Abstract
Institutional anomie theory (IAT) attributes the relatively high levels of violent crime in the United States to a social structure characterized by institutional imbalance towards economic dominance and a cultural ethos known as the American Dream which emphasizes individual material success. One of the greatest challenges in testing IAT lies in how to measure these central structural and cultural constructs. While extant research has largely coalesced around the operationalization of institutional imbalance, the measurement of culture has been markedly inconsistent. Such inconsistency may account for the more equivocal support for its cultural dynamics relative to its institutional dynamics. Using data on 47 countries, this study compares several approaches to operationalizing the cultural ethos known as the American Dream and explores whether these different operationalizations produce consistent findings. Study results provide mixed support for the cultural dynamics of IAT regardless of which approach is used and indicate that the approach taken to the measurement of culture can result in entirely different conclusions. We discuss the implications of these findings for IAT and future research on the relationship between culture and crime.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
To help maintain the distinction, value dimensions are hereafter capitalized while cultural values are in lowercase.
This dimension is hereafter referred to as Achievement Orientation where the Masculinity pole corresponds to a competitive Achievement Orientation and the Femininity pole refers to a cooperative Achievement Orientation.
We considered the inclusion of the Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2004) cultural data but decided against it because utilizing this source would reduce our sample size by about one third. We also opted not to use the GLOBE dataset (House et al., 2002) given its smaller sample and theoretical overlap relative to Hofstede’s indices. Finally, we did not include Inglehart’s (2018) two-dimension cultural model given that it does not clearly map onto the four values specified in the American Dream cultural ethos.
Beugelsdijk et al. (2013) found that Hofstede’s dimensions are replicable across generations. Schwartz (2009) also found relative stability for each of his value orientations over a twelve-year period from 1988 to 1999. We also examined the stability of the WVS cultural proxies by examining the correlation between the respective measures at Waves 2 (ca. 2000) and 7 (ca. 2020) for eleven countries which had data available at both waves. We found moderate to strong correlations for the preferences for private ownership (0.52), competition being good (0.54), and the preference for a stable economy (0.65), while the correlation for hard work bringing success was weak (− 0.15). Appendix 2 shows longitudinal trends in the average values for each of the WVS cultural proxies by geographic region, which highlights the relative stability in these measures over time.
One was subtracted from the original coding for each individual item such that 0 reflects “not at all like me” and 5 reflects “very much like me.”
This factor accounted for 72.4% of the variation in the components. The Eigenvalue would have dropped to 0.58 with a second factor. Finally, power, achievement, self-direction, and stimulation are each strongly and positively correlated with the resulting factor.
The PCA using the four WVS measures would have resulted in a two-factor solution. Using a varimax orthogonal rotation, the first factor would explain 42.3% of the variance (Eigenvalue = 1.69) and would be highly correlated with the belief that competition is good (ρ = 0.91), and that hard work brings success (ρ = 0.82). The second factor (Eigenvalue = 1.38) would account for 34.4% of the variance and would be positively correlated with the preference for private ownership of business (ρ = 0.82), but negatively correlated with the prioritization of a stable national economy (ρ = − 0.83).
References
Andersson, C., & Kazemian, L. (2017). Reliability and validity of cross-national homicide data: A comparison of UN and WHO data. International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, 42(4), 287–302.
Baumer, E. P., & Gustafson, R. (2007). Social organization and instrumental crime: Assessing the empirical validity of classic and contemporary anomie theories. Criminology, 45(3), 617–663.
Beugelsdijk, S., Kostova, T., & Roth, K. (2017). An overview of Hofstede-inspired country-level culture research in international business since 2006. Journal of International Business Studies, 48(1), 30–47.
Beugelsdijk, S., Maseland, R., & van Hoorn, A. (2013). Are Hofstede’s culture dimensions stable over time? A generational cohort analysis. Mimeo.
Bjerregaard, B., & Cochran, J. K. (2008). Cross-national test of institutional anomie theory: Do the strength of other social institutions mediate or moderate the effects of the economy on the rate of crime? Western Criminology Review, 9, 31–48.
Cao, L. (2004). Is American society more anomic? A test of Merton’s theory with cross-national data. International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, 28(1), 15–32.
Chamlin, M. B., & Cochran, J. K. (1995). Assessing Messner and Rosenfeld’s institutional anomie theory: A partial test. Criminology, 33(3), 411–429.
Chamlin, M. B., & Cochran, J. K. (2007). An evaluation of the assumptions that underlie institutional anomie theory. Theoretical Criminology, 11(1), 39–61.
Cloward, R. A., & Ohlin, L. E. (1960). Delinquency and opportunity: A theory of delinquent gangs. Free Press.
Cochran, J. K., & Bjerregaard, B. (2012). Structural anomie and crime: A cross-national test. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 56(2), 203–217.
Cohen, A. K. (1955). Delinquent boys: The culture of the gang. Free Press.
Cullen, J. B., Parboteeah, K. P., & Hoegl, M. (2004). Cross-national differences in managers’ willingness to justify ethically suspect behaviors: A test of institutional anomie theory. Academy of Management Journal, 47(3), 411–421.
Dolliver, D. S. (2015). Cultural and institutional adaptation and change in Europe: A test of institutional anomie theory using time series modelling of homicide data. The British Journal of Criminology, 55(4), 747–768.
Durkheim, E. (1966) [1897]. Suicide: A study in sociology. Free Press.
Hirtenlehner, H., Farrall, S., & Bacher, J. (2013). Culture, institutions, and morally dubious behaviors: Testing some core propositions of the institutional-anomie theory. Deviant Behavior, 34(4), 291–320.
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture’s consequences: International differences in work related values. Sage.
Hofstede, G., & Minkov, M. (2010). Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind Intercultural cooperation and its importance for survival. McGraw-Hill.
House, R., Javidan, M., Hanges, P., & Dorfman, P. (2002). Understanding cultures and implicit leadership theories across the globe: An introduction to project GLOBE. Journal of World Business, 37(1), 3–10.
Hövermann, A., Groß, E. M., & Messner, S. F. (2016). Institutional imbalance, integration into non-economic institutions, and a marketized mentality in Europe: A multilevel, partial elaboration of institutional anomie theory. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 57(4), 231–254.
Hövermann, A., Groß, E. M., Zick, A., & Messner, S. F. (2015). Understanding the devaluation of vulnerable groups: A novel application of Institutional Anomie Theory. Social Science Research, 52, 408–421.
Hövermann, A., & Messner, S. F. (2019). Institutional imbalance, marketized mentality, and the justification of instrumental offenses: A cross-national application of institutional anomie theory. Justice Quarterly, 38(3), 406–432.
Hughes, L. A., Schaible, L. M., & Gibbs, B. R. (2015). Economic dominance, the “American Dream”, and homicide: A cross-national test of institutional anomie theory. Sociological Inquiry, 85(1), 100–128.
Inglehart, R. (2018). Culture shift in advanced industrial society. Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2010). Changing mass priorities: The link between modernization and democracy. Perspectives on Politics, 8(2), 551–567.
Jensen, G. (2002). Institutional anomie and societal variations in crime: A critical appraisal. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 22(7/8), 45–74.
Kim, S. W., & Pridemore, W. A. (2005a). Social change, institutional anomie and serious property crime in transitional Russia. The British Journal of Criminology, 45(1), 81–97.
Kim, S. W., & Pridemore, W. A. (2005b). Poverty, socioeconomic change, institutional anomie, and homicide. Social Science Quarterly, 86, 1377–1398.
Konty, M. (2005). Microanomie: The cognitive foundations of the relationship between anomie and deviance. Criminology, 43(1), 107–132.
Martin, K. D., Cullen, J. B., Johnson, J. L., & Parboteeah, K. P. (2007). Deciding to bribe: A cross-level analysis of firm and home country influences on bribery activity. Academy of Management Journal, 50(6), 1401–1422.
Maume, M. O., & Lee, M. R. (2003). Social institutions and violence: A sub-national test of institutional anomie theory. Criminology, 41(4), 1137–1172.
Merton, R. K. (1968). Social theory and social structure. Simon & Schuster.
Messner, S. F., & Rosenfeld, R. (1997). Political restraint of the market and levels of criminal homicide: A cross-national application of institutional-anomie theory. Social Forces, 75(4), 1393–1416.
Messner, S., & Rosenfeld, R. (2007). Crime and the American Dream (4th ed.). Thomson-Wadsworth.
Messner, S., & Rosenfeld, R. (2008). The present and future of institutional-anomie theory. In F. T. Cullen, J. P. Wright, & K. R. Blevins (Eds.), Taking stock: The status of criminological theory (pp. 127–148). Transaction Publishers.
Messner, S. F., Rosenfeld, R., & Hövermann, A. (2019). Institutional anomie theory: An evolving research program. In M. D. Krohn, N. Hendrix, G. A. Hall, & A. J. Lizotte (Eds.), Handbook on crime and deviance (pp. 161–177). Springer.
Messner, S. F., Thome, H., & Rosenfeld, R. (2008). Institutions, anomie, and violent crime: Clarifying and elaborating institutional-anomie theory. International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 2(2), 163–181.
Miller, T., Kim, A. B., & Holmes, K. (2015). 2015 index of economic freedom. The Heritage Foundation.
Piquero, A., & Piquero, N. L. (1998). On testing institutional anomie with varying specifications. Studies on Crime and Crime Prevention, 7, 61–84.
Pratt, T. C., & Godsey, T. W. (2003). Social support, inequality, and homicide: A cross-national test of an integrated theoretical model. Criminology, 41(3), 611–644.
Pridemore, W. A. (2008). A methodological addition to the cross-national empirical literature on social structure and homicide: A first test of the poverty-homicide thesis. Criminology, 46(1), 133–154.
Schoepfer, A., & Piquero, N. L. (2006). Exploring white-collar crime and the American dream: A partial test of institutional anomie theory. Journal of Criminal Justice, 34(3), 227–235.
Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human values? Journal of Social Issues, 50(4), 19–45.
Schwartz, S. H. (2006). A theory of cultural value orientations: Explication and applications. Comparative Sociology, 5(2–3), 137–182.
Schwartz, S. H. (2009). Cultural Value Orientations: Nature & Implications of National Differences. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel Science Foundation Grant No. 921/02.
Shackleton, V. J., & Ali, A. H. (1990). Work-related values of managers: A test of the Hofstede model. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 21(1), 109–118.
Shaw, C. R., & McKay, H. D. (1942). Juvenile delinquency and urban areas. University of Chicago Press.
Singelis, T. M., Triandis, H. C., Bhawuk, D. P., & Gelfand, M. J. (1995). Horizontal and vertical dimensions of individualism and collectivism: A theoretical and measurement refinement. Cross-Cultural Research, 29(3), 240–275.
Solt, F. (2020). Measuring income inequality across countries and over time: The standardized world income inequality database. Social Science Quarterly, 101(3), 1183–1199.
Stults, B. J., & Baumer, E. P. (2008). Assessing the relevance of anomie theory for explaining spatial variation in lethal criminal violence: An aggregate-level analysis of homicide within the United States. International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 2(2), 215–247.
Triandis, H. C. (1995). Individualism and collectivism. Westview.
Trompenaars, F., & Hampden-Turner, C. (2004). Managing people across cultures. Capstone.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2019). Global study on homicide 2019. Vienna: United Nations.
Weiss, D. B., Testa, A., & Rennó Santos, M. (2020). Institutional anomie and cross-national differences in incarceration. Criminology, 58(3), 454–484.
Weld, D., & Roche, S. P. (2017). A matter of time: A partial test of institutional anomie theory using cross-national time use data. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 33(2), 371–395.
Zito, R. C. (2019). Institutional anomie and justification of morally dubious behavior and violence cross-nationally: A multilevel examination. Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 52(2), 250–271.
Funding
No funding was received for conducting this study.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of interest
The authors have no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose.
Supplementary Information
Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material.
Appendices
Appendix 1: Countries in the Analytical Sample
Country | Code | Homicide rate | Country | Code | Homicide rate |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Argentina | AR | 6.6 | Netherlands | NL | 0.9 |
Australia | AT | 1.3 | New Zealand | NZ | 1.1 |
Brazil | BR | 25.5 | Norway | NO | 0.8 |
Bulgaria | BG | 2.3 | Pakistan | PK | 6.3 |
Burkina Faso | BF | 0.7 | Peru | PE | 7 |
Canada | CA | 1.8 | Philippines | PH | 8.3 |
Chile | CL | 3.5 | Poland | PL | 1.2 |
Colombia | CO | 41.6 | Romania | RO | 2 |
Ecuador | EC | 13.4 | Russia | RU | 19 |
Egypt | EG | 1.4 | Singapore | SG | 0.5 |
Estonia | EE | 6.2 | Slovenia | SI | 1 |
Finland | FI | 2.1 | South Africa | ZA | 37.1 |
Germany | DE | 1 | Spain | ES | 1 |
Ghana | GH | 1.9 | Sweden | SE | 1 |
Hungary | HU | 1.8 | Switzerland | CH | 0.8 |
India | IN | 3.9 | Thailand | TH | 6 |
Indonesia | ID | 0.6 | Trinidad & Tobago | TT | 26.3 |
Iran | IR | 2.8 | Turkey | TR | 4.6 |
Japan | JP | 0.4 | Ukraine | UA | 6.8 |
Jordan | JO | 1.6 | United States | US | 5.3 |
Lebanon | LB | 3.5 | Uruguay | UY | 6.8 |
Malaysia | MY | 2.2 | Vietnam | VN | 1.3 |
Mexico | MX | 15.2 | Zambia | ZM | 6 |
Morocco | MA | 1.5 |
Appendix 2: Longitudinal Trends in Cultural Indicators from the World Value Survey—2000 to 2020
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Weiss, D.B., Santos, M.R. & Testa, A. Operationalizing the “American Dream”: A Comparison of Approaches. Int Criminol 1, 281–298 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s43576-021-00023-0
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s43576-021-00023-0