Abstract
Bruno Frey’s effort to provoke a discussion on the future of democracy seems as timely as his focus on direct democracy is appropriate. Since in his account the necessity of protecting individuals against democratic collective powers seems somewhat neglected this comment emphasizes that the democratic theory of the Calculus of Consent is—in a way—all about the justificatory logic of such protections. In the same vein, referenda are endorsed as strengthening and initiatives rejected as weakening controls imposed on democratic powers in a constitutional democracy.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Incidentally, this also explains why Buchanan—in private conservation—would time and again raise the question: “who is an individual?”; i.e., who is to be treated with the full respect that endows members of the “demos” with veto-power in the conceptual democratic ratification procedure of unanimous voting on all acts.
In a similar vein on EU politics, see Brennan and Kliemt (2008).
References
Böhm, F. (1966). Privatrechtsgesellschaft Und Marktwirtschaft. ORDO, 17, 75–151.
Brennan, H. G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1985). The reason of rules. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brennan, H. G., & Kliemt, Hartmut. (2008). Regulation and revenue. Constitutional Political Economy, 19(3), 249–260.
Brennan, H. G., & Lomasky, L. E. (1993). Democracy and decision. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Buchanan, J. M. (1975). The limits of liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, Gordon. (1962). The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Frey, B. (2017). Proposals for a democracy of the future. Homo Oeconomicus, 34, 1–9.
Kliemt, H. (1986). The veil of insignificance. European Journal of Political Economy, 2(3), 333–344.
Kliemt, H. (1994). The calculus of consent after thirty years. Public Choice, 79, 341–353.
Kukathas, C. (2003). The liberal archipelago: a theory of diversity and freedom. Oxford Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MacLean, N. (2017). Democracy in chains: the deep history of the radical right’s stealth plan for America. New York: Scribe.
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.
Vining, R. (1956). Economics in the United States of America. Paris: UNESCO.
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to Manfred Holler for providing all the right and timely nudges that improve papers.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Kliemt, H. Direct constitutional democracy: Comment on “Proposals for a Democracy of the Future” by Bruno Frey. Homo Oecon 34, 237–242 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-017-0052-5
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-017-0052-5