Abstract
This research study postulates an argument aimed at disputing the conception that determinism intrinsically entails the inevitability or unchangability of events. It claims that within our world, there exist events that are, in fact, avoidable. To defend this claim, the paper draws upon the evolutionary foundation established by cognitive philosopher Daniel C. Dennett. According to Dennett, the phenomenon of natural selection has bestowed human beings with the capability to avoid specific events by reducing the pervasiveness of inevitable events over time. Nevertheless, a crucial query arises while recognizing the existence of avoidance-capable entities within a Toy deterministic world, such as John Conway’s “Game of Life.” The existence of such entities puts forward the presence of a practical expression of free will, despite the allegedly deterministic nature of the world. Dennett, a staunch proponent of naturalism, endeavors to demonstrate that determinism is not inherently problematic and does not pose a significant threat to our free existence. Anchored in compatibilism, Dennett argues that determinism and freedom can coexist, with the emergence of evolution enabling human beings to possess the capacity for avoidance within a so-called deterministic world. Thus, the prime intention of this paper is to exhibit an extensive analysis exemplifying that determinism does not diminish our notion of free will. To achieve this objective, the paper seeks to debunk prevailing misconceptions about determinism by employing a toy model wherein simplistic entities can evolve and acquire the ability to avoid harm, which can also be reflected in human life. Moreover, the paper endeavors to establish that the conventional association between determinism and inevitability is flawed, as the notion of inevitability should be attributed to the design level rather than the physical level of any system.
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Notes
Free will and determinism are thought to be mutually compatible, and it is possible to have both beliefs without being illogically contradictory, according to compatibilism. For compatibilists, freedom can exist or not in certain circumstances for reasons unrelated to metaphysics.
Dennett defined “toy model” to show that in the huge expanse of possible arrangements of matter, there exist some substances that preserve better than others, as they have been designed to escape harm, in spite of determinism being true.
Dennett emphasizes that chess-playing computers and the Game of Life are analogous to agents in this context. Additionally, he shifts the perspective and claims that the entities that resemble the Game of Life and chess-playing computers are agents. In other words, rather than the other way around, he sees agents as being similar to these simulations.
Natural selection is Charles Darwin’s theory of how particular favorable features in a population become more habitual over time because of their survival and reproductive benefits. It is a rudimentary conception in evolutionary biology, driving species adaptation and diversity.
Dennett claims that the “epistemic” level denotes the perspective from which we comprehend and account for the behavior of the agent, stressing their intents, beliefs, desires, and mental states. It entails taking a deliberate position to explain and forecast performance in light of the agent’s internal mental state and motivation. This perspective aids in our understanding of complex behaviors and decision-making processes, especially when addressing higher-order phenomena like human consciousness and free will.
John Horton Conway created the mathematical simulation and model known as John Conway’s Game of Life in 1970. The system’s infinite two-dimensional grid contains square cells that can either be alive or dead. Dennett focuses on how complex actions can develop from simple regulation by using “The Game of Life” as a concrete example. It also demonstrates how interactions between fundamental physical components can lead to higher-level phenomena like human consciousness and decision-making.
In this context, the notion of “evitability” indicates the ability to prevent undesirable events in the determined world. It is referring to the belief that the bounded rationality of the organism (limited rational thinking) has led to the notion that particular outcomes can be avoided or prevented.
Dennett understood “epistemic openness” to mean that even in a deterministic universe, people can engage in rational inquiry, critically assess claims and evidence, and adjust their beliefs in light of new information.
The term “agential state,” also known as an intentional state, refers to a mental state or psychological phenomenon of an agent, such as a human being, that contains desires, beliefs, intentions, or other mental states that affect their behavior and decision-making processes. It is a mental state that controls how the actor behaves and is crucial to understanding and explaining human behavior within the context of intentional psychology.
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Basumatary, D. Does Determinism imply Inevitability? A Dennettian Counter analysis. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 40, 259–286 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-023-00308-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-023-00308-x