1 Introduction

This paper is a joint effort by all the three authors. The design and writing of the paper were predominantly steered by Katharina Zimmerman, with support from the other authors. The analytical perspective was developed by Katharina Zimmermann and Matteo Mandelli. Data collection and analysis was pursued by Katharina Zimmermann and Anne Gerstenberg.

In historical analysis, the welfare state’s emergence during the industrial age is understood not only in terms of its functional attributes—responding to the socio-economic challenges of the era—but also in its political dimensions. Welfare systems of the industrial period can be interpreted as instruments that placated emergent class struggles and to confer legitimacy to market-based democracies, which were, by their very nature, riddled with inherent social inequalities (Briggs 1961; Marshall 1950; Esping-Andersen 1990). Transitioning to the contemporary context of environmental challenges, the welfare state finds itself positioned at a critical juncture. On the one hand, the welfare state has a considerable “ecological footprint” (Matthies 2017), given primarily by its economic implications, which enable even most-disadvantaged individuals to engage in environmentally harmful consumption patterns. On the other hand, environmental degradation might alter the nature and distribution of social risks, potentially generating a new wave of social (or rather “eco-social”) risks for the state to address (Gough et al. 2008; Johansson et al. 2016; Hirvilammi et al. 2023; Zimmermann 2023).

The intricate link between welfare and environmental policies has become increasingly apparent amidst the ongoing climate crisis, highlighting how climate change intensifies existing disparities within and between countries, as well as intergenerationally (Gough 2017). The less affluent and those contributing minimally to CO2 emissions are most vulnerable to ecological disaster repercussions (Walker 2012). Adding complexity, some climate mitigation policies, such as carbon taxes, are socially regressive, disproportionately affecting the lower-middle and working classes (Büchs et al. 2011). Thus, new risks arise directly from environmental degradation and indirectly from climate policies (Gough et al. 2008). Against this background, eco-social policies are emerging as innovative public policy responses to such risks, integrating social and ecological goals in different ways (Mandelli 2022). “Reactive” eco-social policies are constructed by adding a social dimension to an environmental policy, while “preventive” eco-social policies aim at greening the welfare state. Moreover, we can also distinguish “protection” from “investment-oriented” eco-social policies, depending on whether they aim to positively contribute to economic growth. Thus, a variety of eco-social policy preferences are possible. While research on the functional aspects of welfare states in the context of climate change proliferates, particularly in developing integrated socio-environmental solutions (e.g., Hirvilammi and Koch 2020), the political dimensions and associated struggles remain underexplored.

Adding to the political complexity and conflictive potential, eco-social policy making takes place in an increasingly multilevel setup. Not only does the climate crisis not stop at nation state’s borders and is accelerated by globalisation, also its mitigation and adaptation—including the social and welfare dimension—are handled within the complex web of multilevel policy making. Here, the European Green Deal (EGD) stands out as the, to date, most comprehensive net zero transition plan. Combining EU Commission initiatives, stakeholder consultation procedures, and different legislative procedures for different policy fields, the EGD was already a complicated multilevel endeavour at the formulation and policy making stage, which is now to be proceeded and implemented at the European- as well as at the national, regional and local level in EU member states. As the comprehensive European Studies’ literature teaches us, these processes are by far not dry administrative operations, but highly politicised and carry a vast conflictive potential (Graziano 2024).

In our article, we turn our attention to the interaction of eco-social and multilevel policy making. As an exemplary case, we will analyse Germany’s eco-social model in the broader EU context. The magnitude of politicization within Germany’s eco-social policymaking arena, is inextricably tied to the country’s complex history and socio-political fabric. Despite its industrial might and professing environmental commitment (Haas 2020), Germany’s stance on eco-social policies is a reflection on EU-level political dynamics, especially in the context of the European Green Deal. We adopt a ‘usages of Europe’ approach to investigate how Germany’s policy arena mirrors these dynamics. More precisely, we ask how the ‘usages’ within the German policy arena reflect the underlying political contestations and dynamics inherent to eco-social policymaking in the context of the European Green Deal. Our central argument posits that the EGD is more than a policy directive; it is a critical arena where eco-social policy disputes are evident. It presents a specific eco-social agenda (i.e. green growth, industrial decarbonisation, specific just transition ambitions; e.g. Mandelli et al. 2021), compelling domestic stakeholders to engage with its underlying principles and goals.

In exploring the intricate interactions between eco-social policies and multilevel governance, particularly within the framework of the EGD, this study intersects with key themes of power, conflict, and coordination as outlined in the special issue. Our analysis of Germany’s policy arena provides insights into the political practices, actor constellations, and contentious dynamics that define eco-social transformations. This perspective contributes to the broader discourse on how eco-social policies are formulated, adopted, and implemented in complex political landscapes, reflecting the special issue’s emphasis on empirically grounded, multi-theoretical explorations of Germany as a critical case study.

The paper’s structure is as follows: commencing with a multilevel perspective on eco-social policies in the EU, it then introduces the ‘usages of Europe’ analytical framework. This is succeeded by the research design, a background on Germany’s eco-social paradigm, and an empirical analysis of the usages of Europe in the context of Germany’s politicized eco-social policymaking. The study culminates in a discussion and conclusion, aiming to synthesize the findings and reflect upon the future trajectory of eco-social policies within the European milieu.

2 Multilevel eco-social policies in the European Union

A growing interest in the socio-ecological nexus can be detected in European studies. Scholars typically indicate that the 2019 European Green Deal represented a critical juncture in the history of EU climate policies, paying unprecedented attention to the social implications of climate policies, which is expressed by emergence of an EU just transition approach (Kyriazi and Miró 2022; Sabato and Mandelli 2024; Petmesidou and Guillén 2022; Graziano 2024; Crespy and Munta 2023). In December 2019, the von der Leyen European Commission introduced the EGD, aiming to transform the EU into “… a fair and prosperous society with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy, with zero net greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and economic growth decoupled from resource use.” (European Commission 2019, p. 1). The EGD diverged from previous EU strategies by integrating environmental ambitions with the economic growth agenda, advocating for “green growth” and “ecological modernization” (Mandelli et al. 2021). Additionally, it introduced substantial social policy considerations, stressing the need to balance economic, environmental, and social objectives (European Commission 2019). It addressed the socio-economic effects of decarbonization, particularly on low-income households and workers in carbon-intensive sectors, emphasizing support through mechanisms like the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) and the Social Climate Fund (SCF) to ensure no one is left behind (European Commission 2020c, 2021). While the just transition notion in the EGD is almost exclusively framed as a paradigm to accompany the transition of carbon-intensive sectors and to fight energy and transport poverty, this narrow conception of just transition is counterbalanced by linking the EGD to the European Pillar of Social Rights (European Commission 2017).

The EGD’s developments are not mere administrative actions but are imbued with significant conflict potential (McNamara 2015). The EU, as a multi-layered political entity, is inherently characterized by diverse, sometimes conflicting, interests stemming from its broad membership and intricate institutional framework. The result is a complex tapestry of political negotiation, coalition-building, and strategic manoeuvring which needs to be considered when studying any politicization in the EU context (Schmidt 2019). We therefore suggest looking at multilevel eco-social policy making from an analytical angle that sees it not only as technocratic exercise but gives credit to its political character. We argue that, in the case of eco-social policies, conflicts about the distributional implications of climate policy (in-)actions might emerge. We thus expect the adoption and formulation of European eco-social policies, at the intersection between social and climate policies, but also intertwined in multilevel dynamics, to be embedded within a complex terrain of politicization, involving negotiations, contestation, and struggles for legitimization (Grande and Hutter 2016).

To analytically navigate the intricate politics and politicization surrounding EU eco-social policies and its reception in the domestic political arena in Germany, we argue that the ‘usages of Europe’ conceptualization by Woll and Jacquot offers a particularly insightful approach (Jacquot and Woll 2003; Woll and Jacquot 2010; see also Graziano et al. 2011). This framework moves beyond simplistic institutionalist interpretations, emphasizing the agency and cognitive autonomy of actors within the broader European transformation debate. It contends that institutional contexts are not passive backdrops but active arenas for interpretation, contestation, and reformulation. Actors within this framework are not merely responding to political stimuli; they are adaptable, learning, and exerting strategic influence, often transcending structural determinants.

By defining the ‘usages of Europe’ as social practices that tap into the multifaceted opportunities provided by the European Union—be they institutional, ideological, political, or organizational—Jacquot and Woll provide a layered lens through which one can examine the political dimension of the welfare state’s role in the age of climate change (Jacquot and Woll 2003, p. 9). This challenges functionalist perspectives, highlighting the complex interplay of politics, agency, and environmental challenges.

The ‘usages of Europe’ framework encompasses three main categories:

  • Cognitive Usages: These are essential during the framing phase of reform, serving as foundational political resources. Actors utilize these to shape debates and mobilize ideas for persuasion, framing discussions around environmental challenges and their social implications.

  • Strategic Usages: Central to the policy and decision-making phase, these usages function as significant political tools. Actors leverage them to consolidate interests, form coalitions, and delineate political trajectories, using EU guidelines and policies to support their eco-social strategies.

  • Legitimating Usages: These come into play when actors seek to validate their policy positions, invoking the authority of “Europe” to reinforce their stance. The process is embedded in the communication and justification of choices, with actors drawing upon EU debates to support their positions.

The ‘usages of Europe’ first gained prominence when the EU expanded its influence through ‘soft’ forms of governance. This pertains to the mechanisms the EU employs that are not strictly regulatory but are guiding and supportive, influencing member states without direct coercion (Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009). Here, research illustrated how, at various governance levels, actors leveraged EU policies for domestic political gains, particularly visible for social and employment policy contexts (Graziano et al. 2011), as well as for EU enlargement processes and candidate countries (e.g. Günay and Renda 2014). Following this period, EU policymaking entered a phase dominated by responses to the financial crisis, focusing on macroeconomic strategies at a high policy-making level. During this time, although ‘usages of Europe’ continued to be relevant, its direct application in scholarly discussions was somewhat narrowed, concentrated on specific areas (such as defence cooperation; Béraud-Sudreau and Pannier 2021) rather than broad application.

However, the introduction of the EGD signifies in our eyes a return to a governance style that emphasizes extensive implementation and involves a wide array of actors across different governmental levels. The EGD represents a comprehensive governance package that requires active participation from national, regional, and local actors within member states. These actors are now positioned to utilize EU policies for their local and regional political agendas. This shift highlights a renewed opportunity to apply the ‘usages of Europe’ framework to understand how EU policies are politically appropriated ‘at home’ for various purposes, mirroring earlier dynamics seen during the integration and policy adoption phases but in the context of green and social policy integration. This analysis shows the EGD, not only as a policy but as a political tool that facilitates the domestic strategic use of EU-level initiatives and affects eco-social policymaking across the EU.

In utilizing Woll and Jacquot’s ‘usages of Europe’ framework and applying it to the case of Germany, we therefore aim to illuminate the complex political motivations, strategies, and justifications underpinning eco-social policy debates within an EU member state, particularly in relation to the EGD. Given its extensive scope and normative imperatives, the EGD is expected to serve not only as a policy directive but also as a focal point of contention and convergence in eco-social policymaking. This research endeavours to answer the question: “How do the ‘usages of Europe’ within the German policy arena reflect the underlying political contestations and dynamics inherent to eco-social policymaking in the context of the European Green Deal?”. Through this inquiry, the aim is to provide insights into Germany’s green transition and delve deeper into the intrinsic political nature of eco-social policies at large. The following section will outline the research design and methods employed in this study.

3 Research design and methodology

To answer our research question, we draw on 41 qualitative semi-structured expert interviews conducted in the context of the projects “The social dimension of the European Green Deal” and “Perceptions of Climate Policy Instruments” between 2022 and 2023.Footnote 2 Both projects’ questionnaires were developed simultaneously, containing similar questions and thus allowing for shared analysis. The questionnaires enquired the interview partners’ overarching eco-social orientations, examining their perspectives on economic growth, the role of social policy, and their commitment to climate and environmental protection. Furthermore, the focus was on how social and environmental concerns intertwine within the EGD, opinions on its instruments, and broader aspirations for Europe’s future. As a further source of background information, the article also builds on analyses accomplished by Mandelli et al. (2023), which included semi-structured interviews at the EU level (for further details, see Mandelli et al. 2023).

The selection of participants was achieved through a combination of methods. Initial identification relied on comprehensive document research to pinpoint primary actors in the EGD domain (Bowen 2009) enriched by the snowballing technique. In order to be able to portray the different actors and analyze their interests in the field, the interviews span a broad spectrum of policy-makers and societal stakeholders in Germany and the EU (elected politicians, ministerial bureaucrats, third sector organizations and non-governmental organisations [NGOs], as well as lobbyists representing a variety of interests; see Table 1 in Appendix for a list of interviews).

Recognizing the multi-layered implications of the EGD on member states, the project is interested in the diverse discourses around eco-social policy integration. In order to uncover these in the data, information from the interviews was analyzed through qualitative content analysis (Kuckartz 2019) in order to uncover how different societal actors, both within Germany and at the EU level, engage with, interpret, and harness the EGD to further their distinct goals and objectives. The analysis was structured into a two-step analysis, with a first deductive coding round, to broadly structure the data on the actors’ perspectives. Categories of analysis involved the actors’ perception of EU politics, eco-social policies and their integration, specific instruments, justice perceptions as well as the description of their own role and goals within policy making. The coded instances were then re-analysed with a focus on the ‘usages of Europe’ via a combined deductive and inductive approach. Afterwards, a purely inductive coding round followed to ensure an openness to the data and to include aspects that were not foreseen in the deductive scheme.

4 Case selection

Germany represents an interesting case of analysis as the development of Germany’s Energiewende (energy transition) reflects a complex interplay of historical legacies, stakeholder influences, and shifting eco-social paradigms. Originating from anti-nuclear sentiments in the 1970s, it evolved into a significant political agenda, further shaped by global incidents like the 2011 Fukushima disaster (Haas 2020). Although the Energiewende initially symbolized Germany’s commitment to sustainable energy transition, its journey, particularly towards coal-phase out, has been complex and influenced by various stakeholders with divergent interests. While industrial entities, especially from the coal sector, called for a gradual transition to protect economic stability, environmental groups and the Green Party pushed for a swift move away from fossil fuels (Tekin and Goßner 2023). Despite its early leadership in sustainable transitions, Germany now appears to be lagging, showing hesitancy in adapting to environmental challenges and stakeholder demands. On the social policy front, Germany has maintained its conservative-corporatist traditions, yet the Hartz-reforms of 2004 marked a significant shift (a “long goodbye to Bismarck” [Palier 2010]), introducing a dual system of social protection that combined status-protective social insurance with needs-based, means-tested minimum income provisions. This dual approach, while broadening coverage, also maintained the focus on protecting labour market insiders, a trend also evident in the Energiewende policies where protections for traditional sectors like coal mining and automotive overshadow issues like energy poverty. Germany’s role as an industrial leader with strong corporatist interests and its leadership position in the EU make it an interesting case with regard to multilevel eco-social policy making, from whose analysis further insights could be drawn for other cases in future research.

5 Findings: Usages of Europe in eco-social policy making

As outlined above, to understand the politicizations of the current stages of Germany’s Energiewende and its broader eco-social framework, we will in a next step analyse the political usages of the EGD (and related EU policies) in the German policy-making. By examining how German stakeholders, ranging from policymakers to industry leaders, engage with, interpret, and utilize the provisions and aspirations of the EGD, we can glean insights into the likely evolution of the country’s energy transition. Furthermore, understanding this engagement is crucial as it reflects the nation’s capacity to balance its historic eco-social models with emerging European directives. Thus, a dive into the usages of the EGD not only provides a roadmap for Germany’s eco-social future but also highlights the complex interplay of national ambitions and supranational commitments.

A first content analysis of our data showed—unsurprising—salient general ideological lines among respondents: liberals emphasized the significance of economic growth, left-leaning interviewees prioritized redistribution, trade union representatives focused on worker protection and advocated for the classical just transition, while bureaucrats’ views tended to reflect the dominant political ideologies of their departments. In further analyses, we then delved into the intricacies of how the EGD—or European policies in general—was being operationalized within Germany. All three types of usages—strategic, cognitive, and legitimating—were discernible in our interviews. We will discuss them in turn.

Legitimating usage of the EGD was very scarce in our interviews. We did not observe a single case where actors sought to validate or justify specific policy choices referring to the EGD as a legitimate authority. However, some stakeholders (mainly liberal and industry-related) framed the EGD as a constraint to national policy making; using it to validate the status quo in climate protection, or as a strategy to shift the German model away from intensified climate action. For instance, arguing in favour of free ETSFootnote 3 allocations (i.e. providing a certain amount of emission certificates to companies, rather than requiring them to purchase all of their allowances), this interviewee essentially adopts a ‘delay strategy’ (Lamb et al. 2020):

“So, IG Metall […] defended free allocations in the ETS. […] As Europe, we have a choice: we either look at how we can transform our foundation industries and keep jobs in Europe, or we decide, we let them go to other parts of the world where we can’t guarantee what the environmental footprint is, but we, and we basically import all of those materials.” (Interview 9, Industry-related Trade Union, 18).

Another conservative interviewee basically expresses a similar perspective when framing the EU ETS as a threat to German industry:

“Last year, when we were in the middle of the parliamentary consultations on the new ETS, we had a number of votes. These had a major impact on industry, for example on the steel industry in Germany. Where the question was, what [ETS] benchmarks should apply? So, the real question was, does the steel industry still have a future in Germany under these conditions? Yes or no?” (Interview 13, CDU EPP, 17).

Transitioning to strategic usage, we found this type of usage especially in the context of the interviewees’ reflections on specific policy designs. Political actors and ministries, especially incumbents from the Greens and Social Democrats, harnessed the EGD to reinforce their trajectory towards reactive eco-social investment policies—hence policies channelling green and social investment to address the most urgent risks of decarbonisation—particularly accentuating the social acceptability of climate policy. Key in this strategy was their strategic use of monetary resources from the JTF and the anticipated SCF to foster social acceptance for the green transition:

“For Germany it is more important at the moment to get it accepted that we definitely want the ETS2. And if that means that we also have to do the CSF, then we’ll do it. I think that’s okay anyway, because it [the SCF] simply gives us more funds at the national level that have a very clear social focus. That’s why we are definitely strongly in favour of getting the SCF.” (Interview 3, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 139).

Moreover, most of these incumbent-related interviewees underlined the significance of protective compensatory eco-social policies and educational investments to ensure the green transformation’s acceptance and legitimacy:

“I think what is very, very important is that climate policy is also education. And that starts at a very, very early age. And we have to start in the school system and teach young children that climate policy has a high priority […]. We will only achieve acceptance in the long term if we also get this in the children. The second important thing is how we can get those who cannot afford climate policy to accept it now. And that’s where it starts, we have to take low-income households with us.” (Interview 10, SPD, 22).

Cognitive usage, finally, was the most pronounced type of usage we observed. Interviewees from diverse political backgrounds employed various facets of the EGD to bolster their conceptions of governing a green transition. As to be expected for cognitive usage, this took place not in the context of policy implementation, but interviewees especially displayed it when reflecting on policy formulation and green transition pathways at a more conceptual level. Interestingly, both proponents and critics of market instruments, as well as supporters and detractors of regulative policies, here referenced the EGD—either as a commendable guide or a flawed touchstone. For instance, a liberal perspective stressed the significance of price instruments, noting:

“So, from the perspective of the liberals, but also from my personal perspective, price impulses are very important, extremely important. […] It is different with regulatory law, because above all, selected technologies are either promoted or other technologies are hindered, so to speak. […] So for this reason, [we support] decentralized price incentives through price instruments such as CO2 prices. Either via a levy or via EU emissions trading. If one argues here from the perspective of the currently existing climate policy goals, our focus is clearly on EU emissions trading.” (Interview 30, FDP/liberals, 10).

Yet, contrasting this stance, another interviewee underscored the urgency for a structured regulatory approach, asserting:

“I believe that a regulatory, political framework is absolutely necessary. We have tried for a long time in this area with voluntary action at various levels. That is, by asking consumers to consume sustainable things in a very simple way. That doesn’t work, but it works just as little as appealing to the voluntariness of companies. […] What is needed is a legal framework for production standards, as is now being done at EU level with the Supply Chain Act and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive.” (Interview 14, Consumer Advice Centre, 10).

Furthermore, some expressed scepticism towards placing the onus solely on citizens, pointing out inherent profit motives:

“Anyone who says: ‘The responsibility lies with the citizens and not with industry’ does not want climate protection. But he simply wants to secure the profits of the companies. And that is with the EU. And von der Leyen is also a leader in this. And that’s why, for me, EU climate policy is hypocrite. It’s still better than no climate policy at all. But it could be much better if we worked with legal requirements.” (Interview 22, Die Linke, 30).

In juxtaposition, there were voices praising the strides taken by the EU Commission, heralding its focus on a just transformation:

“It has been an absolute step forward with the new EU Commission under the leadership of Ms von der Leyen that attention is being paid to this question of shaping the transformation in a just way. […] Ten years ago, when social issues were discussed in the context of the energy transition, I would say that these were more consumer policy perspectives […] This is undoubtedly an important perspective. It should not be pushed to the back of the queue, but of course there are no more social issues there. And the question of work, employment, also questions of democratic policy, I find very important in that sense […] how can these political, accompanying measures, so to speak, make a contribution to faster success. […] The question was Just Transition Mechanism, so yes, that is absolutely progress, even if with clear criticism.” (Interview 8, Trade Union Umbrella Organisation, 29).

“But in case of doubt, the EU is certainly a little further ahead when it comes to incorporating social issues into climate protection. Yes, so the EU or perhaps the Commission in particular, but also the EU as a whole in various directives or regulations, is a bit of a thought leader in this respect.” (Interview 2, Think Tank, 6)

It therefore becomes clear that stakeholders from varied political orientations draw upon cognitive usage of the EGD to support their visions of the green transition. The EGD offers a projection surface for approval or general criticism of overarching governance instruments, rather than for the evaluation of specific policy outputs. Interviewees address pricing instruments, regulation, or individual responsibility—and criticise or praise the EU for their instalment. This varied reference to the EGD not only underscores the multifaceted nature of the EGD itself—as it bundles different policy approaches rather than presenting a singular, coherent policy direction—but also illustrates how the cognitive usage of political resources can be somewhat eclectic when framing specific positions.

The eclectic take-up of the EGD within cognitive usages often reflects the above-outlined deeper ideological divides, as stakeholders navigate between diverse governance approaches encompassed by the EGD. Simplifying, the primary fault lines manifest between those favoring regulatory approaches and viewing the green transition as a comprehensive, societal project, and those advocating for market-driven approaches, viewing the green transition as a series of technical challenges addressed through targeted policy interventions.

On one hand, stakeholders like social NGOs and politicians concerned with social policies often describe eco-social policymaking as a deeply interconnected societal endeavour. This group employs the cognitive usage of the EGD to emphasize comprehensive governance strategies that integrate various policy outputs. Their approach illustrates how the EGD serves as a reflective tool to reinforce the need for policies that acknowledge and address the complex interdependencies within society. By valuing regulatory frameworks and broader distribution effects of policy decisions, these stakeholders highlight the importance of equity and inclusivity in the transition, ensuring that environmental advancements do not overshadow social imperatives:

“If we do not succeed in putting nature, the environment, biodiversity, climate protection and social aspects above the rights of investors in the EU and worldwide, then we have no chance. Point. Then we will lose, sooner or later.” (Interview 22, Die Linke, 87).

“Wherever someone comes up with a climate protection measure, the question should always be considered of what the distribution effects are.” (Interview 3, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 43)

In contrast, other stakeholders prioritize market-driven mechanisms, often detaching environmental policy from its broader social implications. This second group, including some liberal policymakers and industry leaders, tends to leverage the EGD in a manner that emphasizes efficiency and economic viability. Here, cognitive usage of the EGD is oriented towards optimizing individual policy instruments, such as emission trading systems or carbon pricing, as self-contained solutions. This approach reflects a more segmented perception of governance, where the interplay between environmental goals and societal effects is less emphasized, reflecting a belief in the efficacy of market forces to drive the green transition independently of broader social reforms:

“the focus of the debates is sometimes really too strong on [the social dimension] … It shouldn’t be the role of the climate policymakers to solve all the social problems, even when they are an outcome of the climate policy. But I think, sometimes it would be better to give social policy to politicians who are in social policy and not just think that we should solve all the social problems with climate policy.” (Interview 28, FDP/liberals, 68)

Acknowledging the exploration of the EGD’s applications within the German policy context, our findings highlight a nuanced landscape where stakeholder perspectives are not aligned uniformly with EU policies themselves, but are instead leveraged to frame and reinforce existing ideological and socio-political positions. This examination reveals how stakeholders politically deploy the EGD more as a cognitive framework for articulating their specific agendas rather than as a driving force for direct policy changes. As we transition from this analysis to the ensuing discussion section, it is imperative to recognize that while the EGD serves as a reference point within German eco-social policy debates, its primary function appears to be the provision of a rhetorical tool used to justify or critique positions within these debates.

6 Discussion and conclusion

Our empirical analysis delved into the political usages of the EGD within the German policy making arena to illuminate the underlying contestations and dynamics of multilevel eco-social policy making. Applying the analytical approach of ‘usages of Europe’, we sought to understand how the EGD is deployed as a political resource by German stakeholders to foster their positions in potentially conflictive policy making contexts. The data indicates that stakeholders employ the EGD not predominantly as a direct driver of policy but as a significant instrument for the cognitive framing of their respective positions on eco-social policy questions. This usage highlights a broader theoretical point about the politicization of European policies: while the EGD aims to foster unified European action towards sustainable development, its actual usage in national contexts can sometimes diverge markedly from this goal, reflecting entrenched political ideologies and varying economic priorities.

In the detailed analysis, stakeholders from disparate political backgrounds—ranging from liberals emphasizing economic growth to left-leaning figures focusing on redistribution and social equity—leverage aspects of the EGD to bolster their policy arguments and strategies. This not only underscores the EGD as a flexible framework for policy deliberation but also as a battleground for ideological contestation at the domestic level, reflecting diverging visions of what constitutes an appropriate and effective eco-social policy. The EGD thus serves more as a ‘projection surface’ for broader socio-political debates rather than a prescriptive set of guidelines strictly adhered to. Additionally, the data revealed a scant usage of the EGD for legitimating specific policy choices. Instead, strategic and particularly cognitive usages were more pronounced, with political actors using the EGD to reinforce their broader strategic goals or to (re)frame policy debates towards certain conceptual understandings, such as market efficiency versus regulatory thoroughness.

With regard to the question of politicization, our analysis of inquiry revealed minimal dichotomous politicization separating pro or contra stances on the introduction of eco-social policies. The core of the discourse was less about a heated clash over eco-social policies but more a nuanced divergence in the choice of instruments—be it market-driven, education-centric, or regulatory. The true political contention, it seems, was not about eco-social policy per se but the foundational ideas of eco-social governance. Interviewee’s political usages of European resources were not primarily about the specific policies of the EGD or their eco-social characteristics, but more about the broader contours of governing the green transition. The debate pivots around a set of dichotomies: should the transition be steered via market instruments or hierarchical structures? Should the onus be placed on individual responsibility or should there be a redistribution of resources and responsibilities? In light of these findings, the engagement with the EGD within the German policy arena emerges as a complex interplay of political strategies and governance paradigms, tapping into deeper ideological debates. At the same time, while our study focused on expert interviews to explore these dynamics, it is worth considering whether similar patterns of usages of Europe would emerge from an analysis of public debates or other more public data sources. Future research could investigate how public salience and politicization in broader public fora might shape the usage of the EGD in discourse, especially in relation to eco-social policies. This could provide a richer understanding of how different types of data sources reflect or diverge in portraying the nuanced interplay between European initiatives and national policy debates.

From a broader perspective, our findings align with historical perspectives on the welfare state, emphasizing the interlocking nature of environmental and welfare policies in addressing the complex challenges posed by climate change and socio-economic disparities. By situating the EGD within Germany’s broader eco-social policy framework and examining its politicization, our study contributes to a deeper understanding of how European initiatives, like the EGD, are woven into national policy debates, shaping and being shaped by the domestic political landscape. Importantly, our findings show that, even in a multi-level context like the EU, domestic politics matters for the eco-social policies debate, which is characterized by conflicts between socio-political actors and, hence, it is far from a technocratic debate.

Yet, as comprehensive as our exploration has been, a significant facet remains outside the purview of this paper—the ‘uploading’ trajectory of Europeanisation.Footnote 4 Germany, as an influential entity within the EU, has historically managed to transpose its domestic preferences to the broader European framework. As one interviewee insightfully shared, “So, if we push for a national coal phase-out, there’s also more willingness on the EU level to increase ambition in the ETS because it’s basically already enabled by the German commitment to do the phase-out. So, this is an interaction that’s quite important, I think.” (Interview 29, Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, 21). This quote underscores the multi-directionality of influence, suggesting that while the EU often serves as a resource for domestic stakeholders, the reverse process—of domestic interests influencing EU policies—also plays a pivotal role. Consequently, the necessity for a more extensive exploration becomes evident. Further research should delve into the reciprocal dynamics between national preferences and EU-level directives, examining how domestic imperatives may shape the broader European agenda, particularly in the realm of eco-social policymaking. Only then can we truly capture the holistic panorama of eco-social governance and its politicization in the age of the European Green Deal.

Finally, while our study focused on the German policy-making arena, the implications of our findings extend to the study of interactions between multilevel and eco-social governance in different welfare regimes. The usage of the EGD as a cognitive framing tool rather than a direct policy driver may not be unique to Germany. One could ask whether the patterns observed are inherently linked to Germany’s institutional frameworks and socio-political history, or if they also manifest in other EU member states with varying welfare state and environmental policy characteristics (as shown for EU social and employment policies; Graziano et al. 2011). This broadens our understanding of the EGD in national eco-social policy debates and underscores the importance of examining both public and expert discourses to gain a holistic view of its politicization and usage.