Abstract
Over the past four decades, the nature of Chinese–American military relations has fluctuated from warm and genuinely cooperative to contentious and fraught with real difficulties. At times, the relationship has been relatively stable, with open dialogue and workable crisis management. This paper provides a brief overview of the evolution of Sino-American military relations starting in the early 1970s, when the two countries came together to face a common threat. It traces the relationship through the bumpy, crisis-ridden 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium and examines its gradual steadying toward stability. The paper discusses some of the major issues that hindered positive interaction between the two militaries, including the Taiwan issue; diverging interests in the South China Sea; military developments and regional force postures; U.S. alliances and accommodation of China into the regional security architecture; competition in emerging strategic capabilities and domains; and more profound geostrategic competition. Converging security interests and potential for cooperation are discussed as well. The analysis concludes with suggestions about how to better reduce misperceptions, prevent and manage crisis, refocus from bilateral competition to multilateral cooperation, and create a security architecture in which the world’s two biggest militaries can work together for global public good.
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Notes
Much of the discussions in this section are based on Xin Yi’s three papers (Xin 2016a, b, 2018). His studies of China–US defense and military relations during the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations provide an interesting and detailed description of how defense and military issues between the two countries were perceived, discussed, decided, and implemented by leading figures on both sides during the China–US rapprochement in the 1970 s and 1980 s. His more recent article (2017) on the role Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski played in initiating U.S. arms sales to China reveals the strategic thinking behind U.S. arms sales policy toward China. For a more general account of the military relations, see Liu (1997), Xie and Chen (2010), and Liu and Ma (2015). Shirley Kan’s CRS Reports on “US-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress” (May 2005, March 2009, April 2009, August 2009, June 2012, July 2010, October 2012, November 2012, March 2013, July 2013, November 2013, June 2014, and July 2014) provide both historical overviews and detailed records of all the military-to-military contacts since the Cold War.
The National Security Strategy Reports released by each administration since the 1990s give detailed security threat perceptions and prioritizations of threats.
The six states are China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. They make overlapping territorial claims over land features, territorial waters, EEZs, and rights over living and non-living resources in the South China Sea.
In anticipation of the passage of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the US government initiated a Freedom of Navigation (FON) Operations Program in 1979, which tasked its military to carry out FON operations (FONOPs) to challenge the “excessive maritime claims” by coastal states all over the world. DOD Annual FON Reports gives detailed accounts of these operations. The latest annual report shows that during the period of October 1, 2017, through September 30, 2018, the United States challenged the excessive maritime claims of 26 countries. Many excessive claims were challenged multiple times.
In military terminology, battlefield or battlespace preparation refers to activities of surveying, measuring, and mapping the terrain of future battlefields, and collecting data relevant to military operations against an enemy.
China’s 2018 defense budget grew 8.1% to $ 174.8 billion, and the 2019 budget will grow 7.5%, amounting to $ 177.5 billion, which is still less than one quarter of the FY 2019 US budget of $ 716.3 billion.
Both the Obama and Trump administrations have repeatedly stated that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan applies to the Diaoyu (Senkoku in Japanese) Islands.
The nuclear policy as stated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review stresses possible use of nuclear weapons in conventional conflict, and deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons. These are apparent deviations from the Obama Administration’s nuclear policy.
The U.S. military put forward the Concept of AirSea Battle in 2009 to counter China’s anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. In 2016, the concept was officially renamed the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC). Although Pentagon repeatedly claims that these concepts do not aim at China, “A2/AD” was a tailor-made term to refer to PLA’s capabilities and operational doctrines for force projection and denial operations in the Western Pacific.
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Yao, Y. Sino-American military relations: from quasi-allies to potential adversaries?. China Int Strategy Rev. 1, 85–98 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-019-00016-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-019-00016-9