Abstract
In this short paper, I critically examine Veli Mitova’s proposal that social-identity groups can have collective epistemic reasons. My primary focus is the role of privileged access in her account of how collective reasons become epistemic reasons for social-identity groups. I argue that there is a potentially worrying structural asymmetry in her account of two different types of cases. More specifically, the mechanisms at play in cases of “doxastic reasons” seem fundamentally different from those at play in cases of “epistemic-conduct reasons.” The upshot is a need for further explanation of what unifies these dimensions of the account.
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Notes
The term is attributed to Grace Patterson.
What is the point of condition (1) over and above condition (2)? (1) is important to spell out explicitly, because starting with condition (2) alone would end up misclassifying some practical reasons as epistemic reasons. Some practical reasons count in favour of being in an epistemic state, such as believing p, or undertaking inquiry. Perhaps, the fact I am your good friend is practical reason to believe that I am telling the truth. (1) specifies that the favouring relation at issue must itself be epistemic. That is to say, if R is a collective epistemic reason, it must epistemically count in favour of G’s φ-ing. According to Mitova, a reason R epistemically counts in favour of φ-ing just in case “doing the favoured thing (believing or undertaking epistemic actions) promotes epistemic goals such as truth, knowledge, etc.” (Mitova, 2022, 10).
Indeed, Mitova said as much in personal communication. The following is an invitation for her to say more about a brief sketch of some ideas she offered in personal communication.
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Boult, C. Access to collective epistemic reasons: reply to Mitova. AJPH 2, 60 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00114-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00114-x