Abstract
Proponents of Veritism believe that truth is the sole non-instrumental epistemic good. This view is often taken to entail that all truths should be of equal epistemic value. Hence, it is put under stress by the presence of trivial truths: truths to which we attach relatively little or no epistemic value. Pritchard, in the defense of Veritism, has tried to argue that the best way to understand the implications of Veritism is to think in terms of how an intellectually virtuous inquirer would pursue truth. Furthermore, he thinks that such an inquirer would prefer weighty truths and set aside trivial ones. As such, he thinks that our epistemic disregard for trivial truths is just to be expected given Veritism. We argue that Pritchard’s defense of Veritism fails, and the problem of trivial truths remains a significant challenge for Veritism.
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Notes
Pritchard often uses the word “final” in place of “non-instrumental.”
Pritchard sometimes calls the view Veritism (2016; 2021c) and sometimes Epistemic Value Truth Monism (or, EVTM in short) (2021a; 2022).
The problem seems to have been raised by multiple philosophers seemingly independently of each other. See (Treanor, 2014, 552–3) for some notable sources of this complaint.
While Pritchard seem to suggest the cardinality approach here it is quite clearly not his final position. His final position, where he explicitly rejects measuring truths in number of true beliefs, should become apparent in the next section.
Pritchard (2014) had already made the same point.
We think one should set aside Treanor’s argument. If we accept that there is an infinite amount of truth, then we should simply not think that the complement of the pamphlet has more truth than the complement of the encyclopedia. Then, even though the pamphlet has less truth than the encyclopedia, their complements would then each still have an infinite amount of truth. But, if we do not accept that there is an infinite amount of truth, then we do not see why it should be accepted that the complements will have an infinite number of truths. A proponent of the cardinality approach would need to admit that only if it is a commitment of the approach that a finite amount of truth may break down into an infinite number of truths. It is likely false that the cardinality approach has any such commitment and even if it is true, it is not straightforwardly so to be accepted without further argument.
This is essentially a shift to a strong virtue theory in epistemology, characterized by a “right to left” priority, in Blackburn’s (2001) sense.
We have summarized Pritchard here from multiple sources, namely (Pritchard, 2021a, b, c, 2022). The best single presentation of Pritchard views represented here is perhaps (Pritchard, 2021a, Sect. titled "Veritism and the Motivational Component of Intellectual Virtue"). In putting this summary together, we have tried to be as faithful as possible. But, as is the nature of summarizing, some details have been glossed or abstracted over. Yet we believe the summary here is accurate; accurate in fundamental respects that is.
Pritchard (2021a, 5517) says:
What is puzzling about the dialectical set-up of the trivial truths problem is that even though it is used to critique EVTM, it seems to nonetheless implicitly appeal to it, or at least something very like it anyway. After all, is not the reason that one would value the significant truth far more than the trivial truth in this example precisely because one cares about the truth?
Pritchard here is inviting us to think of aiming for the truth in analogy with a mapmaker’s desire for accuracy. In either case, the aim is to get an accurate representation of the represented reality/terrain: “While the mapmaking analogy is ultimately just a metaphor, in that the intellectually virtuous subject is not literally making a map of the world with their beliefs, it is also not far off from what is in fact the case. For what is a system of beliefs but a kind of system of representation that enables one to navigate reality?” (Pritchard, 2021b, 13).
We shall make a suggestion of this kind ourselves later in the paper.
As Sosa (2001, 49) puts it: “Only through believing it does one relevantly have a truth: We have the truth that snow is white by believing that snow is white. In pursuing the truth what we want is (at least) true beliefs”.
Pritchard (2022, 9) considers the problem of trivial truths to be “a core complaint” of those rejecting Veritism.
Pritchard himself (2021b, 6) makes essentially the same point against thinking of importance as an epistemic good in responding to the trivial truths problem.
In fact, not just the interest in navigating reality but also other non-epistemic considerations must be implicitly at play here if the insignificance problem is to be adequately addressed. For, the interest in navigating reality does not by itself sanction zeroing in on only those truths that allow a grasp of the fundamental aspects of reality. If there are no other constraints in play, then the interest in navigating reality is served equally well if the set of truths you grasp also contain trivial truths in addition to all the weighty ones.
See footnote 8.
To be clear, we are not suggesting that one follow this path, only that such a path is what may need to be followed if one is to hold on to Veritism.
To give one example from a source already mentioned, Sosa (2001, 49), in explaining how to aim for truths is to want beliefs that are true, says: “We have the truth that snow is white by believing that snow is white.” Here, Sosa in using “truth” is referring to the fact of snow’s being white.
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Shukla, A., Bora, M. Pritchard on Veritism and Trivial Truths. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-024-00329-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-024-00329-0