Abstract
America’s levying of punitive tariffs on China in 2018 triggered the possibility of an escalating global trade war. The forces that led to these disruptive events have been building up for more than a decade. America’s concerns are driven by its huge bilateral trade deficits with China and alleged unfair trade and investment practices. The basis for these concerns, however, is often misunderstood. Developing an enduring solution will require follow-up commitments and adjustments that will supersede any agreement likely to be forged in 2019. Trade tensions will persist until a more institutionally grounded solution is developed for which a revamped World Trade Organization and a bilateral investment treaty are possible options. The pressure on China to reach a lasting trade agreement with the U.S. is also pushing Beijing to strengthen its regional alliances and develop its soft power approaches. East Asia and Europe have the most to gain economically in helping the two major powers to reach an agreement, but the key players in both regions are not yet in a position or motivated enough to play such a role without a major shift in China’s strategy.
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Notes
This report can be found at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/04/05/2017-06968/omnibus-report-on-significant-trade-deficits.
A discussion of the “non-market status” issue is in Congressional Research Service, China’s Status as a Non-market Economy, January 10, 2019. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10385.pdf.
There have been a number of studies on the impact of President Trump’s trade policies. The major findings are referred to in Swanson (2019).
For a fuller discussion on the determinants of savings and, in particular, the role of migrant workers, see Huang (2017a), Chapter 4.
A 2014 U.S.–China Business Council Survey indicated that the primary objective of 91% of its respondents was to access the China market, up from 57% in 2006.
Data on these measurements can be found in OECD, FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index, at http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm.
For a discussion about the various views, see Wu (2018).
WTO guidelines can be found at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm.
This example and numbers come from Thompson (2018).
The full survey can be found in https://www.amchamchina.org/policy-advocacy/business-climate-survey/.
Relying on a BIT has been noted by a previous U.S. trade representative, see Froman (2019).
The survey can be accessed in UBS (2019).
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Huang, Y. U.S.–China economic tensions: origins and global implications. China Int Strategy Rev. 1, 127–138 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-019-00002-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-019-00002-1