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From defection to ingroup favoritism to cooperation: simulation analysis of the social dilemma in dynamic networks

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Abstract

The emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas is a core question in the social sciences, the proposed solution being ingroup favoritism, a conditional strategy where individuals only cooperate with members of their own group. However, empirical literature has suggested that ingroup favoritism prevents one from realizing profitable interactions with outgroup members. Such an observation calls for a theoretical analysis that would help in understanding what factors affect the transition from ingroup favoritism to unconditional cooperation. Here, we conducted computational experiments in which agents located in social networks imitate traits of successful neighbors or sever social ties with defecting neighbors and connect them to other agents. The results of our simulation showed transitions from unconditional defection to ingroup favoritism to unconditional cooperation with a more frequent occurrence of link rewiring. This indicates the usefulness of the dynamic-networks framework in understanding the reason why cooperation is achieved in specific societies and why different types of cooperation are observed in different ones.

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Notes

  1. Because cooperation with ingroup members was presumed in this study, this rule was similar to the assumption that agents cut relationships with outgroup members.

  2. In [34], the dissimilarity between agents i and j (\(d_{ij}\)) is calculated by the two agents’ tags. Agent i compares this dissimilarity with his/her tolerance level (\(t_i\)) and chooses cooperation if the neighbor (j) is sufficiently similar (i.e., \(d_{ij} < t_{i}\)). The focal agent cuts the link to his/her neighbor if he/she chooses defection (i.e., \(d_{ij} \ge t_i\)).

  3. In [34], a link forms between the focal agent (i) and a potential new neighbor (n) if \(d_{in} < t_{i}\) and \(d_{in} < t_{n}\). This notation mimics that of footnote 2.

  4. The replication material of the simulation will be available on the author’s web page.

  5. We computed the effective number of tags in the population as the index of tag diversity (see [36], for this index). Specifically, I computed \(1/\sum _{g} p_g^2\), where \(p_g\) is the proportion of agents who adopt tag g. For example, this index takes the value of n when the population is occupied by n equal-sized groups.

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  1. Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, 1-104, Tozuka, Sinjuku, Tokyo, 1698050, Japan

    Hirofumi Takesue

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Takesue, H. From defection to ingroup favoritism to cooperation: simulation analysis of the social dilemma in dynamic networks. J Comput Soc Sc 3, 189–207 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42001-019-00058-4

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