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India and the arctic: revisionist aspirations, arctic realities

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Abstract

India has divergent views about circumpolar affairs. One dominant view holds that the region is a “global commons,” rather than the preserve of the Arctic coastal states with their narrow national interests, and that India should lead international efforts to preserve the Arctic environment and freeze out resource development and militarization (akin to the Antarctic model)—in short, a Polar Preserve narrative. Another view suggests that geostrategic dynamics and weak governance point to a growing Arctic Race that threatens to undermine regional (and even global) peace and security. Accordingly, some commentators argue that India, as a strong advocate of nuclear disarmament, should push for a demilitarized and nuclear-free Arctic. Others frame India’s interests in the context of regional rivalries, particularly with China, and potential impacts on Indian security from the “new Great Game” emerging in the Arctic. Another emerging Indian narrative argues that India should avoid the role of a “revisionist actor” and, instead, can benefit from engaging in established governance fora like the Arctic Council, improving its understanding of emerging Arctic political, economic, and strategic dynamics, and partnering with Arctic states on science and resource development. This narrative situates India in an emerging Arctic Saga, where enhanced cooperation and coordination with Arctic states (particularly Norway and Russia) can serve India’s national and international interests—and those of the world’s inhabitants more generally.

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Fig. 1
Fig. 2

Source: Based on data in Iselin Stensdal, Asian Artic Research 2005–2012: Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger (Oslo: Fridtjof Nansen Institute Report 3/2013), 13. Stensdal notes that the largest share of articles concerned atmospheric studies and meteorology (21, or 20 %). The output for geosciences (20, 19 %) and environmental sciences (17, 17 %) was similar. Furthermore, 12 % (12) of the articles related to observations of sea ice using radiometry or other forms of remote sensing

Fig. 3

Source: Iselin Stensdal, Asian Arctic Research 2005–2012: Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger (Oslo: Fridtjof Nansen Institute Report 3/2013), 14

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Notes

  1. Ministry of External Affairs, India and the Arctic, June 10, 2013, http://www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?21812/India+and+the+Arctic.

  2. Per Erik Solli, et al., Coming into the Cold: Asia’s Arctic Interests, 36(4) POLAR GEOGRAPHY 1–18 (2013).

  3. See, for example, Id.; ORAN YOUNG, ET AL., EDS., THE ARCTIC IN WORLD AFFAIRS: A NORTH PACIFIC DIALOGUE ON ARCTIC MARINE ISSUES (2012); Linda Jakobson & Syong-Hong Lee, The North East Asian States’ Interests in the Arctic and Possible Cooperation with the Kingdom of Denmark, REPORT FOR THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK (April 2013), http://www.sipri.org/research/security/arctic/arcticpublications/NEAsia-Arctic.pdf; James Manicom & P. Whitney Lackenbauer, East Asian States, the Arctic Council and International Relations in the Arctic, (Ctr. for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Policy Brief No. 26, 16 April 2013), http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2013/4/east-asian-states-arctic-council-and-international-relations-arctic.

  4. Shyam Saran, Why the Arctic Ocean is Important to India, BUS. STD., 12 Jun. 2011, http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/shyam-saran-why-the-arctic-ocean-is-important-to-india-111061200007_1.html.

  5. For an interesting recent study on this subject, see Rebecca Pincus & Saleem H. Ali, Have you been to ‘The Arctic’? Frame Theory and the Role of Media Coverage in Shaping Arctic Discourse, 39(2) POLAR GEOGRAPHY 83–97 (2016).

  6. UTTAM KUMAR SINHA, CLIMATE CHANGE NARRATIVES: THE ARCTIC (2013) 74. See also Sinha, The Arctic: An Antithesis, 37(1) STRATEGIC ANALYSIS (2013) 34–39; Sinha, Arctic: A Paradox and Antithesis, in ASIA AND THE ARCTIC: NARRATIVES, PERSPECTIVES AND POLICIES 15–26 (Vijay Sakhuja & Kapil Narula eds., 2016).

  7. Shastri Ramachandaran, India’s Arctic Victory: A major Diplomatic Achievement, DNA INDIA, May 21, 2013, http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/1837429/column-india-s-arctic-victory-a-major-diplomatic-achievement.

  8. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India and the Arctic, Jun. 10, 2013, http://www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?21812/India+and+the+Arctic. Although India has not adopted an official national strategy or policy on the Arctic, a recent edited volume by Indian scholars suggests that this document should be considered the clearest “articulation of the Indian government on the Arctic.” Appendix B: Asian Countries’ Positions on the Arctic, in ASIA AND THE ARCTIC: NARRATIVES, PERSPECTIVES AND POLICIES 133 (Vijay Sakhuja & Kapil Narula eds., 2016).

  9. SINHA, supra note 6, at 34–35.

  10. Elana Wilson Rowe, A Dangerous Space? Unpacking State and Media Discourses on the Arctic, 36(3) POLAR GEOGRAPHY 234 (Oct. 2012).

  11. Global Business Network (GBN), The Future of Arctic Marine Navigation in Mid-Century, [Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) Working Group, May 2008].

  12. Id.

  13. Vijay Sakhuja, The Evolving Indian Narrative, 8(1) INDIAN FOREIGN AFF. J. 13 (2013). On how Indian policy discourse has yet to produce a coherent or “dominant” opinion on the country’s place in Arctic affairs, see P. Whitney Lackenbauer, India’s Emerging Arctic Interests, in ARCTIC YEARBOOK 2013, 1–24 (Lassi Heininen ed., 2013) which critically examining the writings of five Indian commentators on Arctic affairs.

  14. Quoted in Meena Menon & Sandeep Dikshit, India Gets Observer Status in Arctic Council, THE HINDU, May 15, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/india-gets-observer-status-in-arctic-council/article4717770.ece.

  15. Shailesh Nayak, Balancing Development and Environmental Concerns in the Arctic, in ASIA AND THE ARCTIC: NARRATIVES, PERSPECTIVES AND POLICIES 27–28 (Vijay Sakhuja & Kapil Narula eds., 2016).

  16. See, for example, Uttam Kumar Sinha & Arvind Gupta, The Arctic and India: Strategic Awareness and Scientific Engagement, 38 (6) STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 872–885 (2014); Sinha, supra note 6, at 23.

  17. See, for example, Vijay Sakhuja, China’s Arctic Calculus and Iceland (SSPC Issue Brief, Sept. 2011); Ministry of External Affairs, supra note 1.

  18. KLAUS DODDS, GEOPOLITICS IN ANTARCTICA: VIEWS FROM THE SOUTHERN OCEANIC RIM (1997) 135–155; SANJAY CHATURVEDI, THE DAWNING OF ANTARCTICA (1990) 161–162. India initiated research in Antarctica in 1981 and established a research station on the southern continent two years later. Some Indian commentators also point to Lokmanya Bâl Gangâdhar Tilak’s 1903 book The Arctic Home in the Vedas, which suggests that the North Pole was the home of Aryans eight thousand years ago before they moved to India, as another link between India and the Arctic. Sergey Lavrov, India goes to the Arctic, RUSSIAN INT’L AFFAIRS COUNCIL, Apr. 6, 2012, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=281#top; Sanjay Chaturvedi, Tiffin Talk: Geopolitics of Climate Change in the Arctic: Emerging Indian Perspectives, AUSTRALIA INDIA INSTITUTE, May 9, 2013, http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/events/tiffin-talk-geopolitics-climate-change-arctic-emerging-indian-perspectives-dr-sanjay; Uttam Kumar Sinha, India and the ‘Age of the Arctic, 8 INDIAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS J. 27 (2013).

  19. A few Indian commentators acknowledge this reality. See, for example, H.P. Rajan, Arctic Governance Issues: India should Take a Lead Role, 8 INDIAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS J. 39 (2013).

  20. P. Sunderarajan, New Indian research station at the Arctic, THE HINDU, Jul. 2, 2008; Shailesh Nayak, Polar Research in India, 37(4) INDIAN J. MARINE SC. 352–357 (2008); National Centre for Antarctic and Ocean Research (NCAOR), Ny Alesund Science Plan, http://www.ncaor.gov.in/arctics/display/123-ny-alesund-science-plan; S. Rajan & K.P. Krishnan, India’s Scientific Endeavours in the Arctic, in ASIA AND THE ARCTIC: NARRATIVES, PERSPECTIVES AND POLICIES 43–48 (Vijay Sakhuja & Kapil Narula eds., 2016) (who describe India’s “initial footsteps” in the region as “spectacular, to say the least”).

  21. Digambar Kamat Inaugurates Meeting on Polar Sciences, THE HINDU, Aug. 26, 2011. http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-karnataka/article2398984.ece; K. S. Sudhi, Indian Researchers Exploring the Arctic, THE HINDU, Jun. 16, 2016, http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/science/Indian-researchers-exploring-the-Arctic/article14429926.ece; Kabir Taneja, North Pole to the Third Pole: Following Climate Change Debate from the Arctic to the Himalayas, DNA India, Feb. 10, 2016, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-north-pole-to-the-third-pole-following-climate-change-debate-from-the-arctic-to-the-himalayas-2175894.

  22. Government of India, Minister of Environment and Forests, India’s Position on Climate Change Issues, Jul. 4, 2009, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=49738. The Indian government has pledged to engage actively in UNFCCC negotiations and to adopt an approach consist with India’s “role as a responsible and enlightened member of the international community.” See Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, National Action Plan on Climate Change, Jun. 30, 2008, http://pmindia.gov.in/climate_change_english.pdf. However idealistic its rhetoric, India has not proven willingness to sacrifice economic growth for practical global climate change action.

  23. See, for example, Architesh Panda, Assessing Vulnerability to Climate Change in India, 44 (16) ECON. & POL. WEEKLY 105–107 (2009); Sidharth Pandey, Indian Monsoon and the Arctic Connection, NDTV, Jul. 30, 2013, http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/indian-monsoon-and-the-arctic-connection-398707; Dinesh C. Sharma, Stakes in the Arctic are High, INDIA TODAY, Jun. 15, 2013, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/stakes-in-the-arctic-are-high/1/280258.html; Amar Tejaswi, Arctic Ice Melt Can Affect Climate in India, Say Experts, DECCAN CHRONICLE, Nov. 22, 2013, http://www.deccanchronicle.com/131122/news-current-affairs/article/arctic-ice-melt-can-affect-climate-india-say-experts.

  24. Neil Gadihoke, Arctic Melt: The Outlook for India, 8(1) MARITIME AFFAIRS 7–8, 11, (2012).

  25. Kishore Kumar, Push for a ‘Global Commons’ Theory”, 8 (1) INDIAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS JOURNAL 21 (2012).

  26. Arvind Gupta, India’s Gains from Arctic Council, THE NEW INDIAN EXPRESS, Jul. 16, 2013. http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Indias-gains-from-Arctic-Council/2013/07/31/article1709960.ece.

  27. The Norwegian Minister for Research and Education, Tora Aasland, explained in 2011 that “India has been doing polar research for many years, not the least because of the Himalayas, the third pole. And Indian research in polar questions, like air pollution, ocean pollution, changes in the glaciers and changes in the behaviour of animals, are the ones that Norway is also interested in. And that’s the reason why the two nations have found each other.” Quoted in Ramesh Ramachandran, India, Norway for Joint Polar Research, THE HINDU, Feb. 7, 2011. See also Sidharth Pandey, India to Expand Engagement in the Arctic,” NDTV, Jun.13, 2013, http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/india-to-expand-engagement-in-the-arctic-379182.

  28. Iselin Stensdal, Asian Arctic Research 2005–2012: Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger (Fridtjof Nansen Institute Report 3/2013) 13–16.

  29. Chaturvedi, supra note 17. See also Sinha, supra note 6, for similar logic.

  30. See, for example, Shyam Saran, India’s Stake in Arctic Cold War, THE HINDU, Feb. 28, 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/indias-stake-in-arctic-cold-war/article2848280.ece; and Prerna Madan, Why You Should be Concerned About Oil Exploration in the Arctic, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Jul. 5, 2015, http://www.hindustantimes.com/world/why-you-should-be-concerned-about-oil-exploration-in-the-arctic/story-kLqw9cfSCUbQB6JWLtkkbP.html.

  31. Shyam Saran, India’s Date With the Arctic, THE HINDU, Jul. 16, 2013.

  32. India taking Interest in Russia’s Arctic Wealth, RUSSIAN RADIO, Dec. 26, 2012, http://indian.ruvr.ru/_print/99335441.html; Sandeep Dikshit, India Gets Observer Status in Arctic Council, THE HINDU, May 16, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/india-gets-observer-status-in-arctic-council/article4719263.ece. See also Jyoti Prasad Das, India and China in the Arctic, 24 FOREIGN POLICY J. Jul. 24, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2013/07/24/india-and-china-in-the-arctic/; Kabir Taneja, Moscow: India’s Ticket to the Energy Riches of the Arctic, PRAGATI: THE INDIAN NATIONAL INTEREST REV., Apr. 4, 2014, http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2014/04/moscow-indias-ticket-to-the-energy-riches-of-the-arctic/; Uttam Kumar Sinha, India Must Take Advantage of Moscow’s Leverage in the Arctic Region, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Dec. 9, 2014, http://www.hindustantimes.com/ht-view/india-must-take-advantage-of-moscow-s-leverage-in-the-arctic-region/story-KmCi7zcLGKHlludlvGmD9I.html; Anil Sasi, Russia Energy Ties: India Hits the Gas, THE INDIAN EXPESS, Jul. 11, 2015, http://indianexpress.com/ article/business/business-others/russia-energy-ties-india-hits-the-gas/.

  33. Vijay Sakhuja, The Changing Arctic—Asian Response, 7(1) INDIAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS J. 71 (2012).

  34. Sakhuja, China: Breaking into the Arctic Ice, INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS (ICWA), Apr. 2010; Sakhuja, China and India Compete for Energy in the Arctic, INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS, August 19, 2010.

  35. Dhanasree Jayaram, India Reaches North for Energy Options as Arctic Ice Slowly Melts Away, GLOBAL TIMES, Jan. 16, 2014. See also Taneja, supra note 32.

  36. Vladimir Radyuhin, Russia Begins Oil Production in the Arctic,” THE HINDU, Dec. 21, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/russia-begins-oil-production-in-the-arctic/article5487104.ece; Sanjay Chaturvedi, India's Arctic Engagement: Challenges and Opportunities, 18 (1) ASIA POLICY 73–79, (2014); ONGC Videsh, IOC, Oil India Sign Deals to Access Russia’s Lucrative Hydrocarbons Sector, FIRSTPOST.COM, Dec. 25, 2015, http://www.firstpost.com/business/ongc-videsh-ioc-oil-india-sign-deals-to-access-russias-lucrative-hydrocarbons-sector-2559852.html; Atle Staalesen, A Role for India in Russian Arctic, BARENTS OBSERVER, Oct. 18, 2016.

  37. Sinha, supra note 6, at 29.

  38. See, for example, Shebonti Ray Dadwal, Arctic: The Next Great Game in Energy Geopolitics?, 38(6) STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 812–824 (2014); Vijay Sakhuja, Why Russia May Find No Asian Support for Arctic Bailout, NIKKEI ASIA REV. Jan. 23, 2015.

  39. James Henderson Julia Loe, The Prospects and Challenges for Arctic Oil Development, 14 OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. J. (2016); Graça Ermida, Strategic Decisions of International Oil Companies: Arctic Versus Other Regions,” 2(3) ENERGY STRATEGY REV. 265–272 (2014); Kathrin Keil, The Arctic: A New Region Of Conflict? The Case Of Oil And Gas, 49 COOPERATION & CONFLICT 162 (2014); Øistein Harsem et al., Factors Influencing Future Oil and Gas Prospects in the Arctic, 12 ENERGY POLICY 8037–8045 (2011); Lars Lindholt & Solveig Glomsrød, The Arctic: No Big Bonanza for the Global Petroleum Industry, 34 ENERGY ECON. 1465–1474 (2012).

  40. SINHA, supra note 6, at 38–39.

  41. Oran R. Young, The Arctic in Play: Governance in a Time of Rapid Change,” 24(2) INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 426–28 (2009).

  42. Amit Narang, IDSA-PRIO Roundtable on “Governance and Resource Use: The Case of the Arctic, Nov. 19, 2012, www.prio.no/utility/Download.ashx?x=313. James Manicom & P. Whitney Lackenbauer, East Asian States and the Pursuit of Arctic Council Membership, in EAST-ASIA-ARCTIC RELATIONS: BOUNDARY, SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 199–216 (Ken Coates & Kimie Hara eds., 2014); Manicom & Lackenbauer, Asian States and the Arctic: National Perspectives on Regional Governance, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICS OF THE ARCTIC 517–532 (Leif Christian Jensen & Geir Hønnelan. Cheltenham, 2015).

  43. Arvind Gupta, Commentary: Geopolitical Implications of Arctic Meltdown, 33 (2) STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 177 (2009). For a comparative legal overview of the polar regions, see DONALD ROTHWELL, THE POLAR REGIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996).

  44. This provoked an uneasy alliance between the British Commonwealth and Latin America which shared common concerns that a UN resolution would undermine their claims and could set a dangerous precedent for UN control over sovereignty territory. Adrian Howkins, Defending polar empire: opposition to India’s proposal to raise the ‘Antarctic Question’ at the United Nations in 1956, 44 POLAR RECORD 35–44 (2008).

  45. Klaus Dodds, Post-colonial Antarctica: An Emerging Engagement,” 42 POLAR RECORD 59–70 42 (2006).

  46. KLAUSS DODDS, GEOPOLITICS OF ANTARCTICA: VIEWS FROM THE SOUTHERN OCEANIC RIM 143 (1997).

  47. Anita Dey, India in Antarctica: Perspectives, Programmes, and Achievements, 29 (2) INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 176 (1992). See also Peter J. Beck, India In Antarctica: Science—and Politics—On Ice, 306 NATURE 106–107, (Nov. 10, 1983).

  48. Dey, supra note 47, at 173.

  49. Saran, supra note 30. Although Saran acknowledges the basic differences between Antarctica (a continent) and the Arctic (an ocean), he quickly notes that both are covered in a thick layer of ice, hold vast hydrocarbon and mineral reserves, and are threatened by global warming. Given these similarities, Saran suggested that “what happens in the Arctic may well trigger a negative change in the Antarctic”—a disconcerting prospect to India given its longstanding interest in the southern continent.

  50. The language of the “common heritage of mankind,” a principle of international law suggesting that certain territorial areas should be held in trust for all humanity and protected from national or corporate exploitation, is deeply engrained in India’s approach to Antarctic governance. For example, Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee proclaimed in 2007 that the southern continent “being a common heritage of mankind and the foremost symbol of peaceful use and cooperation needs to be protected for posterity.” As Sanjay Chaturvedi observes, this concept finds favour with Indians who believe that their country should “act as a major catalyst for critical post-colonial engagement with the southern polar region” and democratization of the Antarctic Treaty System “in the best interests of entire humankind. “See Sanjay Chaturvedi, India and Antarctica: Towards Post-Colonial Engagement?” in THE EMERGING POLITICS OF ANTARCTICA 50 (Anne-Marie Brady, ed., 2012).

  51. Saran, supra note 30.

  52. Saran, supra note 4; Saran, supra note 30.

  53. Nuuk Declaration on the occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council, 12 May 2011, Nuuk, Greenland, available at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/5-declarations. Observers are expected to contribute to the working groups and may, at the discretion of the respective chair, make statements and submit documents. At ministerial meetings, observers can submit written statements but can only propose projects through an Arctic state or PP. Furthermore, the level of financial contribution provided by the observer to a working group or project may not exceed that provided by the Arctic states, unless permitted by the Senior Arctic Officials. Furthermore, observer status is subject to review every four years, at which time observer states are expected to reiterate their interest in retaining this status and to share information about their activities in and contributions to the Council. For a critical look at these criteria from a Chinese perspective, see Peiqing Guo, An Analysis of New Criteria for Permanent Observer Status on the Arctic Council and the Road of Non-Arctic States to Arctic, 4(2) KMI INTER’L. J. MARITIME AFFAIRS & FISHERIES 21–38 (2012).

  54. For introductions to the Arctic Council, see Timo Koivurova & David Vander Zwaag, The Arctic Council at 10 Years: Retrospect and Prospects, 40(1) UBC L. REV. 121–194 (2007); Koivurova, Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council in a Rapidly Changing Scene of Arctic Governance, 46 POLAR RECORD 146–156 (2009); Paula Kankaanpää & Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of the Arctic Council, 31 POLAR RESEARCH 1–14 (2012).

  55. See, for example, Hans Corell, Reflections on the Possibilities and Limitations of a Binding Legal Regime for the Arctic, 37 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 321–324, (2007); Rob Huebert & Brooks Yeager, A New Sea: The Need for a Regional Agreement on Management and Conservation of the Arctic Marine Environment, PANDA.ORG (2008), http://wwf.panda.org/?122260/A-New-Sea-The-Need-for-a-Regional-Agreement-on-Management-and-Conservation-of-the-Arctic-Marine-Environment; European Parliament Resolution on Arctic Governance, P6_TA(2008)04749, Oct. 2008; Young, supra note 43, at 434–441. These recommendations led the five coastal states to issue the Illulisat Declaration in 2008.

  56. Saran, supra note 30.

  57. Kumar, supra note 25, at 14–22.

  58. Sakhuja, Arctic Circle: Challenging Exclusivity, 29 INST. PEACE & CONFLICT STUD., Apr. 2013, http://sspconline.org/opinion/ArcticCircle_ChallengingExclusivity_29042013; Sakhuja, India and China in the Arctic: Breaching the Monopoly, 18 INST. PEACE & CONFLICT STUD., May 2013, http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/india-and-china-in-the-arctic-breaching-the-monopoly-3936.html.

  59. P.K. Gautam, The Arctic as a Global Common,” IDSA Issue Brief, INST. DEFENCE STUD. & ANALYSES, Sept. 2, 2011, http://idsa.in/system/files/IB_TheArcticasaGlobalCommon.pdf.

  60. Neil Gadihoke, The Arctic Council: Emerging Contours, NATIONAL MARITIME FOUNDATION, Jul. 13, 2012, http://www.maritimeindia.org/article/arctic-council-emerging-contours.html.

  61. Rajan, supra note 19, at 32–39. See also Rajan, The Legal Regime of the Arctic and India’s Role and Options, 38 (6) STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 904–912 (2014).

  62. Devirupa Mitra, Taking Cue from China, India Eyeing Arctic Region, THE NEW INDIAN EXPRESS, Oct. 2 2012.

  63. Kabir Taneja, Indian Arrives at the Arctic, N. Y. T. May 20, 2013, reproduced on the Ministry of External Affairs website.

  64. For Western examples, see ROB HUEBERT, ET. AL., CLIMATE CHANGE & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: THE ARCTIC AS A BELLWEATHER (2012); ROGER HOWARD, ARCTIC GOLD RUSH: THE NEW RACE FOR TOMORROW’S NATURAL RESOURCES (2010); Richard Sale & Evgenii Potapov, THE SCRAMBLE FOR THE ARCTIC: OWNERSHIP, EXPLOITATION AND CONFLICT IN THE FAR NORTH (2010); Scott Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 63–77 (March/April 2008).

  65. See, for example, Ian G. Brosnan, et al., Cooperation or conflict in a changing Arctic? 42/1–2 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L. L. 173–210 (2011); Frédéric Lasserre, et al., Is There an Arms Race in the Arctic? J. MILITARY & 14 (3&4) STRATEGIC STUD. 1–56 (2012); CHRISTIAN LE MIÈRE & JEFFREY MAZO, ARCTIC OPENING: INSECURITY AND OPPORTUNITY (2013); ROLF TAMNES & KRISTINE OFFERDAL, GEOPOLITICS AND SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC: REGIONAL DYNAMICS IN A GLOBAL WORLD (2014); Annika Nilsson &Timo Koivurova, Transformational Change and Regime Shifts in the Circumpolar Arctic, 7(2) ARCTIC REV. L. & POL. 179–195, (2016).

  66. See, for example, Vijay Sakhuja, Northern Sea Route and Russia’s Resource Exploitation Strategy, ICWA ISSUE BRIEF, Jul. 29, 2010; Sinha & Gupta, supra note 16, at 880–881; Dadwal, supra note 38, at 814–815; Sinha, supra note 32.

  67. See, for example, Ambrish Dhaka, The Geopolitics of Energy Security and the Responses to its Challenges by India and Germany, 14(2) GEOPOLITICS 278–299, (2009).

  68. Elana Wilson Rowe & Helge Blakkisrud, A New Kind of Arctic Power? Russia’s Policy Discourses and Diplomatic Practices in the Circumpolar North, 19(1) GEOPOLITICS 69 (2014).

  69. Taneja, supra note 32. See also Tatyana Shaumyan & Valeriy Zhuravel, India and the Arctic: Environment, Economy and Politics, 24 ARCTIC & NORTH 153–161, (2016).

  70. Chaturvedi, supra note 18.

  71. See, for example, the landmark Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment produced by the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment working group of the Arctic Council. For a sophisticated study on scenarios for navigability, see Laurence C. Smith & Scott R. Stephenson, New Trans-Arctic Shipping Routes Navigable by Midcentury, 110 (13) PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4871–4872 (2013).

  72. Sinha, supra note 18, at 29.

  73. Gautam, supra note 59, at 1. Colonel (retired) P.K. Gautam’s discussion of global warming, sovereignty claims, and potential new sea routes draws largely upon general American sources that emphasize geopolitical and security considerations. Accordingly, he produces a highly alarmist portrait of a region on the precipice of conflict. For a critique of his views, see Lackenbauer, supra note 13, at 10–11.

  74. Sarabjeet Singh Parmar, The Arctic: Potential for Conflict Amidst Cooperation, 34 (4) STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 480, 485 (2013).

  75. For example, Sakhuja asserts that “India is a strong advocate of global nuclear disarmament and can play a vital role in promoting the idea of a nuclear free Arctic.” This position flows from India’s support for global nuclear disarmament and for the use of Antarctica for “peaceful purposes only,” where military personnel and equipment are only permissible for scientific research and other peaceful activities. Sakhuja, The Arctic Council: Is There a Case for India, ICWA POLICY BRIEFS, Jul. 13, 2012. See also SINHA, supra note 6, at 77. While the idea of a nuclear-free Arctic deviates from the official positions of Arctic states (several of which rely on strategic deterrent capabilities deployed in the region), it does resonate with some Western disarmament groups and commentators. See, for example, MICHAEL WALLACE & STEVEN STAPLES, RIDDING THE ARCTIC OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A TASK LONG OVERDUE (2010). Sakhuja’s recommendation that the Indian Navy should develop Arctic “sea legs” through training and “ice condition operations,” and his trumpeting of India as “the first Asian country to have obtained some kind of Arctic naval experience” through the Talwar-class frigate INS Teg’s sea trials in “Arctic-like sea conditions” indicates that he is not opposed to non-nuclear military operations in the region. Sakhuja, Indian Navy: Developing ‘Arctic Sea Legs, SOC. STUDY. PEACE & CONFLICT, Oct. 15, 2012, http://www.sspconline.org/opinion/IndianNavyDevelopingArcticSeaLegs_15102012, Sakhuja, supra note 13, 12–13. On the idea of military “spillovers” into an otherwise peaceful region, see K. Narula, Asia and the Arctic: Summary and Takeaways, in ASIA AND THE ARCTIC: NARRATIVES, PERSPECTIVES AND POLICIES 126 (Vijay Sakhuja & Kapil Narula eds., 2016).

  76. Ajai Shukla, Antony Sees Chinese Shipping Bypassing Indian Blockade, BUS. STD., Feb. 28, 2012, http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/antony-sees-chinese-shipping-bypassing-indian-blockade-112022800029_1.html.

  77. Suvi Dogra, India’s Quest for Arctic Ice, INDIAN EXPRESS, May 21, 2013, reproduced in IISS Voices.

  78. Neil Gadihoke, Arctic Melt: The Outlook for India, 8(1) MARITIME AFFAIRS 5–9 (2012). With 80% of China’s imported oil travelling through the Straits of Malacca, a blockade or closure of that route during a conflict could prove both economically and strategically disastrous. Marc Lanteigne, China’s Maritime Security and the “Malacca Dilemma, 4(2) ASIAN SECURITY 143–161 (2008). In November 2003 President Hu Jintao declared that “certain major powers” were bent on controlling the strait, and called for the adoption of new strategies to mitigate the perceived vulnerability. Ian Storey, China’s Malacca Dilemma, CHINA BRIEF, May 17, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31575&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid %5D=196&no_cache=1. Under these circumstances, the prospect of an alternate route (or a number of alternate routes) through the Arctic is particularly appealing.

  79. Sakhuja, The Changing Arctic—Asian Response, 7(1) INDIAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS J. 66 (Jan-Mar 2012).

  80. Sakhuja, supra note 13, at 9.

  81. See, for example, Sakjuja, supra note 34; Sakjuja, supra note 17.

  82. See, for example, Mitra, supra note 62; Associated Press, China and India’s Rivalry Extends to the Arctic, NEW DECCAN HERALD, June 20, 2013; Das, supra note 32; Sasi, supra note 32.

  83. Sean Durns, India Moves on Long-Term Plans for Arctic Investment, GLOBAL RISK INSIGHTS, Dec. 14, 2013, http://globalriskinsights.com/2013/12/14/india-moves-on-long-term-plans-for-arctic-investment/.

  84. Sinha, supra note 18, at 25. Uttam Kumar Sinha, India to Use Sea Route Along Arctic, RUSSIAN RADIO, July 4, 2013, http://indian.ruvr.ru/news/2013_07_04/India-to-use-sea-route-along-Arctic-3910/; UPDATE 2-India’s ONGC Interested in Russia’s Arctic Offshore, REUTERS, Oct.21, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/russia-india-energy-idUSL5N0IB2G020131021; Vladimir Radyuhin, Russia Revives Naval Presence in Arctic, THE HINDU, Sept. 17, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/russia-revives-naval-presence-in-arctic/article5138513.ece; Radyuhin, Upstaging India, China to Get 20% Stake in Russian LNG Project, MEOGRAPH: FOUR-DIMENSIONAL STORYTELLING, June 22, 2013, http://www.meograph.com/online5000/55703/edward-snowden-and-the-nsa-files--story-so-far; Vijay Sakhuja, India and the Arctic: Prospects for Collaboration with Russia, VALDAI CLUB, Jan. 10, 2014. Sanjay Chaturvedi envisages Arctic coastal states’ coast guards “at the forefront of cooperative naval diplomacy to address challenges of common-comprehensive security,” with the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route as possible “sites of cooperation and burden sharing between the Arctic States and Asian stakeholders.” Sanjay Chaturvedi, Geopolitical Transformations: ‘Rising’ Asia and the Future of the Arctic Council, in THE ARCTIC COUNCIL AND ITS PLACE IN THE FUTURE OF ARCTIC GOVERNANCE 240 (Thomas Axworthy et al., eds., 2012).

  85. Shastri Ramachandaran, India at Sea in Arctic Ocean, DNA INDIA, Nov. 11, 2012, http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report-india-at-sea-in-arctic-ocean-1763203.

  86. Solli et al. assess how Arctic states responded to the applications of China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea but overlooks India.

  87. Shastri Ramachandaran, supra note 7; K.P. Nayar, “Fruits of Arctic Success Await Khursid,” THE TELEGRAPH, Jun. 11, 2013.

  88. Nayar, supra note 87. If India had missed the deadline to apply, Nayar suggested, “it would have lost out on a fight for a new frontier like it did in the 1990s when it missed getting into Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) which has become the primary vehicle for trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region.”

  89. Ramachandaran, supra note 7.

  90. See, for example, Solli et al, supra note 2, at 4, 14; Erik Molenaar, Current and Prospective Roles of the Arctic Council System within the Context of the Law of the Sea, 27 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 580 (2012); P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Canada and the Asian Observers to the Arctic Council: Anxiety and Opportunity, 18 (1) ASIA POLICY 22–29 (2014); Matthew Willis & Duncan Depledge, How We Learned to Stop Worrying About China’s Arctic Ambitions: Understanding China’s Admission to the Arctic Council, 2004–2013, in HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICS OF THE ARCTI 759 (Leif Christian Jensen and Geir Hønneland eds., 2015).

  91. See, for example, Dinesh C. Sharma, Frozen Arctic Sea Plays Host to Sino-India Rivalry, INDIA TODAY, Jan. 17, 2012; Kalyan Ray, Resource-Hungry India Seeks a Seat at the Arctic Table, DECCAN HERALD, Jan.15, 2012, http://www.deccanherald.com/cntent/219579/resource-hungry-india-seeks-seat.html%20%20; Nayar, supra note 87; and Sakhuja, supra note 13, at 10–11. Shastri Ramachandaran cited “authoritative sources” confirming that Canada had expressed “bilateral concerns” about India and that Ottawa “proposed to raise these issues” in advance of the Kiruna meeting, but that it did not find Nordic support for its position. Ramachandaran, supra note 7.

  92. Indrani Bagchi, India Gets the Nod to Join Arctic Gold Rush, TIMES OF INDIA, May 16, 2013; Nayar, supra note 87; Ramachandaran, supra note 7; and China, Korea, EU Woo Arctic Council at Norway Conference, NUNATSIAQ NEWS ONLINE, Jan. 22, 2013, www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674china_korea_eu_woo_arctic_council_at_norway_conference/.

  93. Sidharth Pandey, India to Expand Engagement in the Arctic, NDTV.COM, Jun. 13, 2013, http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/india-to-expand-engagement-in-the-arctic-379182. In late 2012, Shastri Ramachandaran surmised that “of the Arctic Five, India’s relations with Denmark are at its worst, and, with friend Russia, disagreements over the aircraft carrier Gorshkov are symptomatic of unresolved issues clouding the atmosphere. India is deeply engaged with the US, but that is unlikely to help its interests in the Arctic. Canada has not been cultivated in this context. That leaves Norway as the one state which can aid and advance the Indian cause, but also help rope in Sweden and Finland. See Ramachandran, supra note 85.

  94. See Piotr Graczyk &Timo Koivurova, A New Era in the Arctic Council’s External Relations? Broader Consequences of the Nuuk Observer Rules for Arctic Governance, 50(3) POLAR RECORD 225–236 (2014).

  95. See, for example, Lisa Gregoire, Arctic Council Should be Cautious about New Observer Hopefuls: Inuit Org President, NUNATSIAQ ONLINE, Feb. 1, 2013, www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/ 65674arctic_council_ should_be _cautious_ about_new_observer_hopefuls_inuit_or/; James Manicom & Whitney Lackenbauer, East Asian States and the Pursuit of Arctic Council Observer Status, in EAST- ASIA-ARCTIC RELATIONS: BOUNDARY, SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 201 (Ken Coates & Kimie Hara eds., 2014).

  96. Chaturvedi, supra note 18. In this talk, Chaturvedi indicates a deep Indian connection to the post-colonial aspirations of indigenous people, he quotes a colleague wary of the category of “indigenous peoples” from an Indian perspective, adding that “I think they have a point.” He does not elaborate on this comment, simply adding that “both India and China have to engage with the issue of cultural geography in the Arctic even if the category of indigenous peoples turns out to be somewhat problematic.” On the need to engage with the “lived in geographies of the Circumpolar North”; see also Chaturvedi, China and India in the ‘Receding’ Arctic: Rhetoric, Routes and Resources, 17 JADAVPUR J. INT’L. RELATIONS 62 (2013).

  97. Nayar, supra note 87.

  98. Solli et al, supra note 2, at 12.

  99. Dogra, “India’s quest for Arctic ice.” US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries David Balton dispelled myths about India’s potential Arctic Council membership in 2011 and had indicated that India could best contribute to issues like shipping through the International Maritime Organization. See India Might Become an Observer of Arctic Council: US, DECCAN HERALD, May 10, 2011.

  100. Solli et al, supra note 2, at 12.

  101. Ministry of External Affairs, India Welcomes Decision of the Arctic Council Admitting it as an Observer State, May 15, 2013, http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/21706/India+welcomes+decision+of+the+ Arctic+Council+ admitting+it+as+an+Observer+State.

  102. Nayar, supra note 87.

  103. Ramachandaran, supra note 7. Contrast this with the narrative of China and India “competing” for observer status in articles such as Shubhajit Roy, It’s India Vs China for ‘Observer Status’ at Arctic Council, THE INDIAN EXPRESS, Apr. 13, 2013.

  104. See Philip Steinberg & Klaus Dodds, The Arctic Council after Kiruna, 51(1) POLAR RECORD 108 (2015); Lackenbauer, supra note 90; Piotr Graczyk, et al., Preparing for the Global Rush: The Arctic Council, Institutional Norms, and Socialisation of Observer Behaviour,” in GOVERNING ARCTIC CHANGE: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 121 (Kathrin Keil & Sebastian Knecht, eds., 2017).

  105. SINHA, supra note 6, at 74–75.

  106. Shyam Saran, supra note 31.

  107. Young, supra note 43, at 432.

  108. Saran, supra note 30.

  109. Saran, supra note 4.

  110. Id.

  111. Saran, supra note 30.

  112. Kevin J. Grove, Insuring ‘Our Common Future?’ Dangerous Climate Change and the Biopolitics of Environmental Security, 15 GEOPOLITICS 536–563, (2010).

  113. Chaturvedi, supra note 50 at, 50–51.

  114. Manjari Chatterjee Miller, India’s Feeble Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May-June 2013; Brett Ryder, Can India become a Great Power? THE ECONOMIST, March 30, 2013.

  115. Richa Sharma, India Drowns in Red Tape as Chinese Ships Break Ice in Arctic, NEW INDIAN EXPRESS, Mar. 9, 2014.

  116. Hari Pulakkat, Geopolitical Race Between India and China, and India’s Vulnerability, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, Oct. 23, 2011.

  117. Teshu Singh, China and the Arctic: Evolving Geopolitics, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES (NAIS) STRATEGIC FORECAST 06 (March 2016).

  118. SINHA, supra note 6, at 38, 80.

  119. Sinha & Gupta, supra note 16, at 877.

  120. Narula, supra note 75, at128–129.

  121. Dogra, supra note 77.

  122. See, for example, Taneja, supra note 63; Meena Menon & Sandeep Dikshit, India Gets Observer Status in Arctic Council, THE HINDU, May 15, 2013.

  123. While Indian commentators often point to China as a proponent of the “South Pole” governance model for the Arctic, Chinese commentators have scaled back any such rhetoric since 2011, downplaying non-scientific research and avoiding formal articulation of an “Arctic Strategy” to avoid alarming the Arctic states. See, for example, Linda Jakobson & Jingchoa Peng, China’s Arctic Aspirations, (SIPRI Policy Paper No. 34, 2012); P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER ET AL, CHINA’S ARCTIC ASPIRATIONS: THE EMERGING INTERESTS OF A “NEAR ARCTIC STATE” AND WHAT THEY MEAN FOR CANADA (2017).

  124. Sanjay Chaturvedi, supra note 96, at 41–68.

  125. Dadwal, supra note 38, at 819.

  126. Taneja, supra note 63. Similarly, Admiral R.K. Dhowan, the Chief of the Indian Naval Staff, wrote in April 2016 that “India’s approach to the Arctic is underscored by a quest for cooperation both in pursuing scientific studies and seeking commercial initiatives.” R.K. Dhowan, Foreword, in ASIA AND THE ARCTIC: NARRATIVES, PERSPECTIVES AND POLICIES (Vijay Sakhuja & Kapil Narula, eds., 2016).

  127. See, for example, Sinha, supra note 6, at 38–39. For a perspective encouraging India to uphold the integrity of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and to work within the existing Arctic governance regime, see Rajan, supra note 61, at 911.

  128. For a compelling recent commentary on the implications of Arctic change for India, see Shyam Saran, Climate Change: Warning Signals from the Ends of the Earth, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Jan. 12, 2017, http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/climate-change-warning-signals-from-the-ends-of-the-earth/story-JnVhi6hLi5LyOPKM1xDFkL.html.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Lance Hadley and Ryan Dean for timely research assistance, as well as the Chanchlani India Policy Centre at the University of Waterloo and the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada for financial support. Grants from the Centre for International Governance Innovation and Arcticnet facilitated research on Asian interests in the Arctic more generally.

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Whitney Lackenbauer, P. India and the arctic: revisionist aspirations, arctic realities. Jindal Global Law Review 8, 23–54 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41020-017-0040-4

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