Abstract
In this paper, I respond to what I have called an epistemological objection to a dialetheist approach to the doctrine of the Incarnation, of which one example is Beall’s contradictory Christ. I discuss Anderson’s book Paradox in Christian theology, in which the author claims to account for the rationality of the doctrine of the Incarnation as a merely apparently contradictory doctrine, and I present my model, based on Anderson’s model, according to which the doctrine has the possibility to be rational by understanding it as genuinely contradictory. I show that this model fits perfectly well with the criteria that, according to Anderson, any model for the rationality of a paradoxical doctrine should meet. Beall does not address the problem of the rationality of the doctrine in his works about the contradictory Christ, and he asserts that he is not interested in it. However, I think that if he wants to make his theory more robust, less suspicious, and more convincing for theologians, philosophers, and ordinary people, he should consider this problem.
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Notes
Roughly speaking, metaphysical dialetheism is a sort of dialetheism in which some true contradictions exist because of contradictory facts. In contrast, semantic dialetheism considers that there are no contradictory facts. All contradictions arise because of the relationship between language and the world. According to Mares (2004), “The metaphysical dialetheist thinks that there are possible worlds for which contradictions cannot be eliminated from an accurate and complete description. The semantical dialetheist, on the other hand, thinks that it is always possible in principle to provide an accurate and complete description of a possible world that is consistent” (p. 270).
As has being noticed by one of the referees, Beall (2021) affirms that, in general, he prefers to use the term “glut theory” instead of “dialetheic” to refer to theories that contain gluts, and in the case of his theory about Christ, he prefers to refer to it as contradictory Christology. I think that Beall is not clear about the reasons why he prefers this terminology. Probably it is because the term “glut” does not commit to metaphysical or semantic dialetheism. However, I consider that I still can classify his theory about Christ as a dialetheist because his central thesis is that Christ is a contradiction, and without this saying, the truth about Christ would be incomplete. In my view, this commits him to metaphysical dialetheism.
Formally, the explosion principle is expressed as follows:
$$A\wedge \neg A\models B$$According to this principle, a theory containing contradictions explodes; that is, from it follows any sentence B, that is, any sentence that can be constructed in the language of the theory. Hence, as the critics of contradictions say, any absurdity can be deduced from a theory with contradictions.
It is worth mentioning that some authors have dealt with the problem of the logicity of the doctrine of the Incarnation in works before Beall's. One of them is Guillermo Páramo (1989), who proposes that the logic that should be used to treat this doctrine, that of the Trinity, and other myths that have the form of a contradiction, is the paraconsistent logic of Newton C. da Costa. The other is Lorenzo Peña (1981), who accounts for what he calls the coincidence of opposites in God, which includes the Incarnation. He proposes a logical system he calls ANU, which, as he describes it, is “a diffuse contradictory logic,” which, in terms of its relation to ontological laws, “is much more comprehensive and richer than the traditional and classical logics in which there is no room for the contradictory” (Peña, 1981, p. 17). I prefer Beall’s work because it is a much more elaborate proposal, at least on a technical level, and because, unlike Paramo’s proposal, technically speaking, it allows us to go beyond the conception of Incarnation as a myth insofar as the logical systems he introduces, namely FDE and LP, make it logically possible for there to be true contradictions and, with that, make it theoretically possible for there to be contradictions in reality.
Beall (2021, p. 67) states that his theory about Christ should be accepted, even though it is implausible because the idea of a contradictory Christ is “nearly beyond belief.” This suggests that, for him, taking his theory commits us to a particular sort of fideism. I am afraid that I disagree with him, and this is precisely one of the motivations of this paper.
I present a more detailed explanation of this in Gómez Gutiérrez, (2017, 2020b, Forthcoming)
In this sense, I agree with Da Costa (1980) when he says that if a certain belief or belief system is rational, it must be logical. It is worth noting that he does not say that if a belief or believe system is logical, it is rational. This second formulation would imply that logicity is a sufficient condition for rationality, which, in my view, is not the case.
The translation into English is mine.
One of the referees points out that, for Plantinga, a belief is rational if it is the result of properly functioning cognitive faculties. Thus, for Plantinga, a belief could be false and still be rational. As I understand it, when the notion of rationality is defined in terms of warrant, it is highly unlikely that a false belief can be rational. The reason is that proper function is not the only requirement for epistemic warrant. Warranted beliefs must be produced by cognitive faculties working properly in the right sort of environment according to a design plan aimed at truth and, most importantly, a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth. This means that “there is a high probability that a belief produced according to that plan will be true (or nearly true)” (Plantinga, 2015, Sect. 4 of “Warrant and the F&M Complaint”). Based on this, we can say that if there is a false belief, that belief is not warranted because it probably does not meet any of these conditions.
According to Anderson’s model, Christian doctrines can be warranted in four ways that sometimes blend together. These ways range from that of individuals who believe because they believe that the Bible as a whole—and not just some of its statements—is inspired by God and make a specialized study of it and the doctrines to that of individuals who believe simply because they trust the testimony of someone whose belief that the doctrine is true is warranted in some way that ultimately depends on the former.
The italics are included by the author.
Anderson affirms that his thesis is not that there are principled reasons for saying that genuine contradictions are false but that there are reasons to reject dialetheism. However, rejecting dialetheism, which at least accepts some genuine contradictions, implies rejecting all, either based on reasons or by principle.
This premise is supported by the three arguments mentioned above.
I discuss objections related to the meaningfulness of contradictions in Gómez Gutiérrez, (2020b, Forthcoming)
Beall (2021, p. 71) has a succinct version of this argument.
One way out of this may be that empirical propositions have been questioned in these two cases, while the PNC is an a priori judgment. I give the answer to this way out with a question: How does one know that it is an a priori judgment? Perhaps because it is unquestionable, and here, the answer becomes circular.
Anderson affirms that this is not the main reason the consistentist thinks there are no real contradictions. For him, there are independent arguments that support that. I discuss a limited number of arguments here, so I only can say that those particular arguments, including Anderson’s, fail in their purpose.
One of the authors that could be useful for this research is Williamson (2007), who discusses the neutrality of evidence in philosophy, particularly regarding metaphysical positions. Another author who could be used as a reference is Fogelin (2005), who discusses what he calls “deep disagreements,” a theory according to which there are cases of disagreements in which there is no common ground between conflicting positions that would allow a real discussion to take place. Martin (2019) argues for the possibility of deep disagreements in logic, particularly in relations between classical logic and paraconsistent logics. This discussion is later than the one I am proposing here because, as I suggest below, the idea of the correct logic depends on how the object is characterized within the theory, whether as a consistent or inconsistent object.
This objection was also suggested to me by María Martínez-Ordaz.
Beall (2018) is clear in saying that logic must be topic-neutral, and this could lead to thinking that the object or the theory is irrelevant when deciding which one is the best logic or the logic. However, he also clarifies that FDE is the best logic (the logical-consequence) because it accounts for all true theories, including glutty, gappy, and classical. This makes logic depend on the theory or the object (phenomenon), even though it does not include theory language.
I think that the dependence of the logic on the object of study or theory must be taken into account even when that logic leaves out some rules. This would seem problematic in some non-classical logics. However, as shown by Beall (2015) and Priest (2006, 2008), it is not problematic in logics such as LP and FDE, in which, while it is true that they leave out essential rules like modus ponens, there are ways to introduce them into the system.
This can be seen from Philippians 2:5–8.
This can be seen in Matthew 26:39, Luke 22:42, and Mark 14:35–36, where Jesus Christ, praying to his Father, asks him to take the cup of suffering from him. For example, in Luke's passage, he says, “Father, if you are willing, take this cup away from me; yet not my will but yours be done.” In these passages, Jesus Christ shows he has a space of doubt about what will come. He still hopes that it is possible that it will not happen if his Father so permits. Yet, in the midst of this, not knowing for sure of uncertainty, he abandons himself to God’s will, and, whatever God’s decision may be, he humbly accepts it.
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Acknowledgements
This paper is a re-elaboration and, in some topics, an extension of previous works on the subjects addressed here. I thank Luis Fernando Múnera S. J., Graham Priest, Jc Beall, James Anderson, María Martínez-Ordaz, José Andrés Forero, José Tomás Alvarado, Lorenzo Boccafogli, and Michael Devito for their discussions and contributions to either or both works. I also thank the peer referees for their valuable comments. I especially thank Nicolás Vaughan for his generous patience and support. And as always, as a believer, I am also profoundly grateful to God, Virgin Mary, the angels, the saints, and all the luminous beings for everything.
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Gómez Gutiérrez, S. Contradictions and rationality in the context of the doctrine of the Incarnation. AJPH 2, 32 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00085-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00085-z