Abstract
This paper offers a comparative-philosophical examination of how the early 20th-century Chinese philosopher Xiong Shili (1885–1968) and late 19th-century Japanese philosopher Kiyozawa Manshi (1863–1903) thought about the topic of transformation. Although the two thinkers face similar material and intellectual circumstances – both attempt to develop an idealist philosophy of mind to combat naturalism – my focus is on demonstrating that they occupy inverted philosophical positions on transformation. I begin by discussing their different evaluations of logic. Xiong considers logic nothing more than a tool for combating false views that must be abandoned upon achieving its goal. Kiyozawa has a positive understanding of logic and thinks that it can be used speculatively to conceive of our relation to the unlimited. I then show how their differing evaluations of logic are rooted in their divergent views on transformation. Kiyozawa conceives of transformation as a process of spiritual evolution from matter to mind; that is, for him something transforms into something else. To Xiong, transformation is the sole reality; that is, for him there is only: transformation. In the last part, I supplement idea-historical reasons for their inverted positions vis-à-vis transformation with a philosophical examination aimed at revealing the existential attitudes from which Xiong and Kiyozawa theorize and engage in practice. To that end, I heuristically apply Kiyozawa’s two-gate theory. Within the framework offered by this theory, Xiong can be considered a philosopher of self-power, and Kiyozawa one of other-power.
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Notes
Among Kiyozawa’s high-profile disciples can be counted Soga Ryōjin 曽我量深 (1875–1971) and Akegarasu Haya 暁烏敏 (1877–1954). That he moreover had a certain degree of influence on Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 (1870–1945), the main representative of the Kyoto School of Philosophy, is clear. For a study on Kiyozawa’s influence on Nishida, see Fujita 2003.
The ti-yong distinction goes back to Wang Bi’s (226–249) commentary on the Dao De Jing; see Chan, 1963: 323.
Since to Xiong the term ‘reality’ is a synonym for ‘fundamental reality’ (本體 or 實體) (Xiong, 2015: 56), I use the term in this sense as well when discussing his philosophy throughout the paper.
Xiong rejects Western idealism as the view that there are ‘real minds’ in Xiong, 2015: 110. To Xiong, mind has no self-nature but is the expanding movement of that which does, namely constant transformation. Since the expression of reality (that is, its movement) is mental, but reality itself, which is beyond oppositions such as mind and matter and being and non-being, is not, Xiong’s subjective idealism is secondary to his monism.
The strongest indication of Kiyozawa’s objective idealism in the Draft is found in Sect. 16 on pan-mentalism (萬有心靈); see Kiyozawa, 1955 (4): 417–418. The objective idealism of the Draft stands in marked contrast with his later ‘spiritualism’ (精神主義), which, since it is a practical teaching, forgoes philosophical speculation on the ultimate nature of the universe and therefore according to Kiyozawa is unrelated to idealism. Consider Kiyozawa, 1955 (6), 29–32.
See Makeham, 2014.
The view that Yogācāra is a type of idealism is not uncontested; see Garfield & Westerhoff, 2015: 4–5.
See also Jorgenson, 2014.
For the rejection of the concept of buddha-nature by Yogācāra, see Tagawa, 2009: 101–104.
For Lotze’s views in this regard, see Beiser, 2014: 267.
See Jorgenson, 2014: 68–71.
Etymologically, the word ‘logic’ derives from the Greek τέχνη της λογικής, or the art (tekhne) of logic (logikes). It may not be unreasonable to surmise that the choice for 論理 as the rendition of the English ‘logic’ is partly inspired by the Dutch ‘redeneerkunde,’ itself literally meaning ‘the art of reasoning.’ The work of Nishi Amane 西周 (1829–1897) is important to rendering this conjecture plausible; consider that he studied philosophy in Leiden under Simon Vissering (1818–1888) and Cornelis Willem Opzoomer (1821–1892), two Dutch philosophers with positivist and utilitarian affinities. On the opening page of Nishi’s 1874 Chichi Keimō 致知啓蒙 the English ‘logic’ and the Dutch ‘redeneerkunde’ are referred to as 致知學, or ‘the study of extending knowledge.’ Chichi Keimō can be considered Nishi’s introduction for the general Japanese intellectual public to Western logic, particularly that of Mill. Precisely when 論理 became the standard translation for ‘logic’ is unclear to me, but we see Nishi already refer to logic (ロジック) as 論理學 in no. 23 of the Meiroku Zasshi 明六雑誌.
See Havens, 1970: 8.
Xiong mentions Bergson by name a few times in New Treatise, generally approvingly. See e.g. Xiong, 2015: 111.
This is due to Nishi’s efforts (see note 12). See Havens, 1970, in particular 100–108.
Kiyozawa studied these philosophers at Tokyo University under the American philosopher Ernest F. Fenollosa (1853–1908), who attempted to synthesize the philosophies of Spencer and Hegel.
For Xiong’s syncretism, see Xiong, 2015: xvii-xxii.
See e.g. Kiyozawa, 1955 (4): 428.
Consider e.g. the series of refutations found in Xiong, 2015: 30–49.
Consider e.g. Xiong’s negative evaluation of Mahāyāna logic in Xiong, 2015: 56.
For the difference between the apophatic and kataphatic modes of explanation, see Xiong, 2015: 87–88.
As e.g. when previous Yogācāra masters thought of seeds (果) as having self-nature; see Xiong, 2015: 64–65.
Cf. Makeham, 2014: 269.
Note that to Kiyozawa the unlimited is not simply a practical postulate in the Kantian sense, since he accepts Descartes’ ontological argument (in Kiyozawa, 1955 (4): 397). Interestingly, Kiyozawa disregards Kant’s rejection of that argument (in Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, A592/B620-A603/B631), mistakenly writing that it has gone logically unchallenged.
Consider the paradoxical statement in Xiong, 2015: 183–184 that mind both is identical to fundamental reality and different from it.
Cf. Makeham, 2014: 250.
For ‘the nature’ and ‘buddha-nature,’ see footnote 38 of Makeham’s introduction to the New Treatise (Xiong, 2015: xx).
Consider the closing remarks of the fifth chapter of the Kyōgyōshinshō 教行信証: ‘…when we reach the Buddha Land of Peace and Bliss, Buddha-nature will certainly be revealed to us – through the merit transference by the Primal Vow-Power’ (Shinran, 2003: 230).
Cf. Xiong, 2015: 70–71: ‘Mind-consciousness is able to flow uninterrupted only through constant renewal and a complete absence of abiding with the old.’
That this decision is ‘existential’ is my way of putting it; Kiyozawa himself does not employ the term. I call the decision ‘existential’ because even though we are free to choose either option, a choice must be made. To Kiyozawa himself there is such a thing as a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ choice, since each option represents a teaching and people’s capacities (機) make them better suited for one teaching over the other. See Kiyozawa, 1955: 429.
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Acknowledgements
I thank Eric Nelson, Greg Moss, Hugo Hogenbirk, Dirk-Jan Laan, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
Funding
I am a recipient of the Hong Kong PhD Fellowship Scheme administered by the Hong Kong-based Research Grants Council (RGC).
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Prooi, D. Xiong Shili, Kiyozawa Manshi, and the Logic of Transformation. Journal East Asian Philosophy 2, 53–70 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s43493-021-00012-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s43493-021-00012-7