Abstract
In this commentary, I raise a few questions about Schmidt’s argument against (R-E): whether facts about incoherence are directly reasons for suspension on particular propositions, as opposed to reasons against sets of attitudes; whether (R-E) should really be formulated in terms of a broad category of “doxastic attitudes” that includes transitional attitudes like suspension; and whether incoherence-based reasons really must fit into the category of “epistemic reasons,” as opposed to be a more general category of right-kind reasons. Though my questions reflect some skepticism about the specifics of Schmidt’s argument, I conclude that it succeeds in what I take to be its broader aim.
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Notes
Presumably, Schmidt means it would be structurally irrational to hold all of the attitudes. Some argue that structural irrationality (incoherence) and substantive irrationality can come apart—see, e.g., Worsnip (2021).
These considerations fit well with wide-scope conceptions of principles of structural rationality. Because one could comply with a wide-scope principle by giving up any of the attitudes in the incoherent set, if one could pinpoint the defective attitude and give that up, there would be no reason to suspend on all of the attitudes in the set.
Strictly speaking, for Staffel, suspension isn’t necessarily a transitional attitude. It can be a terminal attitude of deliberation, but it can only be a transitional attitude of inquiry (Staffel 2019, 284). Even if this is right, I don’t think it affects the substance of the point here, as all of Schmidt’s examples involve reasons for suspension qua transitional attitude. But it still bears clarifying, as Schmidt herself has helpfully pointed out to me in conversation.
This is basically the conception of evidence Schmidt works with in the paper.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this.
Of course, one might respond that in cases of incoherent doxastic attitudes, it must be a doxastic attitude that has gone wrong, so it must be a case of theoretical failure. But it would still be the case that what makes it a theoretical failure is that a doxastic attitude has gone wrong, so the point stands.
References
Hieronymi, P. (2005). The wrong kind of reason. Journal of Philosophy, 102(9), 437–457.
Schmidt, E. (2023). Facts about incoherence as non-evidential epistemic reasons. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2(1), 1–22.
Singh, K. (2021). Evidentialism doesn’t make an exception for belief. Synthese, 198(6), 5477–5494.
Singh, K. (n.d.). Rationality reunified.
Staffel, J. (2019). Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes. Philosophical Issues, 29(1), 281–294.
Worsnip, A. (2021). Fitting things together: Coherence and the demands of structural rationality. Oxford University Press.
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Singh, K. What kind of reason does incoherence provide?. AJPH 2, 49 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00107-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00107-w