port is completed, it can create 2 million jobs and become the world’s largest deep-water port (China Enterprise News, 2016). Based on this, during the development, construction, and operation of Gwadar Port, the employment issues of the local people should be taken into account in the construction and operation of the port, and the proportion of Baluchistan locals among port staff should be increased. By increasing their employment rate substantially, they can increase their economic income, thereby reducing their dissatisfaction during the development of the port and reducing the occurrence of terrorist activities significantly. Moreover, with substantial progress and development in the economy of Gwadar Port and its location, the Pakistani government can naturally use economic means to achieve local social security and stability. Whether hampered by the independent separatists of Baluchistan or terrorist organizations such as the BLA, it will be difficult to achieve significant success in the local area. The security and stability expected by the long-term economic benefits to the people will prevail because they feel that the independence movement and terrorism are incompatible with their long-term interests. Participating in the independence movement and terrorist organizations will only cause considerable losses to the economic benefits they have already gained, and it will put their lives at high risk. Hence, they choose to oppose the independence movement and terrorism and even attack them in groups. Due to the limited education level and job skills of the local Baluchistan people, the local government should provide corresponding training to Baluchistan people capable of managing and providing technical support in Gwadar Port so that their abilities match their positions. By implementing the above measures, we can balance the ethnic groups of workers in the port and achieve security and stability. To further accelerate the economic development of the port, it is also necessary for the Pakistani government to provide legal and policy facilitation for its further development. On October 7, 2019, Pakistani President Arif Alvi issued two decrees, namely, the ‘2019 China–Pakistan Economic Corridor Authority Regulations’ and the ‘2019 Tax Law (Amendment) Regulations’, aimed at granting exemption from income tax, sales tax, and customs duties to Gwadar Port and Gwadar region (Indiatvnews, 2019). Before this, on February 17, 2019, the Pakistan Maritime Authority made modifications to 17 articles of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 2001 Income Tax Act, the Sales Tax Act, and the Federal Customs and Excise Regulations, which are consistent with the concession agreements between the GPA and the China Overseas Port Authority. At the same time, accelerating economic development also requires training for officials and technical workers in Gwadar Port. According to Dostain Khan Jamaldini, Chairman of the GPA, China has requested 38,000 skilled workers for the Gwadar Free Trade Zone by 2023. Currently, 2,500 employees are working on different GPA projects, including 2,000 local employees working closely with 500 Chinese people (Kiani, 2018). The Pakistani workers China needs come from fields such as electronics, engineering, hotel management, housekeeping, pipelines, SAP-IT, beauty, woodworking, and shipbuilding, and speak English and Chinese. The first batch of 5,000 workers is undergoing emergency training at Gwadar Technical Vocational College in the CPEC and will graduate in May.

4 Enhancing maritime security through regional collaboration

4.1 China’s military strategy and Gwadar Port’s regional security impact

China’s military strategy in the Indo-Pacific region involves a comprehensive approach, combining economic, diplomatic, and military factors at both international and regional levels (Wiśniewski, 2023). At the regional level, China has adopted what is known as the ‘string of pearls strategy’, as identified in a 2004 report by Booz Allen Hamilton (Ghani & Ali, 2020). This strategy entails investing in ‘strong points’ near its borders and neighboring countries, including India, with a focus on expanding its naval presence through dual-use maritime infrastructure. The BRI serves as a key component of this strategy, with intentional investments in ports across the Indian Ocean, potentially serving as naval bases to encircle neighboring countries and secure proximity to strategic choke points in the Indo-Pacific. China’s naval capabilities have seen significant enhancements, including the expansion of surface combatants and an increase in submarine numbers operating in the Indian Ocean since 2013. How many submarines are used by China in the Indian Ocean is not clear; however, there is a belief that they have 58 submarines in the Indian Ocean. Conversely, the United States and India have a strategic advantage over China in the Strait of Malacca due to its geography, which is too shallow for the unidentified passage of both conventional and nuclear submarine fleets. For Chinese vessels, it is quite difficult to pass through unnoticed. The strategic importance of Gwadar Port is notable due to its proximity to India and the Strait of Hormuz. It gives China the opportunity to land the PLAN vessels in the future at Gwadar Port. Already, the Chinese company COPC has a legal obligation to support the People’s Liberation Army operations if needed (Hashim & Zulkifli, 2023). China’s investment in the Karachi Coastal Comprehensive Development Zone (KCCDZ) is part of the agreement of the CPEC project. This investment will make the Karachi coastal area a mixed-use residential, commercial, and seaport development. This project includes building housing for 2,000 families and modernizing the fishing harbor into a waterfront commercial district with a new state-of-the-art fishing port and processing zone. Beside it, the KCCDZ will also construct a giant harbor bridge across the Baba Channel and a highway, which will connect Karachi container terminals (Kong & Liu, 2021). This investment affects the vast context of maritime security, especially concerning Gwadar Port, and highlights China’s strategic interests in the region. Developing commercial ports and infrastructure through initiatives like the CPEC could potentially serve both commercial and military objectives. Therefore, it is important to understand these dynamics to improve maritime security around Gwadar Port and address any risks associated with China’s regional military strategy.

4.2 Security of Gwadar Port and the role of international players in Pakistan maritime affairs

To strengthen maritime security at Gwadar Port and counter the escalating threat of terrorism, the Pakistani government has implemented a comprehensive strategy involving legal reforms and joint regional initiatives. In 2014, the anti-terrorism law was amended, which is a great achievement in the country’s strategy against terrorism as it strengthens the counter-terrorism capabilities of Pakistan. This effort shows the seriousness of Pakistan’s role against terrorism and terrorist elements (Parliament passes 21st Constitutional Amendment, Army Act Amendment, 2015). The port law of Pakistan is crucial in ensuring stringent security permits, safety, and hazard prevention in port construction projects. This legal framework needs approval from legal authorities, including federal and provincial governments, to ensure that projects involving hazardous cargo, gas stations, and fuel storage companies comply with safety regulations and standards (Makkawan & Muangpan, 2021). The Pakistan Metrological Department has established a proactive early warning system that enhances the nation’s preparedness. This system connects Gwadar Port and Pansi to Karachi via satellite, aligning with the public safety lifecycle theory. The system emphasizes effective response measures against potential tsunamis and facilitates evacuation plans (Jamila & Ghazala, 2016). Collaborative efforts at the regional level play a crucial role in enhancing maritime security. Recently, Pakistan demonstrated leadership in the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 by conducting a comprehensive counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden. This operation was named Focused Operation (FO) TAHAFFUZ and took place from February 26 to March 5, 2021. Nine nations, including the US Navy, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, the Hellenic Navy, the Spanish Navy, and the European Naval Force, actively participated in this multinational endeavor. FO TAHAFFUZ highlighted the shared commitment of these nations to combat piracy and protect global maritime commerce (Combined Maritime Forces, 2021). The cooperation between nations emphasized their shared commitment to improving the security of the Gulf of Aden. The participation of different countries and their contribution highlighted the importance of safeguarding crucial sea routes not only for individual nations but also for the international maritime community. The Canadian team of the Unclassified Remote-Sensing Situational Awareness system provided critical support to the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operation. They also contributed a pattern-of-life evaluation to the Task Force, which improved the overall intelligence-gathering and situational awareness capabilities. Gwadar Port is an important maritime hub in the region and this counter-piracy operation is particularly significant in this context. Gwadar Port plays a crucial role as a gateway for trade and economic activities. To maintain the port’s functionality and ensure the safety of maritime activities, it is necessary to address the piracy threats in the surrounding waters. The involvement of the Pakistan Navy, along with cooperation from other countries, highlights the strategic importance of securing Gwadar Port and its maritime activity against piracy. These collective efforts demonstrate the Pakistani government’s holistic approach to strengthening maritime security. While they are legal reforms and multinational collaborations, these initiatives showcase a comprehensive strategy aimed at ensuring the safety of global maritime commerce and operations. This reflects a commitment to mitigating various maritime threats, including terrorism and piracy, and contributing to a more secure maritime environment in the region.

4.3 Strengthening the role of the Pakistan Navy in the security management of Gwadar Port in response to maritime security risks

Because Gwadar Port is a multibillion-dollar investment project, and because of its strategic position and economic importance, to protect Chinese builders and investors and ensure the safety of Gwadar Port, sea lanes, sea routes, and projects related to the CPEC, the Pakistan Navy established a special maritime force called Task Force 88 (Kardon et al., 2020). At the same time, given the importance of Gwadar Port’s status, Pakistan’s arch-enemy, India, inevitably sees it as a thorn in its side and will find ways to sabotage the Gwadar Port project. As Raheel Sharif, the Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army, said, ‘One thing I have to highlight is that our close neighbor India openly challenges our development projects' (Johnson, 2016), which means ‘India secretly sabotages the Gwadar project’. To this end, the Pakistani government has strengthened security measures inside and outside Gwadar Port and the city. The Ministry of Ports and Shipping of Pakistan has transferred the security responsibility for Gwadar Port to the Pakistan Navy. The Pakistan Navy has established a dedicated monitoring mechanism to ensure maritime connectivity at deep-sea ports and the safety of ships. Regarding the strategic power balance, the Pakistan Navy plans to maintain a 1:5 ratio to the Indian Navy, and the Indian Navy plans to acquire 50 warships, 3 aircraft carriers, and 22 submarines within the next 10–15 years, of which five are nuclear submarines. In addition, India also plans to transform its naval power into a Blue Water Navy—a naval force capable of operating across deep open oceans—for intercontinental expansion. At present, the main attack fleet of the Pakistan Navy includes four former British Navy Amazon class ships, known as Type 21, which will be replaced with new tonnage by 2020. Four Chinese light frigates, the F-22P, are also part of the attack fleet. In addition, the Navy has the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate. To replace Type 21, they plan to add 5 to 6 more of these surface warriors until a new one is built. In addition, the surface fleet consists of destroyers, high-speed missile boats, gunboats, mine-hunting boats, and training vessels. To conduct underwater surveillance, the Navy has deployed submarine service units. Their main tasks include initiating peaceful contact, monitoring and intelligence management, special operations, precision strikes, combat group operations, and controlling Pakistan’s maritime borders. At present, the Navy has five submarines, three 90B Agosta-class submarines and two 70B Agosta-class submarines. In the near future, it plans to add eight more ships, completing the third component of Pakistan’s naval force.

4.4 China–Pakistan partnership: securing Gwadar Port’s future

China’s investment in Pakistan’s Gwadar Port has been a topic of discussion for many years. The port holds immense strategic significance for China for two main reasons: the first is that it serves as a gateway to the Indian Ocean through the CPEC, and second, it will stabilize western China, where Beijing perceives vulnerability to Islamic unrest. The port has the potential to become a major platform for China’s economic, diplomatic and military activities in the northern IOR. According to the China Maritime Studies Institute of the Naval War College, Gwadar Port’s location and infrastructure make it an ideal logistics hub for the People’s Liberation Army. However, significant challenges remain, including inadequate transport infrastructure and security risks posed by local militant groups. China has been the primary investor in Gwadar Port since 2002, with operations commencing in 2008 (Khan et al., 2024). However, the port’s commercial activities remain limited due to minimal vessel traffic and inadequate road infrastructure. Nevertheless, if the road network improves, Gwadar Port could offer China access to the Indian Ocean, alleviating concerns associated with the Malacca Dilemma. The China–Pakistan partnership plays a crucial role in securing Gwadar Port’s future. Despite its security concerns, China continues to invest in Pakistan, viewing development as a means to ensure stability. Gwadar Port is already home to a modest Pakistan Navy base, indicating Pakistan’s strategic interest in the port’s security. Task Force 88, established in 2016, is tasked with protecting the port and surrounding sea lanes. Pakistan’s reliance on Chinese-built naval vessels further strengthens the partnership between the two countries. While Gwadar Port’s potential as a logistics hub for the PLAN exists, establishing a full-fledged military base would require strategic decisions from both Beijing and Islamabad (Rahman et al., 2024). However, vigilance is necessary, as the possibility of Gwadar Port being used for military purposes cannot be ruled out entirely. Therefore, Gwadar Port’s strategic significance is crucial for both China and Pakistan. The partnership between the two countries is essential for securing the future of the port. While challenges remain, including security risks and infrastructure limitations, the potential benefits of the port as a strategic asset cannot be ignored.

In conclusion, Gwadar Port’s strategic significance is crucial for both China and Pakistan. The partnership between the two countries is essential for securing the future of the port. While challenges remain, including security risks and infrastructure limitations, the potential benefits of the port as a strategic asset cannot be ignored.

5 Limitations and future research directions

This research does encounter certain limitations. First, the ever-evolving nature of Gwadar Port due to ongoing construction means that the overall security management situation is subject to change. This dynamism can pose challenges when attempting to analyze the port’s security status comprehensively.

Second, it is essential to acknowledge that security management at Gwadar Port often involves sensitive military information, which is not disclosed publicly. Consequently, gaining access to in-depth data can be a complex task. To address this issue, the study relies on a combination of on-site investigations and information obtained from various sources, including the Internet.

In light of these limitations, keeping abreast of the latest developments in Gwadar Port’s security landscape is important. Continuous monitoring and engagement with relevant stakeholders are crucial to ensure the research remains relevant and well-informed in the face of evolving challenges and developments.

6 Conclusions

Gwadar Port is the ace of Pakistan’s economy and will bring many opportunities for Pakistan’s future. Gwadar Port is expected to become the largest port in the Middle East and the future commercial center of Pakistan. Gwadar Port is only 400 kilometers away from the Hormuz Strait, the Gulf oil channel. This port has the potential to become a natural gas and oil processing center, providing oil transportation, storage, and a large refinery on the Indian Ocean. The critical economic and strategic position of the port makes it an important target for hostile foreign forces, domestic separatists, and terrorist organizations to attack. The safety management of Gwadar Port comprises two parts: land safety and sea safety. To protect the safety of Gwadar Port, the Pakistani government has continuously accelerated the construction process of Gwadar Port, improved infrastructure such as communications, electricity, an airport, roads, railways, and seawater desalination, and strengthened the essential work of port safety management; At the same time, in terms of security arrangements, the military has arranged an army division in Gwadar Port—trained 10,000 soldiers and formed a police force of 800 and strong security forces such as the Navy Special Forces’ Task Force 88. In terms of weapons and equipment, advanced ships, rapid attack aircraft, helicopters, drones, and ocean surveillance equipment have been purchased to strengthen technical defense forces to protect the safety of local Chinese people and port facilities. In terms of port maritime security, the Pakistani government has also strengthened its maritime security forces to prevent cross-border crime in the IOR, as well as maritime terrorism (onshore/offshore), piracy, trafficking, and cybercrimes. In terms of economic development, the Pakistani government has strengthened investment in Gwadar Port and urged the Chinese government to complete the acquisition as soon as possible following the agreement between the Chinese and Pakistani governments to drive local employment and economic development and eliminate potential threats to port security such as poverty and unemployment. In terms of education, the Pakistani government has strengthened primary and vocational education to improve the educational level and work skills of local people. Since Gwadar Port is still in the construction stage and most port security management belongs to military secrets, there are not many publicly available sources, making it difficult for this study to collect data and analyze the issues in depth, but in future research, it will be further improved.