1 Introduction

The rise of the Global South is an important fact in the context of contemporary world politics and an integral part of the tremendous ongoing changes. As great power politics returns, the South, a huge group of countries and an important force in international political and economic relations, has become the object of competition among the relevant powers. Two phenomena are quite eye-catching. One important fact is that the United States, Japan, and the European Union (EU) have individually and collectively amplified their support and wooing for the Global South. Another significant fact is the divide-and-rule policy adopted by Western powers to not only drive a wedge between China or Russia and the Global South but also to sow discord between the emerging powers and other important emerging economies in the Global South. Meanwhile, emerging powers and economies have persistently strengthened global and regional coordination and cooperation with a positive attitude and practical initiatives, thus becoming the most important and active force among countries in the South toward reforming the international order and global governance system.

In this essay, the author attempts to investigate the interactions and mechanisms between the rise of the Global South and changes in the contemporary international order. This paper will also attempt to reveal the basic nature and general trends of changes that arise from three key aspects, namely, international distribution of power (international configuration), modes of international interactions, and international rules and systems.

2 The rising process and collective identity of the Global South

The vast majority of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have been identified as “developing countries”, irrespective of the collective labels they've been assigned, such as the Third World, the Southern countries or the Global South. All these labels have been generally defined and imposed by those outside of the group. At different times, the Global South and various regions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have exhibited a distinct and remarkable subjective consciousness and self-identity. These unique identities pertain to both their own respective regions and the Global South as a whole.

2.1 During the Cold War: decolonization and “rebels within the system” (1945–1989)

A large number of African countries gaining independence in the early 1960s marked a watershed in the decolonization process. During the first stage of decolonization, the vast majority of Asian countries, along with more than two-thirds of African countries, achieved political independence and joined the United Nations (UN). The number of Asian and African UN members surpassed that of European and North American for the first time. The Third World rose to be an important force in the international political arena, marked successively by the Bandung Asian-African Conference in 1955 and the subsequent Afro-Asian solidarity movement, the birth of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, and the launch of the Group of 77 and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. In the second stage, all colonies, semi-colonies, and trust territories gained political independence except for East Timor in Asia and Palau in the Pacific. Asian, African and Latin American countries now represented an absolute majority in the UN system. With a view to consolidating political independence and achieving economic development goals, they took center stage at the UN General Assembly, UNCTAD and NAM to safeguard their own economic rights and interests and championed a new international economic order through increased solidarity and cooperation. In a word, Third World countries became an emerging element and revolutionary force in the post-war international order. They were “rebels within the system”.

Throughout the Cold War, Asian, African, and Latin American countries were called “the Third World” and “developing countries”, both carry the connotation of economic underdevelopment. In 1952, Alfred Sauvy, a French economist, first used the “Third World” phrase. It has since become an entry in the glossary of international politics with both economic (underdevelopment) and political (anti-colonialism and neutrality) connotations. In the beginning, the Third World was closely linked to the concepts and practices of revolution, independence and autonomy, equality and development. Later, it increasingly interacted with non-alignment and anti-hegemonism (Palieraki 2023). The concept of “developing countries” formally appeared at the UNCTAD in 1964, replacing “underdeveloped countries”, which had long been used by American economists and government agencies. Since then, the dichotomy and its underlying criteria have been employed as a convenient tool for developed countries and international economic, trade, and financial institutions under their dominance. This tool has been used by these actors to formulate trade, investment and official development assistance (ODA) policies, serving as the main basis for the establishment and expansion of exclusive rich clubs. In a word, the “Third World” and “developing countries” are the external, especially Western, definition of “the other”, i.e., Asian, African and Latin American countries.

To a certain extent, Asian, African, and Latin American countries have accepted the above two “imposed” identities. By the early 1960s, the “Third World” became widely used and was even superseded in popularity by the term “developing countries”. When it became part of the official glossary of UN agencies and documents, the vast number of countries tagged as such also added to its definition an additional connotation of “unity among countries in the South” in pursuit of shared development goals and a just and reasonable new international economic order. The term thus also began to embody a collective sense of autonomy and identity (Farias 2023).

On the other hand, in the process of decolonization and the movement for a new international economic order, Asian, African, and Latin American countries actively shaped their regional and global collective identities. India, Indonesia, Myanmar, and other Asian countries advocated Asianism and “handling Asian affairs in an Asian way”, and pursued a policy of neutralism between the East and West camps. At the Bandung Conference, Asianism and African nationalism joined the force, leading to the Afro-Asian solidarity movement and Third World internationalism (Yin 2022, 5–8, 53). Then NAM and G77 came into being. The Third World formally rose on the international political stage. In January 1966, the Tricontinental Conference was held in Cuba, thus born Tricontinentalism and the tricontinental solidarity movement (Fan 2023, 103–104).

Since the middle and late 1960s, however, the emerging Third World collective identity has been weakened. First of all, the globalization of the Cold War led to many proxy wars in South Asia, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa, and many regions and countries fell into the abyss of long-term conflicts and turmoil. Secondly, the Western camp used the “divide and rule” strategy against Afro-Asianism, Tricontinentalism, and the NAM, leading to the decline of internationalism in the Third World and the plight of the NAM. In addition, numerous export-oriented developing economies and resource-based countries have successively embarked on the road to industrialization since the 1970s. This has led to a great South-South divergence in economic development models.

2.2 Post-Cold War: globalization and “responsive participants” (1990–2008)

After the end of the Cold War, accelerating globalization and the U.S. “unipolar moment” engulfed the Third World into the post-Cold War era. Developing countries actively or passively joined the international system, engaged in globalization, and participated in and created various integration processes. Emerging economies, including the Asian Tigers (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand) and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), stood out from their Third World peers. These select few emerging powers, in particular, not only became key driving forces for economic growth in their respective regions but also on the world stage. Furthermore, they began to play a leading role in international and regional affairs, thus becoming an important force for multi-polarity in world politics and the democratization of international relations. It was the second South-South divergence, and “responsive participants” became winners (Zheng 2023, 48–55).

In the North–South dialogue process, the concepts of “South” and “Southern countries” gained traction; the term “Third World” faded away; while “developing countries” remained synonymous with Asian, African, and Latin American countries. In December 1979, the Independent Commission on International Development Issues (the North–South Commission or Brandt Commission) published its report North–South: A Programme for Survival, which described a host of serious problems confronting Third World countries and proposed to reform the international economic order, strengthen North–South dialogue and international cooperation, ease international tensions, and develop new state-to-state relations (Independent Commission on International Development Issues 1980). The report kicked off a great debate about the Third World. The South and the North had very different opinions on the domestic and international causes of the Third World’s development dilemma, but on the whole, the political and academic circles in the North directed their focus towards domestic factors while those in the South pointed to colonial aggression and exploitation as well as the unjust and unreasonable international economic system (Rohr 1989).

As discussions went deeper, the West, with its greater power of discourse, sculpted the South as the root of the problem and the object of global governance (Carlsson and Ramphal 1995; Thomas 1999). It also constructed a new development narrative, classified and divided countries in the South through the lens of neoclassical liberalism and the Washington Consensus, and hand-picked “emerging markets” from among the Third World for potential encouragement, investment, and acceptance. Politically, with its supremacy in power at the “unipolar moment”, the West worked to divide the South. It absorbed into its camp a large number of transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as a few developed Southern countries. This was accomplished by enlarging EU and NATO memberships eastward, consolidating, and expanding a liberal international order and a democratic security community. However, the Global South had its own unique development course. On the one hand, through regional integration processes, countries in the South constructed their respective regional identities and developed identification as such, and emerged as new forces in regional and even world affairs. China, India, ASEAN, and the African Union (AU) became critical players in promoting development, maintaining stability and collaborating against terrorism in their respective regions. In Latin America, multiple countries developed more independent foreign policies and development strategies.

On the other hand, emerging powers are actively exploring new channels and ways to conduct South-South cooperation and North–South dialogue. Furthermore, they are working tirelessly to shape a new collective identity of the South at the global level. From 2002 to 2009, the China–Russia–India foreign ministers meeting mechanism, the India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum and the BRICS mechanism were created one after another. Emerging powers coordinated and cooperated on major international affairs inside and outside these mechanisms to jointly advance a development agenda shared among the Global South. The collective identity of developing countries based on “development” was strengthened, and the Global South maintained a certain degree of unity and cooperation (Li 2023, 139).

2.3 Era of major power politics: collective rise of emerging economies and “active agents” (2009 to the present)

The 2008 world financial crisis was an important turning point in contemporary international politics and economic development. Both the United States and Europe found themselves facing political and social polarization. Consequently, the US had to initiate a kind of strategic retreat. The Global South has since emerged on the international political and economic stage with a brand-new look. A large number of emerging economies, especially emerging powers, have been rising continuously and rapidly. They started to take an increasingly visible part in international and regional affairs and to push for the reform of the international order and global governance system. The rise of emerging economies and powers came to be “non-Western” and represented the rise of Southern countries as a group, hence the birth of the New South or the Global South. The Global South has now been moving from the periphery of the international political and economic arena towards the center as “active agents” in the evolving international order. It marks the arrival of a new era.

The North or the West has displayed a range of emotions towards the rise of the Global South. While they understand that they must grapple with this reality, adapting to this situation has proven challenging. In recent years, with the return of major power politics and out of geo-strategic planning, the United States, Japan, and some EU countries have begun to construct a Western narrative of the Global South, which excluded China. This narrative is designed to drive a wedge among emerging powers, and between those powers and other developing countries, to win over certain emerging economies and regional powers (Wenhuibao 2023, 5). However, the collective rise of emerging economies also forced the North to face reality and readjust the rules and systems of the international order and global governance system to maintain world economic growth and stability and jointly solve important and urgent global issues. Since 2009, the Group of Twenty (G20) has developed into a leading decision-making mechanism in international economic cooperation. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have, on several occasions, reviewed and adjusted voting powers and quota distributions to allow China, India, Brazil, Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Turkey to have a greater say. This marks the first time that West-dominated international rules and systems have made major concessions to non-Western countries.

In shaping collective identity, the Global South continued to strengthen unity and collaboration, fostering a new model of South-South cooperation. Southern countries advocated for sustainable development, asserting that development and security are inseparable from each other. By pushing for reform of existing international rules and systems and creating new ones, the subject consciousness and collective identity of the Global South in the new era have been strongly and effectively revived. Landmarks in this process included the establishment of UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) in 2015, the proposition of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by China in 2013 and the launching of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) in 2015. The new South–South cooperation aims to promote sustainable development, primarily involving emerging economies and using the BRICS mechanism as its central platform. This approach serves to strengthen the collective identity of countries in the South and further promote the multi-polarization of international politics and the democratization of international relations.

3 Global South and changes in international power structure

With the rise of the Global South, the power structure of the contemporary international order has undergone major changes on multiple occasions. Generally speaking, the international distribution of power or global configuration has been moving towards multipolarity at a faster speed. During the Cold War, the world was dominated by two superpowers. However, after the Cold War, this shifted to one sole superpower, supplemented by multiple major powers. And now in this era of major power politics, there are more power centres and influential players. The fundamental driver behind such changes lies in the new forces and roles stemming from the unbalanced world political and economic developments, among which the most fundamental and lasting factor has been the rise of the Global South.

3.1 Rise of the Third World and increasing multi-polarity in a bipolar world

During the Cold War, a bipolar confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union was the underlying international configuration. That structure was impacted by the Third World repeatedly from both within and without, breeding the long-term potential for multipolarization. First, the Third World rose rapidly to become a majority political group in the UN system and a vast intermediate zone between the United States and the Soviet Union. Politically, the Third World opposed colonialism, imperialism, and hegemonism, vigorously promoted decolonization, and pursued neutral and non-alignment policies. Upon the peak of African decolonization, the number of Asian and African members in the UN surpassed that of European and American members. In 1965, the UN had a total of 117 member-states, including 66 Asian and African ones and 51 European and American ones. In 1969, UN membership increased to 126, 73 from Asia and Africa, and 53 from Europe, North and South America, the Caribbean, and Oceania.Footnote 1 At the same time, Asian, African and Latin American countries began to proactively shape regional orders and had a great influence on the world order. Starting from the mid-1960s, the Third World attempted to march forward towards greater solidarity and self-reliance. They actively promoted regional and sub-regional integration, and at a global level through NAM and G77 unity and cooperation. They advanced their demand for a new international economic order inside and outside UN forums and called for changes to the bipolar structure in world politics and the Bretton Woods system in the economic field.

Secondly, the interplay between the rise of the Third World and internal changes within the two camps also contributed to the multi-polarization trend based on five power centers.Footnote 2 Three developments were the most prominent. First, while Western Europe and Japan became two major power centers, China broke away from the Soviet camp to be a major independent political force. Second, multiple regional power centres emerged within the Third World, such as the ASEAN, established in 1967, and Egypt (1956 and 1978), Saudi Arabia (1974) and Iran (1979) in the Middle East. They shaped regional orders and boosted the trend of multi-polarization in international politics. Third, important forces in the Third World interacted with regional forces in the Western camp, also contributing to multi-polarization to varying degrees. Examples of this included China improving relations with France and Japan, and India having frequent interactions with the United States and the Soviet Union.

3.2 Collective rise of emerging economies and multi-polarization in the context of “one superpower plus multiple major powers”

In a world featuring “one superpower plus multiple major powers”, the Global South remained vigorous towards multi-polarization. In the new wave of globalization, a great divergence in economic development took place within the Global South. The continuous and rapid development of emerging economies effectively led to the redrawing of political and economic maps. Emerging powers and economies contributed to multi-polarization in four aspects (Song 2022).

First of all, with the continuous increase of strength, emerging powers have progressively established themselves as power centres in international and regional affairs. China and India were engines of economic growth in the Asia–Pacific region and even the world at large and possessed undeniable military capabilities. Having completed its political and economic transformation, Russia recovered some of its economic strength and sustained its military power. Brazil and South Africa also performed well in terms of economic development. Emerging powers not only promoted multi-polarization both bilaterally and multilaterally but also played a critical role in restricting hegemonism and power politics by taking positions similar to those of traditional powers such as France, Britain, Germany, and Japan on major international issues.

Secondly, emerging powers played a leading role in political and economic integration processes in their respective regions, laying down the regional order foundation for multi-polarity. China and Russia initiated to establish the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), became leading partners in regional security, stability, and anti-terrorism cooperation, and advocated the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), along with a new security concept in Asia. India, Russia, and Brazil created new integrated cooperation mechanisms in their respective regions. In addition, some emerging economies, regional powers, and sub-regional organizations started to play a role in regional affairs. For example, Türkiye championed a Turkic-speaking countries organization, and ASEAN created multiple ASEAN Plus mechanisms, both being critical forces in regional affairs.

Thirdly, emerging powers began to cooperate strategically on major international and regional issues and made a commitment to reviving South-South cooperation. In terms of major peace and security issues such as multi-polarization, UN Security Council reform, humanitarian intervention, global anti-terror war, and nuclear non-proliferation, they sought and coordinated a common understanding at both global and regional levels. On global issues such as world economic growth and development governance, poverty reduction, environmental protection and climate change, polar and ocean governance, and health, they coordinated and collaborated with one another. Additionally, emerging powers and economies were committed to reviving South-South cooperation. China, India, Brazil, and other emerging economies turned from development assistance recipients to donors. Their unconditional and non-mandatory assistance to other developing countries in the Global South led to a “silent revolution” (Li 2023, 139).

Finally, emerging powers and other emerging economies began to participate in international economic governance. In 1999, shortly after the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, the Group of Eight (G8) invited the EU, Australia, and 10 emerging economies to participate in a meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors. A financial stability forum was created at the meeting. It was the first time for countries in the Global South to take part in global economic governance. In 2002, the G8 presidency started to invite certain selected Southern countries to an economic affairs dialogue during the G8 summit. Gradually the G8 + O5 (Outreach 5 or five emerging countries: Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa) mechanism came into being. After the outbreak of the 2008 global financial crisis, eleven emerging economies, including the BRICS, became full members of the G20 summit, the meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors, and the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The G20 was born, a first-ever venue of North–South joint governance for global economic affairs. The global economic governance system has become more pluralistic and relatively balanced (Ding 2021, 115).

3.3 Rise of the Global South and a multipolar and pluralistic world

In 2009, at the G8 summit in L’Aquila, Italy, leaders of the North and the South for the first time issued a joint statement; the G20 Pittsburgh Summit decided that the G20 series of meetings and the FSB would serve as the main forums and institutional consultation platforms for international economic cooperation; and the BRICS held its first summit, indicating the formal appearance of the Global South as one in the contemporary international political and economic arena. Emerging powers have become the main representatives and leaders of the Global South. Many emerging economies and regional powers have increasingly established themselves as power centres in their respective regions, contributing significantly to today’s multipolar and pluralistic world pattern. The global and regional power centers are the poles, while the regional economic, trade, and value chains and representative cultural/civilizational units are the pluralist players, hence increased presence and weight for countries in the South (Acharya 2017, 276–277 and 279; Qin 2021). Within this emerging configuration, China, the United States, and the European Union lead in comprehensive strength. They are the first echelon in the international system’s power structure. Emerging powers India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa and traditional powers Britain, France, Germany, and Japan, which have some advantages in economy, science and technology, military, culture, and international or regional influence, constitute the second echelon. Other emerging economies, regional powers, and country groups in the Global South have economic, political, and cultural influences mainly within their own regions and are the third echelon. They include Indonesia and ASEAN in Southeast Asia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey in the Middle East, Ethiopia, Nigeria and the AU in sub-Saharan Africa, and Argentina and Mexico in Latin America.

The rise of the Global South has shaped the multipolar and pluralistic world configuration mainly in three aspects. It has first of all brought about great changes to the world economic structure. In 2020, developing and developed economies respectively accounted for 40% and 60% of the world economic aggregates. Among them, the shares of the BRICS and G7 changed from 14.78% and 52.15% in 2008 to 24.25% and 45.63% in 2020. In 2022, the total economic output of 11 emerging economies, BRICS included, stood at US$ 3.296 billion, accounting for 32.78% of the world’s total. The figures for G7 were US$ 4.376 billion and 43.52% of the globe. In addition, the Global South has seen rapid growth in foreign trade and investment. In 2020, their import and export of goods accounted for 45.9% and 42.1% of the world total respectively, not too far behind that of developed countries. Trade in goods and services (including financial services) among emerging economies already accounted for 25% of the world’s total.Footnote 3 In short, emerging economies, those emerging powers in particular, play an important role in global economic growth, development, and a new world economic structure.

Moreover, the Global South has made major strides in manufacturing, technological innovation, and global value chains. China, India, and Brazil are great examples of rapid manufacturing expansion. More importantly, by participating in globalization and global value chains, emerging powers and regional emerging economies have become hubs and critical nodes in global value, supply, and industrial chains. China in East Asia, India in South Asia, Brazil in South America, Indonesia in ASEAN, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in the Middle East have all gained indispensable positions in the ongoing reshaping or re-globalization of global value chains (Yu and Luan 2023).

Additionally, while pushing for the reform of the contemporary international order and global governance system, the Global South has shifted from proactive proposals of norms and principles to positive institutional buildings and practical implementations. On the one hand, the Global South, especially emerging powers and other emerging economies, has been increasingly engaged in global economic governance. They work within frameworks such as the UN and the G20 to reform relevant regimes, actively contributing to the formulation of rules and policies beneficial to Southern countries. These initiatives are facilitated by their improved capacities and hard-won negotiations. On the other hand, emerging powers have promoted the creation of many new institutional platforms. With global development governance in particular, they pushed for the adoption of the SDGs, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and the financial and technical compensation mechanisms to support climate actions, created the AIIB, the BRICS, and the NDB, advanced new South-South cooperation, and developed many new rules and systems.

4 Global South and evolving modes of international interactions

On the basis of inheriting, learning and imitation, the Global South has innovated modes of modern international interactions. State-to-state interactions are generally organized into five categories: use of force (war, interference, arms race, deterrence), diplomacy (negotiation, balance of power, neutrality, alliance), use of economic means (trade, aid, sanctions, embargo, coercion), international law and international organizations, and scientific, technological and cultural exchanges. In handling international affairs and foreign relations, countries in the South have employed all the means in the above five categories. At the same time, they have also been very innovative.

4.1 Emergence and development of Third World internationalism

The primary catalyst for Third World internationalism was the decolonization process after World War II. The Bandung Conference marked its emergence on the world stage (Yin 2022, 5–8, 48–53 and 210–256). At the center of Third World internationalism was African–Asian–Latin American solidarity, mutual assistance and cooperation against colonialism, imperialism, and hegemonism. It was believed that nations must first strive for liberation and independence and then maintain national sovereignty and territorial integrity, seek economic development and equal rights, and pursue a just and reasonable new international political and economic order. The thoughts and actions of Third World internationalism have transitioned through five stages of development.

From the end of World War II in 1945 to the Bandung Conference in 1955, Third World internationalism came into being. China, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Egypt provided political and military assistance to other Asian and African people and countries fighting for national liberation. As the Cold War expanded from Europe into Asia and Africa, some countries on the two continents decided on a solidarity and mutual assistance movement to completely overthrow colonialism and imperialism. In April 1955, they put forward the Ten Principles of Bandung for handling international relations, which has since served as a guide to the Afro-Asian solidarity movement.

From 1955 to 1965, Third World internationalism developed rapidly in the form of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement. Four Asian-African conferences were held to promote Afro-Asian solidarity and oppose colonialism and imperialism (Li 2012). Third World internationalism mobilized public opinion politically, organized peace movements, and supported anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements in Asia and Africa. It also supported African independence movements in theory and kind, such as the support to Algeria’s war of independence and the work leading to the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960 Declaration on Decolonization). It further contributed to the creation of NAM and G77 to lead the Afro-Asian solidarity movement.

The period from 1966 to 1978 was a turning point for Third World internationalism. On the one hand, the Afro-Asian movement expanded into the Asian-African-Latin American solidarity movement, However, due to the globalization of the Cold War, the split between China and the Soviet Union, coupled with differences within NAM, became an arena for great power competition. On the other hand, the economic dimension became visible. North–South dialogue was carried out at UNCTAD, pushing for reform and adjustment of the Bretton Woods system. A practical process of South-South cooperation was also initiated, with UNCTAD steered to adopt the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (BAPA-TCDC).

From 1980s to the 2008 global financial crisis, Third World internationalism experienced a downturn, leading to a more loosely woven NAM and G77. Many developing countries tended to engage in dialogue and cooperation with Northern countries either on their own or in smaller or more specialized groups (such as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC). Many international conferences on North–South dialogue failed to yield substantial results. South–South cooperation generated only two nominal achievements in the 1980s: the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and in 1989 the establishment of the Group of Fifteen (G15) and the announced evolution from technical cooperation to economic cooperation among developing countries (ECDC).

Since 2009, Third World internationalism has seen a revival, with new South-South cooperation surging. Three landmark events in 2009 heralded such revival: the BRICS Summit, the G20 Pittsburgh Summit, and the first High-level UN Conference on South-South Cooperation. New South-South cooperation has emerged, with the BRICS taking the lead, diversified entities as partners, sustainable development as the objective, and in various forms of regional, sub-regional, trans-regional, region plus, and triangular cooperation.

4.2 Economic dimension of Third World internationalism: from traditional to new South-South cooperation

Third World internationalism in the economic field is manifested as South-South cooperation, which has evolved to have a new outlook.

Traditional South-South cooperation was started at the Bandung Conference, and coordinated via the Afro-Asian solidarity movement, NAM and G77. A series of programmatic documents adopted at NAM conferences in particular provided the guiding principles and specified areas and modes of cooperation. Countries, regions, and sub-regional organizations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America were the leading entities in South-South cooperation. As the NAM ebbed and G77 went into decline, developing countries created several temporary consultation or coordination bodies, including the South-South cooperation consultations, NAM’s South Committee, G15 and the South Summit of G77. Furthermore, they put forward various proposals and plans focused on the purposes, principles, and methods of South-South cooperation.

Traditional South-South cooperation was mainly concentrated in two areas. The first involved raw materials, natural resources, and development. Two landmark events were noteworthy in this respect. The first of these was the establishment of OPEC in October 1973. This took place when developing countries began to weaponize oil to fight against imperialism and hegemonism, seeking a new international economic order. The second event occurred in 1974, during the sixth special session of the UN General Assembly. Here, the G77 successfully placed issues related to raw materials and primary products, along with permanent sovereignty over natural resources and nationalization, and other development issues on the agenda. This marked their first major victory in UN agenda-setting. The other primary area of focus was economic and technical cooperation. The General Assembly Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order in May 1974, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States in December 1974, the resolution on technical cooperation among developing countries in December 1991, the resolution on a UN conference on South-South cooperation in December 1994 and resolution on economic and technical cooperation among developing countries and a UN conference on South-South cooperation in December 1995 provided for the principles, pathways and tasks of South-South cooperation. Economic and technical cooperation among developing countries also covered regional and sub-regional integration, trans-regional trade, and economic and technical assistance. Large developing countries aiding small and medium-sized ones became an important aspect of South-South cooperation. For example, China vigorously put Third World internationalism into practice and implemented large-scale economic and technical assistance projects for many Asian and African countries, such as the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) (1970–1976), which included Chinese medical teams and agricultural expert groups.

Since the start of the twenty-first century, South-South cooperation has been increasingly included in the UN development agenda and linked with to the environmental protection and climate change agendas. China, India, Brazil, and other emerging powers have been actively exploring new modes and ways of cooperation among developing countries. New South-South cooperation has thus emerged (Zheng 2023, 298–305).

This process embraces new concepts. Traditional South-South cooperation was focused mainly on economic and technical cooperation by way of commodity trade and economic and technical assistance. Guided by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the aim of new South-South cooperation has shifted from poverty reduction to people-centred sustainable development through combined means of investment, trade, and assistance. It has also given priority to modern agricultural development, new industrialization projects, and infrastructure investment.

This process relies on new forces and mechanisms. Emerging economies are the main players in new South-South cooperation, with emerging powers taking the lead. Meanwhile, the BRICS mechanism and the NDB provide collaboration platforms, and other emerging economies are increasingly becoming the main force in intra-South trade, investment, and assistance. In addition, more and more non-state actors participate in South-South cooperation, including non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and aid funds. For example, the Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund and the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund, both initiated by China, focus on the UN sustainable development agenda and support “small but beautiful” projects in poverty reduction, pandemic response, human resources development, food security, digital connectivity and green development in Southern countries.

This process employs new models and forms. The traditional South-South cooperation was mainly conducted via the UN channel. In other words, G77 conducted South-South cooperation and North–South dialogue under the UN framework according to NAM principles and programmes. Under the new mechanism of South-South cooperation, the UN channel and Global South channels are used in parallel. As a result, two such new channels now stand out. The first includes the BRICS and G20, which engage in North–South dialogue and South-South cooperation within the UN framework while simultaneously developing direct dialogue and cooperation with Northern countries (G7). The other involves new models of cooperation, such as South plus, regional plus, and triangular cooperation. Cross-regional, regional, and sub-regional cooperation now takes place in many fields, at various levels, and in diversified forms.

5 Global South and changes in international rules and institutions

With its strong push for reform, innovation and development of international institutions, the Global South is now the most important driver of change in the contemporary international order. It has creatively put forward a series of norms, principles and rules and developed a series of regional, sub-regional and inter-regional organizations, forums, and campaigns.

5.1 Promoting readjustment and reform of international rules and institutions

First, developing countries have pushed forward institutional reforms of the UN Security Council. In August 1965, non-permanent members of the UN Security Council increased from 6 to 10. Since 2005, the Secretary-General and relevant countries and groups of countries have tabled a number of reform plans for the Security Council, with developing countries demanding better representation and a louder voice. In maintaining international and regional security, Southern countries have played an important role and made major contributions within the frameworks of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) under the Security Council. Two contributions from Global South partners have been particularly remarkable. The AU and sub-regional organizations in Africa have carried out more than 30 peacekeeping, security, and stability missions on the African continent in the past 20 years, successfully operationalizing and showcasing “regional collective security” and “collective peacekeeping right” advocated by the AU (Hu 2021). Since 1990, China has also strongly supported UN peacekeeping operations and has taken part in 25 UN peacekeeping missions. Moreover, it has been the largest contributor of troops and the second largest financial contributor among permanent members of the Security Council for such peacekeeping missions (China’s State Council Information Office 2020).

Second, the Global South has promoted the reform and development of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and its subsidiary bodies. ECOSOC created such bodies on multiple occasions. From 1948 to 1974, it set up four more regional commissions for Latin America, Asia Pacific, Africa, and West Asia. In 1964, UNCTAD was established to discuss the development of Southern countries and carry out North–South dialogue. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) was reorganized in 1965, and as part of the reorganization, the Special Unit for Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC) was created in 1974 to promote North–South aid and development cooperation as well as South-South technical and economic cooperation. With regard to the reform and development of the three Bretton Woods institutions, during the Cold War, countries in the South repeatedly urged the World Bank and the IMF to set up preferential financing and loan funds and projects. Furthermore, they negotiated to include the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, replaced by the World Trade Organization in 1995) the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) and the principle of “differential and more favourable treatment”. In the early twenty-first century, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis, given the collective rise of emerging economies in the South, the Bretton Woods institutions started structural adjustments and reforms. The IMF has reformed its quota formula and quota structure many times since 2006, increasing quota resources for emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil, Republic of Korea, Mexico and Turkey and adding the Chinese Renminbi to the special drawing rights basket. In 2010, the World Bank for the first time reformed its shareholding structure and shareholding review procedures, increasing the shares and voting power of representative emerging economies such as China, South Korea, Mexico, and Turkey. Moreover, to deal with world economic crises and promote economic development and growth, developed countries and emerging economies formed the G20. The monopoly of decision-making in world economic affairs by the Western rich club (G7) gave way to a new pattern of North–South joint governance.

5.2 Proposing new international principles and rules

Countries in the South have put forward many creative new ideas, principles and rules for international politics and economy, effectively rewriting the system of rules in the contemporary international order.

A. Norms and principles of the right to equality. Building on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, Southern countries produced a series of innovative new norms, principles and rules for handling international political, security, and social affairs. Around 1954, in the midst of processing relations with countries that utilize different systems, China agreed upon five principles of peaceful coexistence with Myanmar and then with India: mutual respect for territorial sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. At the Bandung Conference, the five principles advocated by the three countries were endorsed by the vast majority of participating countries and incorporated into the Ten Principles of the Bandung Conference. In the Declaration on Principles of International Law adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence became an integral part of the basic principles governing international relations.

The central principles among the aforementioned include sovereign equality and non-interference in internal affairs. Since the end of the Cold War, to maintain and carry forward these principles, the Global South has initiated or revised some principles and theories in major international affairs. For example, with regard to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, Southern countries have achieved four major revisions to the American and European versions of R2P: National sovereignty includes the responsibility to protect citizens and defend the rights of the weak; The international community has a moral obligation to protect the victims when the relevant state fails to fulfill its R2P, but intervention by any major country or countries must be opposed; Sovereign states take on the main duties for protecting their own civilians, and the international community may only intervene when the state concerned is unable or unwilling to fulfill its R2P; and Protection operations must be authorized by the UN Security Council (See Chen 2019). The strictly defined R2P principle not only limits the Western impulse for “humanitarian intervention” but also contributes to the development and operationalization of the “collective peacekeeping right” in Africa and the “new security concept” in Asia.

B. Principles and rules of the right to development. A series of propositions, principles, rules, goals, and visions have been developed around the right to development advocated by the Global South. In July 1972, Kéba M’Baye, Senegalese diplomat and a member of the UN Commission on Human Rights, first proposed that “the right to development is a human right” (Marks 2004). Since then, Southern countries have used the concept in their campaigns for equal rights in international economic cooperation, UNCTAD agenda-setting and a new international economic order. In November 1979, the General Assembly adopted resolution 34/46, providing that “the right to development is a human right and that equality of opportunity for development is as much a prerogative of nations as of individuals within nations”. In December 1986, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development in its resolution 41/128, formally confirming that “the right to development is a human right”. And finally, in 1993, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights reiterates that the right to development is “a universal and inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental human rights”. With the Global South leading the campaigns, the right to development has now been placed at the centre of the “third generation human rights”, with clearly-defined connotations: the right to development is an inalienable basic human right; it is both an individual and a collective human right; it is realized and protected through individual, national and international actions; and it is a necessary condition for the realization of other human rights (China’s State Council Information Office 2016).

Bearing in mind that the right to development is “both an individual and a collective human right”, countries in the South have persistently striven for favorable conditions and equal rights for economic development and turned the development agenda a priority at United Nations forums. For example, the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1982 concluded the UNCLOS and established the limits of territorial seas (12 nautical miles) and exclusive economic zones (200 nautical miles). To advance the development agenda, G77 pushed the General Assembly to adopt in 1961, 1970, 1980, and 1990 four international development strategies for four “development decades”, and ultimately established “development” as UN’s central agenda in the 2000 Millennium Development Goals and the 2015 SDGs.Footnote 4

5.3 Creating new institutional platforms

The Global South has advanced regional and sub-regional integration processes in parallel. During the Cold War, Asian, African, and Latin American countries set up exclusive political and economic cooperation organizations in their respective regions and sub-regions. Such regional organizations included the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of American States (OAS), and sub-regional ones included the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Andean Community (CAN) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). There was an apparent lack trans-regional organizations, with only political and economic forums such as NAM and G77. After the end of the Cold War, in Africa and Latin America, regional and sub-regional integration started to overlap and integrate. For example, the AU along with eight sub-regional organizations in Africa agreed to coordinate their development process. Similarly, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) were created. Through this connection, open regionalism has flourished, as indicated in the emergence of many inter-regional platforms of cooperation in different fields, and at various levels.

The Global South has also worked actively to promote inter-regional cooperation. This has been the product of open regionalism, mainly driven by emerging economies in the South. Open regionalism focuses on economic and trade cooperation, and “overflows” into other fields such as politics, security, society, and culture. Typical examples include ASEAN Plus processes such as ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the multi-faceted APEC and Bay of Bengal Initiative. Trans-regionalism is also manifested at the regional and global levels. The former is limited to or dominated by two regions and extends and builds on “regional plus” mechanisms. Examples of this include the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The latter is universal and open, and its most recent examples are the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the AIIB, the BRICS mechanism and its New Development Bank.

Moreover, the Global South vigorously explores “region plus” and “triangular cooperation”, which are the latest forms of Global South regionalism and the development trend for new South-South cooperation at present and in the future. “Region plus” or “South plus” refers to the cooperation between a region in the South and any one or more regions and countries in the South or the North, while “triangular cooperation” refers to the collaborative engagements between the two parties of a South-South project and a Northern partner (such as a multinational corporation, financial institution or non-governmental organization), which is also increasingly incorporated into the UN SDGs framework. In the past ten years and more, “region plus” collaboration has mainly been between regional and sub-regional organizations in the Global South, between the Global South and regional and sub-regional organizations in the North, and between the Global South and countries and international organizations in the North. The entities of “region plus” and “triangular cooperation” are slightly different, but they operate in similar fields and with similar approaches. Among all those processes, the “ASEAN plus” and “AU plus” are the highlights.

In the above-mentioned areas of innovation, emerging powers have played a particularly prominent role. The latest research shows that China, India, Brazil, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Egypt, and South Africa have participated in or created many new rules and institutions in regional security, economic and trade integration and development governance, human rights, climate change, and ocean governance, resulting in “clusters” of Southern rules and institutions (Acharya et al. 2023).

6 Conclusion

The Global South has played an extremely important role in promoting changes in the international order, achieving several important milestones. However, when viewed from a broader and longer-term perspective, these achievements are still phased and partial. On the one hand, while the Global South is enjoying a long-term trend and a favorable position with “the South/East rising while the North/West declines”, the North–South power distribution remains unbalanced and asymmetrical in a way that is not favourable for the South. Multi-polarization is still threatened by power politics and hegemonism, and external powers still interfere in regional security and national internal affairs from time to time. On the other hand, as it rises as a group, the Global South, especially the emerging economies, has not yet been fully represented in a series of international institutions such as the UN Security Council and the Bretton Woods system. In many areas of the global governance system, including climate change, health, energy and food security, and transnational crime control, breakthroughs in favour of the Global South have not been made. Due to a lack of capacity and other constraints, the Global South has even found itself unable to join some important negotiation processes, including arms control and disarmament, nuclear security and non-proliferation, outer space, polar regions, networks, and artificial intelligence. In short, due to the imbalances of world political and economic development and the asymmetrical strengths between the North and the South, as well as the diversity and differences within, the Global South still has a long way to go in promoting a just and reasonable new international political and economic order and realizing extensive consultation, joint effort and benefits sharing in global governance.